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CS 188: Artificial Intelligence Spring 2007

CS 188: Artificial Intelligence Spring 2007. Lecture 21:Reinforcement Learning: I Utilities and Simple decisions 4/10/2007. Srini Narayanan – ICSI and UC Berkeley. Announcments. Othello tournament signup Please send email to cs188@imail.berkeley.edu HW on classification out today

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CS 188: Artificial Intelligence Spring 2007

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  1. CS 188: Artificial IntelligenceSpring 2007 Lecture 21:Reinforcement Learning: I Utilities and Simple decisions 4/10/2007 Srini Narayanan – ICSI and UC Berkeley

  2. Announcments • Othello tournament signup • Please send email to cs188@imail.berkeley.edu • HW on classification out today • Due 4/23 • Can work in pairs

  3. Reinforcement Learning • Basic idea: • Receive feedback in the form of rewards • Agent’s utility is defined by the reward function • Must learn to act so as to maximize expected utility • Change the rewards, change the behavior • Examples: • Playing a game, reward at the end for winning / losing • Vacuuming a house, reward for each piece of dirt picked up • Automated taxi, reward for each passenger delivered

  4. Maximum Expected Utility • MEU: An agent should chose the action which maximizes its expected utility, given its knowledge • General principle for decision making • Often taken as the definition of rationality • Let’s decompress this definition…

  5. Reminder: Expectations • Often a quantity of interest depends on a random variable • The expected value of a function is the average output, weighted by some distribution over inputs • Example: How late will I be? • Lateness is a function of traffic: L(T=none) = -10, L(T=light) = -5, L(T=heavy) = 15 • What is my expected lateness? • Need to specify some belief over T to weight the outcomes • Say P(T) = {none: 2/5, light: 2/5, heavy: 1/5} • The expected lateness:

  6. Expectations • Real valued functions of random variables: • Expectation of a function a random variable • Example: Expected value of a fair die roll

  7. Utilities • Utilities are functions from outcomes (states of the world) to real numbers that describe an agent’s preferences • Where do utilities come from? • In a game, may be simple (+1/-1) • Utilities summarize the agent’s goals • Theorem: any set of preferences between outcomes can be summarized as a utility function (provided the preferences meet certain conditions) • In general, we utilities are determined from rewards and actions emerge to maximize expected utility.

  8. Preferences • An agent chooses among: • Prizes: A, B, etc. • Lotteries: situations with uncertain prizes • Notation:

  9. Rational Preferences • We want some constraints on preferences before we call them rational • For example: an agent with intransitive preferences can be induced to give away all its money • If B > C, then an agent with C would pay (say) 1 cent to get B • If A > B, then an agent with B would pay (say) 1 cent to get A • If C > A, then an agent with A would pay (say) 1 cent to get C

  10. Rational Preferences • Preferences of a rational agent must obey constraints. • These constraints (plus one more) are the axioms of rationality • Theorem: Rational preferences imply behavior describable as maximization of expected utility

  11. MEU Principle • Theorem: • [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944] • Given any preferences satisfying these constraints, there exists a real-valued function U such that: • Maximum expected likelihood (MEU) principle: • Choose the action that maximizes expected utility • Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU) without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities • E.g., a lookup table for perfect tictactoe, reflex vacuum cleaner

  12. Human Utilities • Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers? • Standard approach to assessment of human utilities: • Compare a state A to a standard lottery Lp between • ``best possible prize'' u+ with probability p • ``worst possible catastrophe'' u- with probability 1-p • Adjust lottery probability p until A ~ Lp • Resulting p is a utility in [0,1]

  13. Utility Scales • Normalized utilities: u+ = 1.0, u- = 0.0 • Micromorts: one-millionth chance of death, useful for paying to reduce product risks, etc. • QALYs: quality-adjusted life years, useful for medical decisions involving substantial risk • One year with good health = 1 QALY • Note: behavior is invariant under positive linear transformation • With deterministic prizes only (no lottery choices), only ordinal utility can be determined, i.e., total order on prizes

  14. Example: Insurance • Consider the lottery [0.5,$1000; 0.5,$0] • What is its expected monetary value? ($500) • What is its certainty equivalent? • Monetary value acceptable in lieu of lottery • $400 for most people • Difference of $100 is the insurance premium • There’s an insurance industry because people will pay to reduce their risk • If everyone were risk-prone, no insurance needed!

  15. Money • Money does not behave as a utility function • Given a lottery L: • Define expected monetary value EMV(L) • Usually U(L) < U(EMV(L)) • I.e., people are risk-averse • Utility curve: for what probability p am I indifferent between: • A prize x • A lottery [p,$M; (1-p),$0] for large M? • Typical empirical data, extrapolated with risk-prone behavior:

  16. Example: Human Rationality? • Famous example of Allais (1953) • A: [0.8,$4k; 0.2,$0] • B: [1.0,$3k; 0.0,$0] • C: [0.2,$4k; 0.8,$0] • D: [0.25,$3k; 0.75,$0] • Most people prefer B > A, C > D • But if U($0) = 0, then • B > A  U($3k) > 0.8 U($4k) • C > D  0.8 U($4k) > U($3k)

  17. Reinforcement Learning DEMO • Basic idea: • Receive feedback in the form of rewards • Agent’s utility is defined by the reward function • Must learn to act so as to maximize expected utility • Change the rewards, change the behavior • Examples: • Learning your way around, reward for reaching the destination. • Playing a game, reward at the end for winning / losing • Vacuuming a house, reward for each piece of dirt picked up • Automated taxi, reward for each passenger delivered

  18. Markov Decision Processes • Markov decision processes (MDPs) • A set of states s  S • A model T(s,a,s’) = P(s’ | s,a) • Probability that action a in state s leads to s’ • A reward function R(s, a, s’) (sometimes just R(s) for leaving a state or R(s’) for entering one) • A start state (or distribution) • Maybe a terminal state • MDPs are the simplest case of reinforcement learning • In general reinforcement learning, we don’t know the model or the reward function

  19. Example: High-Low • Three card types: 2, 3, 4 • Infinite deck, twice as many 2’s • Start with 3 showing • After each card, you say “high” or “low” • New card is flipped • If you’re right, you win the points shown on the new card • Ties are no-ops • If you’re wrong, game ends 3 4 2 2

  20. High-Low • States: 2, 3, 4, done • Actions: High, Low • Model: T(s, a, s’): • P(s’=done | 4, High) = 3/4 • P(s’=2 | 4, High) = 0 • P(s’=3 | 4, High) = 0 • P(s’=4 | 4, High) = 1/4 • P(s’=done | 4, Low) = 0 • P(s’=2 | 4, Low) = 1/2 • P(s’=3 | 4, Low) = 1/4 • P(s’=4 | 4, Low) = 1/4 • … • Rewards: R(s, a, s’): • Number shown on s’ if s  s’ • 0 otherwise • Start: 3 4 Note: could choose actions with search. How?

  21. State Reward Action Elements of RL • Transition model, how action influences states • Reward R, immediate value of state-action transition • Policy , maps states to actions Agent Policy Environment

  22. MDP Solutions • In deterministic single-agent search, want an optimal sequence of actions from start to a goal • In an MDP, like expectimax, want an optimal policy (s) • A policy gives an action for each state • Optimal policy maximizes expected utility (i.e. expected rewards) if followed • Defines a reflex agent Optimal policy when R(s, a, s’) = -0.04 for all non-terminals s

  23. Example Optimal Policies R(s) = -0.01 R(s) = -0.03 R(s) = -0.4 R(s) = -2.0

  24. Finding Optimal Policies Demo

  25. Stationarity • In order to formalize optimality of a policy, need to understand utilities of reward sequences • Typically consider stationary preferences: • Theorem: only two ways to define stationary utilities • Additive utility: • Discounted utility:

  26. Infinite Utilities?! • Problem: infinite state sequences with infinite rewards • Solutions: • Finite horizon: • Terminate after a fixed T steps • Gives nonstationary policy ( depends on time left) • Absorbing state(s): guarantee that for every policy, agent will eventually “die” (like “done” for High-Low) • Discounting: for 0 <  < 1 • Smaller  means smaller horizon

  27. How (Not) to Solve an MDP • The inefficient way: • Enumerate policies • For each one, calculate the expected utility (discounted rewards) from the start state • E.g. by simulating a bunch of runs • Choose the best policy • We’ll return to a (better) idea like this later

  28. Utility of a State • Define the utility of a state under a policy: V(s) = expected total (discounted) rewards starting in s and following  • Recursive definition (one-step look-ahead):

  29. Policy Evaluation • Idea one: turn recursive equations into updates • Idea two: it’s just a linear system, solve with Matlab (or Mosek, or Cplex)

  30. Example: High-Low • Policy: always say “high” • Iterative updates:

  31. Optimal Utilities • Goal: calculate the optimal utility of each state V*(s) = expected (discounted) rewards with optimal actions • Why: Given optimal utilities, MEU tells us the optimal policy

  32. That’s my equation! Bellman’s Equation for Selecting actions • Definition of utility leads to a simple relationship amongst optimal utility values: Optimal rewards = maximize over first action and then follow optimal policy Formally: Bellman’s Equation

  33. Example: GridWorld

  34. Value Iteration • Idea: • Start with bad guesses at all utility values (e.g. V0(s) = 0) • Update all values simultaneously using the Bellman equation (called a value update or Bellman update): • Repeat until convergence • Theorem: will converge to unique optimal values • Basic idea: bad guesses get refined towards optimal values • Policy may converge long before values do

  35. Example: Bellman Updates

  36. Example: Value Iteration • Information propagates outward from terminal states and eventually all states have correct value estimates [DEMO]

  37. Convergence* • Define the max-norm: • Theorem: For any two approximations U and V • I.e. any distinct approximations must get closer to each other, so, in particular, any approximation must get closer to the true U and value iteration converges to a unique, stable, optimal solution • Theorem: • I.e. one the change in our approximation is small, it must also be close to correct

  38. Policy Iteration • Alternate approach: • Policy evaluation: calculate utilities for a fixed policy until convergence (remember the beginning of lecture) • Policy improvement: update policy based on resulting converged utilities • Repeat until policy converges • This is policy iteration • Can converge faster under some conditions

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