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The Iraq War and Beyond Eric Davis fas-polisci.rutgers emdavis@rci.rutgers

The Iraq War and Beyond Eric Davis http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu emdavis@rci.rutgers.edu. American Institute for History Education June 2008. Mesopotamia or the Fertile Crescent represents the origins of human civilization, at least 5000 BCE

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The Iraq War and Beyond Eric Davis fas-polisci.rutgers emdavis@rci.rutgers

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  1. The Iraq War and BeyondEric Davishttp://fas-polisci.rutgers.eduemdavis@rci.rutgers.edu American Institute for History Education June 2008

  2. Mesopotamia or the Fertile Crescent represents the origins of human civilization, at least 5000 BCE Many “firsts” occurred in what is Iraq today: first legal code, parliament, accountability to sovereign to an electorate, Iraq is one of the world’s largest oil producers Iraq has a highly educated and democratically oriented middle class Iraq is the only Arab country which enjoys oil wealth, water and great human resources Why is Iraq important to the global community?

  3. To eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): biological, chemical, and nuclear To control Iraq’s vast oil wealth For strategic interests, e.g., to curtail Iranian power To promote a new Middle East agenda understood as “Domino Democracy” Why are possible explanations for US invasion of Iraq?

  4. The Bacthist regime was genocidal and engaged in massive human rights violations Regime engaged in Anfal campaign against Kurds Killed an est. 3 million Iraqis, 15% of population The Bacthist regime destabilized the Middle East The Bacthist regime invaded Iran in September 1980 without any provocation or basis in international law The Bacthist regime seized Kuwait in August 1990 Regime brutally suppressed 1991 Intifada (national uprising), and then engineered greatest ecological disaster of 20th in Iraqi marshes (Shatt al-Arab) What factors justified invading Iraq?

  5. Bush foreign policy based in “unilaterialism” that reflected dominance of “Pax Americana” after collapse of communism Bush administration sought to reshape the Middle East with no external constraints Precedent of the Nuremburg trials and the trial of Slobodan Milošević offered alternative path to dealing with Saddam Husayn’s Bacthist regime Saddam Husayn’s regime points to need for international law and a meaningful United Nations with control over international conflicts Why did US not use international law to depose Saddam Husayn?

  6. Arrogance of post-communist era triumphalism Purposeful ignoring of Iraqi history, customs and local traditions Few Arabic speakers in CPA (US occupation authority from May 2003 to June 2004) Neo-conservative model of government prevented new Iraqi government from delivering needed social services Excessive reliance on a market strategy to rebuild devastated Iraqi economy Decommissioning the 385,000 Iraqi conscript army in May 2003, and firing of 500,000 state public sector workers How effective was US post-war policy in Iraq?

  7. US military largely unaware that Bacth Party had prepared for an insurgency if regime fell Attitude that US had won the war put US military at psychological disadvantage when insurgency began US military not prepared for insurgent tactics, e.g., suicide bombings, car bombs, hit and run attacks, and insurgent terrorizing of local populace US placed relatively little emphasis between 2003 and 2005 on effective strategies to win “hearts and minds” Why was the US military so ineffectual in Iraq after March 2003?

  8. Iran pleased US toppled Saddam but disturbed by possibility of long-term occupation of Iraq Tremendous human/material losses of 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War made Iran fearful of Iraq Iran has given considerable support to Shiite militias, such as the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization (military wing of Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council) Iran-Iraq border long, porous and difficult to defend, allowing fighters and weapons to easily cross it What was the role of “neighborhood effects”?

  9. Syria fears “encirclement” - being caught between hostile countries: pro-US Iraq and Lebanon, and Israel As a Bacthist regime with a radical reputation, Syria feared it was next in line for attack Syria has provided haven for many Iraqi Bacthists Many anti-US insurgents and Islamist radicals cross undefended Iraqi-Syrian border with ease Syria has been staging point for recruits and funds for Sunni Arab insurgent groups What are other negative neighborhood effects on Iraq?

  10. Saudis and many Gulf Arabs – including powerful merchants – fear US facilitating Iranian expansion into Iraq through Shiite dominated Iraqi government Saudis and Gulf Arabs critical to funding sectarian organizations such as the Association of Muslim Scholars Many Sunni Arab Iraqi clerics had been influenced by extremist Wahhabi notions of Islam while in exile in Gulf during Saddam Husayn’s rule Radical clerics provide conduit for radical Islamist ideas into Iraq and inciting Sunni Arabs against US What was the impact of the Saudis and Gulf Arabs on Iraq?

  11. Shiite militia organizations Sunni Arab insurgent groups supported by the former Bacth Party Sunni Arab insurgent groups independent of the Bacth Party Iranian “special groups” trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Iran for attacks on US What have been the main military threats to the US in Iraq?

  12. No history of militias/insurgent groups in Iraq Iraqi state’s collapse after Saddam’s fall created a political vacuum and lack of order US complicity in collapse of the state Looting of ministries, disbanding conscript army, firing public sector workers, ending agricultural subsidies Lack of security and jobs, esp. for youth Many insurgent groups organized by Bacth Party Why do Iraqis join militias and insurgent groups?

  13. Most powerful movement is Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi) – JAM – led by Muqtada al-Sadr Second most powerful: Badr Organization – military wing of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), formerly Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) – formed in Iran 1982 Third is the militia of the Basra based Virtue Party (Hizb al-Fadila), splinter of JAM Fourth are “rogue elements”:JAM units not under control of al-Sadr, and Iranian “special groups” What are the main Shici militias in Iraq?

  14. Most powerful after 2003 was al-Qacida in Iraq led by Abu Muscab al-Zarqawi al-Qacida has appeared under other names, e.g., Organization for Islamic Unity and Jihad (Jamacat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad ), al-Qacida in the Valley of the Two Rivers (al-Qacidafi Wadi al-Rafidayn), and the Islamic State of Iraq (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi-l-cIraq) Other militias linked to the deposed Bacth Party, such as Muhammad’s Army (Jaysh Muhammad), the 1920 Revolution Brigades (Kata’ib Thawrat Ashrin), and The Return (al- cAwda) What are the main Sunni militias?

  15. Many insurgent groups have an ad hoc leadership structure, that is very dependent on one or a small group of leaders Hence insurgent groups fluid and unstable Although many called themselves “Islamist,” ideology of insurgent groups very ill defined Insurgent groups fill a political vacuum Many insurgent groups drew upon personnel from ex-Bacthist military, such as Republican Guard, Special Republic Guards, Fedayeen Saddam What are the general characteristics of insurgent groups?

  16. Iraqi economy devastated by 1991 Gulf War and UN Sanctions (1991-2003) Very little job creation by CPA after 2003 Few employment opportunities for young Iraqis entering job market (60-70% unemployment of youth under 25) Employed middle class less affected by inflation than unemployed youth (65% population under 25) Shiite militias and Sunni Arab insurgent groups used economic downturn and feelings of no hope in the future to recruit members among Iraqi youth What is the relationship between economic deprivation and violence?

  17. Sunni Arab insurgent groups are more ideological than Shiite militias; seek to return Bacth to power One reason is threat that many in larger Arab world see in a Shiite dominated Iraq al-Qacida has used this argument to attract fighters to come to Iraq Many insurgent groups were formed by Bacth Party prior to 2003 to fight US occupation Shici militias frequently attract fighters who view organizations as vehicle for economic mobility How do insurgent groups and militias differ?

  18. Continuous decline of agrarian sector since 1920s “Rentier” nature of Iraqi economy – oil dependency – producing neglect of agriculture “Shurugi/shargawiya” (migrants from the south) became serious problem in 1940s and 1950s Prior to 1963, many migrants absorbed by trade unions and artisan organizations and recruited by Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) No militia movement (Islamist or otherwise) prior to 1990s What are the historical factors behind creation of militias?

  19. Limited employment opportunities in urban areas, esp. for youth under 25 Militias offer sense of community and belonging in anomic urban environment Militias give youth sense of empowerment Militias offer possibility of upward mobility, through (oil) smuggling, extortion, protection rackets and kidnapping What are social, psychological, economic incentives behind militia recruitment?

  20. JAM began in response to a crisis, i.e., formed as a result the collapse of the state and economy during 1990s Began as social service or “self-help” organization that built a “state within a state” Initially linked to religious organizations, i.e., Muqtada’s father, Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr JAM draw upon a social base of society’s displacedand déclassé, especially youth JAM draws heavily on local narratives of victimization, regional solidarity and honor, and kinship ties among leadership JAM based on a loose hierarchy of authority (“emulation”) Internal structure characterized by ambiguity and instability (rules are not well institutionalized given lack of agreed upon enforcement mechanisms) What are the key factors in explaining the JAM?

  21. Mahdi Army has origins in “retail” crime syndicates of 1990s Outgrowth of politicization of religious authority (al-marjaciya)following July 14, 1958 Revolution in Iraq and movement of Iraqi youth towards secular left Trend accelerated in late 1970s with cAshura demonstrations of 1977, Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, and seizure of power by Saddam in 1979 and creation of “family-party state” (dawlat hizb al-usra) Muqtada al-Sadr’s uncle, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and father, Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, pushed idea of the State of the Supreme Jurisprudent (wilayat al-faqih) Struggle to politicize Shiism in Iraq through juxtaposing “Quietist Hawza” (al-Hawza al-Samita) - which non-political - to “Activist Hawza” (al-Hawza al-Natiqa) Evolution of the Mahdi Army

  22. JAM’s main ideologues offer strong symbols of a “counter-hegemonic discourse,” e.g., notions of martyrdom, resistance of foreign occupation, unity and sovereignty of Iraq, social justice, but with a thin theological veneer As largest social service provide in Iraq, and vehicle for upward mobility, JAM attracts (esp. young) urban dispossessed and rural migrants JAM alienated many Shica in “ethnically cleansed” neighborhoods where it steals automobiles and personal property, seizes houses to auction off holdings, and sells or rents Increasing divide between “political” Sadrists and criminal elements of JAM Criminalization of Mahdi Army

  23. There is no history of sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) conflict in Iraq 25% populace intermarried (including Kurds) “Sectarian entrepreneurs” exploited social chaos and economic collapse of 1990s Sunni radicals blew up revered Shiite shrine in Samarra (Feb, 2006) to create sectarian tensions Shiite radicals bombed their own co-confessionalists in Baghdad market on June 17, 2008 Is the war in Iraq sectarian in origins?

  24. Muqtada al-Sadr’s truce of August 2007 “Surge” strategy begun in 2007 (particularly embedding troops with Iraqi units in violence prone neighborhoods) Major expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams by Gen. David Petreaus and US Ambassador Ryan Crocker New strategy of developing reconstruction projects according to needs defined by Iraqis What factors have led to a decline in violence?

  25. Victory must serve Iraqi, not only American needs Military force alone cannot win in Iraq US cannot sustain force levels in Iraq due to lack of personnel and high cost Social and economic reconstruction best approach to achieve a “win-win” situation for Iraq and US Iraq in unique position with 115 billion barrels of oil and 70% oil and natural gas still to be discovered “Listening” to Iraqis – respecting their needs and desires constitutes best method to win in Iraq What does “victory” mean in Iraq?

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