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無線區域網路網路安全現況. 報告人 : 黃上峰. 報告內容. Wireless Service Category WLAN Security History WLAN Attack conclusion. Wireless Service Category. WPAN : < 10m, such as hands-free cell phone WLAN : < 100m, such as laptop to broadband access WMAN : < xx km, such as building-to-building
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無線區域網路網路安全現況 報告人: 黃上峰
報告內容 • Wireless Service Category • WLAN Security History • WLAN Attack • conclusion
Wireless Service Category • WPAN : < 10m, such as hands-free cell phone • WLAN : < 100m, such as laptop to broadband access • WMAN : < xx km, such as building-to-building • WWAN : cell phones
802.11 Header • 802.11 header : AP -> STA : DA AP SA STA -> AP : AP SA DA
WLAN Security History (1/3) • No Security : • WLAN access control by MAC address • WEP : only one 64/128 bit WEP key • WLAN access control by MAC address. • All STA in the same WLAN use the same key. • All STA in the same WLAN can capture each other packets. • 802.1x : • WLAN access control by RADIUS server.
WLAN Security History (2/3) • All STA in the same WLAN use the same group and uni-cast key. • AP can change WEP key random or periodically. • All STA in the same WLAN can capture each other packets if user can show WEP key real time. • IPSec VPN : transport mode • It is stronger than RC4 algorithm, but it is not popular. • IPSec VPN tunnel is used for layer 3.
WLAN Security History (3/3) • WPA 1.0 : WPA or WPA-PSK • TKIP + MIC algorithm • All STA in the same WLAN use the same group key and different uni-cast key. • AP can change group and uni-cast key random or periodically. • TKIP security is still based on RC4 algorithm. • WPA 2.0 (802.11i) : • CCMP + MIC algorithm
WLAN Attack • 網卡位址偽裝(MAC Spoofing) • 無線訊號干擾(RF Jamming) • 中斷訊框攻擊(De-authentication) • 雙面攻擊(Evil Twin Attack) • 網卡或基地台弱點攻擊(Wireless Device Vulnerability)
MAC Spoofing (1/2) 未加密連線 • 收集資訊 • 改變MAC address
MAC Spoofing (2/2) • 困難點: • AP無法主動判別此使用者此刻是否為合法者? • AP無法主動判別合法者與駭客是否同時存在? • 預防: • 使用login認證機制,例如:RADIUS server • WLAN採用加密模式保護 • 設定每個使用者存取權限,例如:使用時間限制、與頻寬限制
RF Jamming (1/3) 特定無線設備攻擊: 無線訊號干擾
RF Jamming (2/3) 全頻帶攻擊: • 802.11b/g可以用11/13頻道,每個頻道佔5 MHz • 802.11b/g訊號使用20 MHz,所以相鄰2個頻道到會被影響 頻道1 ~ 3受影響 頻道4 ~ 8受影響 頻道9 ~ 13受影響 無線訊號干擾頻道1 無線訊號干擾頻道6 無線訊號干擾頻道11
RF Jamming (3/3) • 困難點: • 此種無線網路阻斷式攻擊,須配合無線訊號偵測器來確定干擾源位置 • 此類攻擊程式可隨時隨地發動干擾,受影響範圍取決於發射功率 • 2.4GHz有許多干擾源,例如:無線電話、藍芽、微波爐等,都容易相互干擾
De-authentication • 困難點: • 此種無線網路阻斷式攻擊,STA無法偵測出來 De-auth Dis-assoc
Evil Twin Attack (1/2) 冒充合法SSID引誘上網
Evil Twin Attack (1/2) • 困難點: • 駭客可以偽造SSID、BSSID(MAC address) • 此類攻擊可隨時隨地發動,受影響範圍取決於發射功率 • 駭客主要目的騙取login無線網路資訊 • 無法區分是否屬於無線漫遊當中一環
Wireless Device Vulnerabilities (1/2) • 確認無線基地台廠商型號,例如透過BSSID • 查詢該無線基地台弱點 • 開始攻擊
Wireless Device Vulnerabilities (2/2) • 困難點: • 採用開放原始碼(Open Source code)的設備 • 802.11i協定的限制,一分鐘內若超過1次以上EAPoL或MIC錯誤,要停止服務一分鐘 • 預防: • 架設無線網路時,要修改出場預設值 • 要對無線設備進行必要的程式更新
Conclusion • 基本: • 無線溢波問題 • 不當的無線網路設定 • 進階: • 搭配使用者認證機制,並制定管理政策 • 固定式或行動式監控 • 搭配加密應用工具程式
DH (Diffie-Hellman) Algorithm • Goal : product public key and private key Let g : fixed constant prime (huge prime) x : private key (huge prime) y : peer private key (huge prime) X : public key; X = gx Y : peer public key; Y =* gy • Xy=(gx)y=gxy=(gy)x=Yx • Send : T*Y = T*gy • Peer receiver : (T*Y)*g-y=T*gy*g-y =T*gy-y=T*g0=T