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August 2018

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan Strategic Multilayer Assessment Briefing. August 2018. Scope. “Stabilization”

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August 2018

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  1. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in AfghanistanStrategic Multilayer Assessment Briefing August 2018

  2. Scope “Stabilization” -a specific process designed to permanently keep insurgents out of an area after they have been expelled by security forces (akin to the “clear-hold-build” cycle) The report covers: • How stabilization programming took shape in the war’s early years; • The inception and evolution of stabilization as an overarching strategy in 2009; • How the strategy was operationalized as part of the military and civilian surge; • How State, USAID and DOD devised and implemented their respective stabilization programs and interventions; • The main U.S.-sponsored programs that fell under a “stabilization” heading, the resources they received, and how they were used to support counterinsurgency; • The theories of change implied by stabilization programs; • The degree of effectiveness of stabilization programs; • Key lessons and recommendations for U.S. policy and practice in future stabilization and reconstruction missions.

  3. Reviewed Programs USAID • PRT Quick Impact Projects (PRT QIP) • Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP), GIRoA • Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) • Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) • ACAP II • Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) • Community Development Program (CDP), previously called Food Insecurity Response for Urban Population Program (FIRUP) • Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI), OTI • Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture-Plus (AVIPA Plus) • Community-Based Stability Grants (CBSG) • District Delivery Program (DDP), USAID/GIRoA • Rule of Law Stabilization – Informal Component (RLS-I) • Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiative (MISTI) • Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) • Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI), OTI • Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) DOD • Village Stability Operations (VSO) • Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

  4. Overview There were two critical overarching decisions that pushed the stabilization effort toward failure: • We prioritized the most insecure districts first • Believed targeting the worst places first would create a “cascading impact” everywhere else • Instead, we got bogged down in those chronically insecure areas • Civil servants were afraid, implementing partners couldn’t get out, areas remained too violent to win over population • We drew down forces and civilians on calendar-based timelines, rather than conditions-based timelines • This decision forced debilitating compromises on planning, staffing, and programming

  5. Findings • The U.S. government greatly overestimated its ability to build and reform government institutions in Afghanistan as part of its stabilization strategy. • The stabilization strategy and the programs used to achieve it were not properly tailored to the Afghan context. • The large sums of stabilization dollars the United States devoted to Afghanistan in search of quick gains often exacerbated conflicts, enabled corruption, and bolstered support for insurgents. • Because the coalition prioritized the most dangerous districts first, it continuously struggled to clear them of insurgents. As a result, the coalition couldn’t make sufficient progress to convince Afghans in those or other districts that the government could protect them if they openly turned against the insurgents. • Efforts by U.S. agencies to monitor and evaluate stabilization programs were generally poor. • Successes in stabilizing Afghan districts rarely lasted longer than the physical presence of coalition troops and civilians. • Stabilization was most successful in areas that were clearly under the physical control of government security forces, had a modicum of local governance in place prior to programming, were supported by coalition forces and civilians who recognized the value of close cooperation, and were continuously engaged by their government as programming ramped up.

  6. Lessons • Even under the best circumstances, stabilization takes time. Without the patience and political will for a planned and prolonged effort, large-scale stabilization missions are likely to fail. • Most U.S. government capabilities and institutions necessary in a large-scale stabilization mission should be established and maintained between contingencies if they are to be effective when they matter most. • Having qualified and experienced personnel in the right positions at the right times is vital to stabilization’s success. • Increased funding alone cannot compensate for stabilization’s inherent challenges, and believing that it will can exacerbate those challenges. • Physical security is the bedrock of stabilization. • The presence of local governance is a precondition for effective stabilization programming. • Stabilizing communities requires a tailored approach. • Stabilization efforts must be rigorously monitored and evaluated. • Successfully conceiving and implementing a stabilization strategy requires extensive local knowledge of the host-nation government and population. • Winning hearts and minds requires a close examination of what has won and lost the hearts and minds of that particular population in the recent past.

  7. Executive Branch Recommendations • State should take the lead in laying out a robust whole-of-government stabilization strategy, USAID should be the lead implementer, and DOD should support their efforts. • DOD and USAID should update COIN and stabilization doctrine and best practices to stagger stabilization’s various phases, with the provision of reliable and continuous physical security serving as the critical foundation. SIGAR offers a blueprint to serve as a model. • DOD should develop measures of effectiveness for any CERP-like program in the future. • USAID should prioritize the collection of accurate and reliable data for its stabilization projects. • DOD and USAID should prioritize developing and retaining human terrain analytical expertise that would allow a more nuanced understanding of local communities. • DOD should ensure it has a sufficient number and mix of civil affairs personnel with the right training and aptitude for the next stabilization mission. • State and USAID should designate a new civilian response corps of active and standby civilian specialists who can staff stabilization missions.

  8. Legislative Branch Recommendations Congress should consider: • Funding a modified civilian response corps. • Requiring State, the designated lead on stabilization, to develop and implement a stabilization strategy within a broader campaign strategy and in coordination with USAID and DOD. • Requiring USAID, the designated lead on implementation, to develop and implement a monitoring and evaluation plan in coordination with State and DOD. • Focusing its oversight on stabilization outcomes.

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