political economy after the crisis n.
Download
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
Political Economy After the Crisis PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
Political Economy After the Crisis

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 9

Political Economy After the Crisis - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 126 Views
  • Uploaded on

Political Economy After the Crisis. Michael Woolcock Week 4 February 20, 2014. Overview. My week Four questions on growth, institutions, the crisis, and economics (social science): Why do we care about economic growth? Why do institutions matter for growth?

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'Political Economy After the Crisis' - ilana


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
political economy after the crisis

Political Economy After the Crisis

Michael Woolcock

Week 4

February 20, 2014

overview
Overview
  • My week
  • Four questions on growth, institutions, the crisis, and economics (social science):
    • Why do we care about economic growth?
    • Why do institutions matter for growth?
    • What does the crisis reveal (again) about institutions?
    • What do these lessons imply for economics, for social science?
1 why do we care about economic growth
1. Why do we care about economic growth?
  • It’s directly necessary for promoting things we care about
    • Poverty (Kraay 2012), health*, employment, etc
  • It’s indirectly necessary for promoting other things we care about
    • Generates tax venues for the arts, museums, Social Security, etc
  • It’s insufficient for promoting still other things we care about
    • E.g., gender equality, social inclusion, product safety
  • It can actively undermine yet other things we care about
    • The environment, community cohesion, health*, equality
  • We’ve measured it for a long time, and it enables interesting and important analyses to be done (across time, between countries, within countries)
    • But see Jerven (2013) Poor Numbers
  • Because (hopefully) it promotes broader conversations about what an economy is for, how to improve it, for whom, on what basis, etc
2 why do institutions matter for growth
2. Why do institutions matter for growth?
  • Establish conditions under which scale and sophistication of production, distribution, exchange takes place
    • Especially as it pertains to risk (insurance, social protection), finance, contracts (impersonal, intertemporal agreements)
  • (Less directly, by creating and protecting skills, technology)
  • Manage distributional conflicts that growth (or collapse) itself generates
    • Ensure legitimacy of change process, for ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
  • Create power, and power must be regulated; by bodies with
    • Credible, comprehensive information
    • Diverse, professional expertise
    • Durable political independence
  • What particular institutions “look like” (form) matters much less than what they actually “do” (function)
    • Capability to implement is key (and implementation is really hard)
    • Acquired collectively, over time (decades)
3 what does the crisis reveal yet again about institutions
3. What does the crisis reveal (yet again) about ‘institutions’?
  • That they are wondrous but fragile political creations, both responding to and creating ‘incentives’

Comparatively

Domestically

Internationally

sidebar some lessons from sports
Sidebar: Some lessons from sports

Social theory points beyond the narrower (if more technical) analyses of game theory -- “how the players play particular games” -- to “why those games, and not others, arise in the first place, why some players, and not others, get to play, how rules of engagement shift . . . and how players acquire the resources -- both tangible and intangible -- with which to play.”

Xavier de Souza Briggs (2008: 22) Democracy as Problem Solving

3 what does the crisis reveal yet again about institutions1
3. What does the crisis reveal (yet again) about ‘institutions’?
  • That we still don’t really understand them
  • That dominant paradigms for understanding them are remarkably impervious
    • Just how bad does a crisis have to be before key assumptions (presumptions) are revisited?
      • John Maynard Keynes:
        • “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”
        • “The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.”
4 what do these lessons imply for economics for social science
4. What do these lessons imply for economics, for social science?
  • That economics is necessary but insufficient for understanding how particular institutions work, how they can be designed, improved, assessed, held accountable (cf. North)
  • That economists, like everyone else, can be technically competent and yet subject to biases, fads, group-think, ‘incentives’, pressure
    • Thus, like everyone else, need countervailing pressure
    • Especially so, because their actions are highly consequential
  • That ideology should be taken seriously (because one can’t be “post-ideological”) and lightly (because it is a poor guide to understanding, solving complex problems)
    • E.g., “Free markets” are self-correcting
  • That ancient, hard-won lessons must be heeded
    • Quiscustodietipsoscustodes?
    • "We tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing, and what a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress.“ Gaius Petronius Arbiter (c. 27 – 66 AD), courtier to Nero