Egitto Moderno & Contemporaneo

1. Egitto Moderno & Contemporaneo Lezione 3: Da Nasser a Sadat

2. 1961-67 • Populism: Welfare – education, land reform, heavy industrialization and ‘full employment’ in public sector • Al-Mithaq al-Watani • What is Arab Socialism? • The Growth of the Public Sector • The Hegemony of State Burgeoisie . • Five Years Plan

3. Which Development? • ‘The Dogma of Development’. ‘Alternative’ road to development (based on US economist WW Rostow’s theories in fact) provides strong legitimacy for regimes, beyond cohercition and indipendence/revolutionary credentials. • ‘Arab Socialism’ repudiates Class struggle and uses many ‘progressive Muslim’ doctrines in fact. • Militant quasi-Marxist Language (‘5 Years Plan’, ‘socialist trasformation’, etc). Nationalised Factories (Yugoslav example)

4. Politics in an Authoritarian State • Authoritarian regimes are not totalitarian, as they cannot control the whole society, hence the need of constant mobilisation of the masses (Single Party, Political Rallies, Youth Organisations, Charisma of the Leader). • Religious Traditional Authorities Co-opted • Political Islam brutally repressed (S. Qutb killed in 1966) • The Growth of Bureaucracy creates a ‘new class’ of ‘State capitalists’ made of high ranked managers of the nationalised economy (coming from officers). They foster corruption, re-create parassitic capitalism, cause failure of (already not realistic) development plans.

5. Authoritarian Politics: Some Cautionary Notes • Common Representation of ‘all the power in hands of the leader’ can be misleading. • Even in Nasser’s Egypt, the president could not enjoy absolute power, hence the obsession with security, and fear of coups (army, security forces, rural and tribal leaders are all ‘centres of power’).. • Widening of the ‘ruling elite’, with historical evolution (re-inclusion of Religious leaders, land aristocracy in the ‘post-populist’ phase). • ‘State Capitalism’ is, together with international constraints, the main cause of the failure of development policies: corruption, clientelism, elite consumerism.

6. Al-Naksa 1967 • Why the War? • Escalation of Events • Nasser prisoner of his own ‘ideology’ and propaganda. • Syria and Feda’yeen • Yemen Civil War • Not like Suez

7. The Crisis after the Defeat http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6w_v_ueg-4 Political Crisis of: Legitimacy of ‘Progressive Regimes’ (Syr, Irq coup, ‘Amer). Hegemony of Nasser’s Nizam Economic Crisis Cultural Crisis

8. Post 1967 Egypt Khartoum: End of Arab Cold War Acceptance of 242 Resolution, and PLO independent. Army Disastrous Performance War Economy without Suez Revenues Soviet – Gulf Dependence End of Gami’ Qawmi (T. al-Bishri)

9. An Egyptian 1968 • Students’ Movement • More Protagonism (‘war’) than democracy • End of Hegemony • Regime’s Response: • Bayan 30 Maris 1968: • Vague Promise of Opening • Real Opening to the Right and Old Pashas • ASU Group (Sabri)

10. Epilogue? • 1968/69: War of Attrition and Rogers Plan • 1970: Black September • Within USSR Orbit (‘Experts’ welcome) • Internal Dissent (Universities, Factories, the Arts) • Marakiz al-Quwwa in the ASU • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ypESG-4JjZc&feature=player_embedded#!

11. Sadat: In Search of a Legitimacy President ‘by accident’ May 1971: Internal Coup (Sadat vs ASU) 1971 Constitution: Continuation of Bayan Maris? Move to the Right. End of UAR, Shari’a main source. Pan-Arab rhetoric cover the shift. ASU Reform: Widening of Regime Basis Saudi Arabia & Soviet Technicians Qadhafi & al-Asad The Student Movement & Neo-Authoritarianism

12. October 1973 and Sadat’s Egypt • 1973: A war of liberation or negotiation? • Limited War for Limited Results? • End of Isreali Myth and Restoration of Army Pride • The SymbolicCrossing: From Nasser to Sadat and the Beginning of De-Nasserization

13. Sadat’s Egypt: 5 Pillars • The Symbolic Crossing: From Nasser to Sadat and the Beginning of De-Nasserization (in Culture too); • 1. Economic Liberalization (Infitah); • 2. Return to the ‘West’ and Oil Countries (USA vs USSR). • 3. Limited Democratization from Above. • 4. Pacification with Israel and Disengagement from the Arab Front

14. 1. Al-Infitah • What’s in one word. • 1974: Waraqat October • Re-opening to Arab, then foreign sector • Local Bourgeoisie rehabilitated • Welfare

15. 2. Turning North-West? • October and its aftermath • Sadat’s Personal Beliefs • Anti-Communism • 1975/76: Another ‘Ubur • Egyptian Upper Class

16. 3.‘Democratization’ • 1975: an October Gov’t • Old ASU Nasserists • Students and Workers and Intellectuals Dissent • Re-Shaping Society • 1976: al-Manabir • A Flawed Democracy from the Birth

17. Pitfalls on the Way • January 1977 Intifada shows the dramatic failure of Sadat’s economic policies and his reaction illustrates how limited the democratization was. • Sadat’s losing grip on Egyptian Reality • Opposition divided

18. 4. A Trip To Jerusalem (1977) • Internal and Foreign policy Motives • Sadat’s gone too far? • Internal, Regional and International Consequences

19. Growing Isolation at Home • 1979-81: Legalizing Dictatorship (Life Presidency, Parliament Purged from Opposition). • Playing with Fire (Political Islam: Shari’a and Family Code) • The Siege on Civil Society, Culture and The Press • Monologue

20. Another 6 October • Growing Isolation and Incapacity of Admitting Opposition. • Obsession with ‘Red Threat’ • Iranian Syndrome of Egyptian Opposition • Losing Touch with Reality: Sept 1981

21. Cicli storici • Mohammed ‘Ali & Nasser: Fondatore e Ri-fondatore dello Stato • Sadat e Isma’il: ‘traditori’? • Scritture e riscritture storiche tra mito e realtà • Oltre la polemica e il ‘virus’ nazionalista