eitm institutions week n.
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
EITM Institutions Week PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
EITM Institutions Week

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 37

EITM Institutions Week - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

  • Uploaded on

EITM Institutions Week. John Aldrich Duke University Arthur Lupia University of Michigan. Implications of Multiple Chambers. Tsebelis on Veto Players and Policy Stability Diermeier & Myerson on Bicameralism and the Organization of Legislatures Bawn on Choosing the German Electoral Law.

I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'EITM Institutions Week' - iona

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
eitm institutions week

EITM Institutions Week

John Aldrich

Duke University

Arthur Lupia

University of Michigan

implications of multiple chambers
Implications of Multiple Chambers

Tsebelis on Veto Players and Policy Stability

Diermeier & Myerson on Bicameralism and the

Organization of Legislatures

Bawn on Choosing the German Electoral Law

tsebelis decision making in political systems
Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems
  • M: Compare democratic political systems in terms of policy stability/change.
  • NH: Regime type (presidentialism vs. parliamentarism) and party systems (two vs. many parties) are the crucial ways by which democratic political systems “matter.”
tsebelis decision making cont d
Tsebelis, Decision-Making, cont’d.
  • P:
    • Veto players (one whose assent is necessary to change the status quo) are central.
    • Institutional vetoers (e.g., president, chamber) and party are the crucial veto players.
    • Change is less likely as:
      • The number of veto players increase
      • Congruence of policy preferences among veto players decrease
      • Cohesion (internal policy agreement) decreases.
    • Size of win set is key to stability
tsebelis decision making cont d1
Tsebelis, Decision-Making, cont’d.
  • C:
    • As number of players increases, the win set of the status quo does not increase (stability decreases).
    • As distance among veto players increases along the same line, the win set does not increase.
    • As size of yolk of veto players increases, the win set increases
    • N.B.: determination of veto players complex; even so, data from others consistent with derivations.
tsebelis veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies
Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies
  • Empirical tests of the following hypotheses:
    • Increase in the number of parties in government reduces the ability to produce significant legislation.
    • Increase in ideological distance reduces the ability to produce significant legislation.
    • Number of sig. laws increase with government duration.
    • Number of sig. laws increases with increasing distance between the current and preceding governments.
bawn 1993
Bawn (1993)
  • M. Questions about institutional choice.
  • NH. Institutional choice is a matter of social engineering, it is not political.
  • P.
    • Party preferences are defined over policy outcomes.
    • Parties use information to predict vote shares.
    • Parties know other parties’ policy preferences.
  • C. Decisions on German election law in 1949 and 1953 are consistent with Bawn’s political model.
1949 cdu favored fptp spd small parties favored pr
1949. CDU favored FPTP. SPD & small parties favored PR.

What assumptions are needed to produce the estimate?

1953 spd small parties favored split ballot cdu did not
1953. SPD & small parties favored split ballot. CDU did not.

Incumbents, SPD, and smaller parties gain.

diermeier and myerson 1999
Diermeier and Myerson (1999)
  • M. What explains variations in committee systems across countries?
  • NH. Informational and distributional theories are sufficient to answer the question.
  • P. Legislative chambers compete in a market for legislation. Procedural hurdles as legislative prices.
  • C. Presidential veto power and bicameral separation encourage chambers to create internal hurdles.
diermeier and myerson 19991
Diermeier and Myerson (1999)
  • The model is not game-theoretic & ~ a theorem.
    • It builds on Groseclose and Snyder (1996, g-t).
  • Agent 1 wants a bill to pass. Agent 0 wants it to fail.
    • Each can pay money to individual legislators conditional on them supporting the bill.
  • Legislator utility is payment from lobbyists.
  • Q: When are House members’ expected payoffs increased by raising the House’s hurdle factor?
hurdle factors
Hurdle Factors
  • Q[0,1] is the proportion of the legislature whose assent is required for a bill to pass.
    • Any coalition larger than 1-Q can block the bill.
  • Agent 1 must promise a sufficient amount to each potential blocking coalition.
  • The hurdle factor is 1/(1-Q) plus N of veto players.
    • Dictator in the chamber: 1.
    • Simple majority rule: 2.
    • 2/3 supermajority: 3.
    • Simple majority rule plus one internal veto player: 3.
diermeier and myerson 19992
Diermeier and Myerson (1999)
  • The House’s hurdle factor is s.
  • The external hurdle factor is t.
  • V is what Agent 1 can pay.
  • W is what Agent 0 can pay.
  • What value of s should the House choose?
bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures

Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures

What would you do?

Candidate Entry and CompetitionThe Rationality of Candidate Emergence in Seemingly Uncompetitive Elections
a later example of eitm

A Later Example of EITM

John Aldrich


Arthur Lupia

rohde progressive ambition
Rohde, Progressive Ambition
  • M: There are no variable “types” of (careerist) ambition, but one expected utility maximizing problem for all.
  • NH: Ambition for higher office is exogenous.
  • P: Incumbents are decision makers, not solving a “career ambition game” at equilibrium.

Risk-taking is an exogenous, psychological trait.

  • C: At least for House incumbents, incumbency is attractive due to electoral safety, a Senate seat is more desirable than a Governorship, and the probability of winning the higher office seems most crucial.
banks kiewiet
Banks & Kiewiet
  • M: Empirical research is insufficiently theoretically grounded to provide insights into candidate competition.
  • NH: Inexperienced challengers to incumbent Members of Congress make foolish decisions with respect to politics.
  • P: Game theoretic principles; three person context.

“Quality” means “higher probability of defeating incumbent.”

  • C: Weak challengers run for out-party nomination to oppose an incumbent because that yields a higher probability of winning office than opposing a strong challenger in the primary.
aldrich bianco
Aldrich & Bianco
  • M: Choice of party affiliation is endogenous to career aspirations.
  • NH: Party is chosen by “ideology” or beliefs or up-bringing. It is, like party identification in the electorate, all but an “unmoved mover.”
  • P: Game theoretic premises. Affiliation changes can be due to change in electoral support for a party but may also be due to seeking to avoid contested primaries
  • C: As support for party declines, party affiliates face a collective action problem.
  • M: Estimate game theoretic model of candidate emergence with game theoretic-consistent methodology.
  • NH: Standard, “decision theoretic” probit estimation yields sufficiently accurate estimates.
  • P: Game theoretical setting, with endogenized disturbence term.

QRE equilibrium concept.

  • C: Incumbent spending significantly reduces the probability of a subsequent challenger entering. Challengers pay attention to the incumbent’s voting record on floor. Both are different in standard, “decision theoretic” probit model.
basic game
Basic Game





Probabilities in Equilibrium

probit and strategic probit models of candidate competition in u s house elections 1990 2000
Probit and Strategic Probit Models of Candidate Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1990-2000

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at p < 0.05

shepsle and muthoo 2003
Shepsle and Muthoo (2003)
  • M. Do staggered terms affect Senate dynamics?
  • NH. Individual-level variations in time before election do not affect Senate bargains.
  • P.
    • The Senate contains an “old” player and a “young” player.
    • Each period, they play an ultimatum game.
    •  a “what have you done for me lately” heuristic.
  • C. Under broad conditions, most agenda setting power is allocated to the old player.
the solution
The Solution

Corollary 2. In case i, the old player still gets more power.

agenda setting powers in organizations with overlapping generations of players

Agenda Setting Powers in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players

What would you do?

Don’t answer yet.

shepsle dickson and vanhouwelling 2003
Shepsle, Dickson and VanHouwelling (2003)
  • M. What are the implications of staggered terms?
  • NH. Individual-level variations in time before election do not affect Senate bargains.
  • P
    • The Senate contains an “old” player and a “young” player.
    • Each period, they play a “divide-the-dollar” game.
    •  a “what have you done for me lately” heuristic.
  • C. Under broad – but different -- conditions, most agenda setting power is allocated to the old player.
baron ferejohn format
Baron-Ferejohn format

With common knowledge and symmetric information, the first proposal is accepted in equilibrium.


There are now three generations of legislators in the game.