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Explore the critical role of media in military operations and its impact on public support during conflicts, using NATO's Kosovo Campaign as a case study. Analysis includes the influence of public affairs, media reporting, and the challenges faced by democracies in wartime.
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Did NATO Win the Media War?&Does this matter for C2 research? Pascale Combelles Siegel Independent Consultant CCRP symposium, Monterey, 27 June 2000
The Dilemma • “No matter how brilliantly you fight, what matters is the actual packaging” • Why repeat the same mistakes? • Why haven’t we fully integrated PA into C2 research?
For Democracies in wartime, the media are
An Essential Battlefield • Popular support is key • Democracy rules by popular consent • Erosion of support may end mission • Potential vulnerability • Asymmetrical warfare • Easy and cheap to manipulate
A Difficult Battlefield • Who are “the media”? • Neither partner nor opponent • Multiplying types — not unitary • Some fundamental media rules • The cycle of news • The cycle of punditry • The speed of media reporting
An Understudied Battlefield • Large literature on “military-media relations” (Hotel Warrior, etc…) • Little on the critical importance of media reporting for the conduct of operations • What is there on the role of Public Affairs in operational C2?
NATO Public AffairsandThe Kosovo Campaign A brief overview
NATO Public Affairs • Jamie Shae, the “anti Winston Churchill” • “Total engagement,” • Limited transparency • Isolated • Victim of erroneous assumptions • PA dissociated from ops and intel • Some improvement at mid-course
Yugoslav Approach ... • Undermine NATO’s will to fight • Thwart NATO’s rationale • Exploit “mistakes” and civilian damage • A multi-media campaign • Pictures • Speakers • Internet
The Bottom Line • NATO able to maintain support • Majority supported strikes until the end • Mass deportations strengthened resolve • Demonization of Milosevic worked • Collateral damage had limited impact on popular support • By end of May: use diplomacy, not bombs
However, some reasons for concern • Faulty planning process • Lack of operational information • Fueled debate and controversy • Credibility on the line • National coordination deficient • Different policies/viewpoints • Problems adapting to speed of media reporting — reactive
Some thoughts for the future • PA/Media issues frequently require command attention — resource eater (time) • Some PA C2 issues from Allied Force • Relationship between PA and Operations • Centralized v. decentralized PA operations • Interoperability • Planning process • Military v. media reporting speed
Fig 2. Responsibility for Refugees • Whose actions are more responsible for the large number of ethnic Albanian refugees now leaving Kosovo: The Serbian government 67% The NATO alliance 19% Both equally 4% Neither 1% Don’t know 9% “Special Report: Kosovo: The data,” The Gallup Poll Monthly, nº 402, March 1999, p17.
Fig 4. Evaluation of US policy after Chinese Embassy Incident
Fig 5. Diplomacy and Bombs • Which of the following approaches to reaching a peace agreement in Yugoslavia would you prefer to see the US take? • continue the current military action: 48% • stop the military action and focus on diplomacy: 48% • Neither (vol.) 3% • No opinion: 1%
Fig 5. Diplomacy and Bombs (2) • Please say whether you would approve or disapprove if NATO and the US were to temporarily suspend the strikes and attempt to resolve the matter through negotiations and other means? • Approve: 82% • Disapprove: 15% • No opinion: 3%