Planning the CREZ 345 kV System for Multi-contingencies

1. Planning the CREZ 345 kV System for Multi-contingencies CREZ Technical Conference January 26, 2010 Bernie Pasternack AEP Service Corporation

2. The build out of the CREZ 345 kV system will have enormous impacts on the planning and operation of ERCOT’s bulk transmission system. The required level of reliability will be greater than past expectations. Impact of system failures Variability of transmission loading patterns

3. Agenda TPL-001-1 Overview Performance Requirements Raising the Bar for EHV Other Notable Changes Summary 3

4. TPL-001-1 Drafting Team Roster • Ron Mazur, Manitoba Hydro • Tom Mielnik, MidAmerican • Bernie Pasternack, AEP • Bob Pierce, Duke • Chifong Thomas, PG&E • Jim Useldinger, KCPL • Dana Walters, National Grid • Active observers • NERC Staff Coordinator – Ed Dobrowolski • John Odom, FRCC (Chair) • Bob Millard, RFC • Darrin Church, TVA • Bill Harm, PJM • Doug Hohlbaugh, FirstEnergy (Vice Chair) • Julius Horvath, Wind Energy TX • Bob Jones, Southern • Brian Keel, SRP

5. Project Scope Standards Involved TPL-001-0.1 (NERC A, No Contingency) TPL-002-0a (NERC B, Single Contingency) TPL-003-0 (NERC C, Multiple Contingency) TPL-004-0 (NERC D, Extreme Contingency) TPL-005-0 (RRO Regional and Interregional Studies) TPL-006-0.1 (RRO Data, Reports, as requested by NERC) Applicable Entities Involved Planning Authority (Planning Coordinator) Transmission Planner Regional Reliability Organization NERC Website Project 2006-02 http://www.nerc.com/filez/standards/Assess-Transmission-Future-Needs.html

6. Project Scope Create a new standard that: Has clear, enforceable requirements Is not a Least Common Denominator standard Addresses the issues raised in the SAR and issues raised by FERC and others

7. FERC Order 693 Inputs FERC is looking for a clearer Standard that “raises the bar” on reliability Consider a full range of variables to identify critical system conditions Ensure simulations replicate real-time expectations Should not allow for firm load shedding or curtailment of firm transfers in response to single contingencies

8. Project Status Draft 5 authorized by Standards Committee for 30 day pre-ballot pool period January 20, 2010 through February 19, 2010 Plan to ballot in early Q1 2010 10 day ballot period Need to achieve quorum (75% of Registered Ballot Body) Approval requires 2/3 approval from ballot body NERC Website Project 2006-02 http://www.nerc.com/filez/standards/Assess-Transmission-Future-Needs.html

9. Table 1 Performance Requirements P0: Normal System P1: Single Contingency P2: Single Contingency [higher impact] P3: Generator + 1 P4: Stuck Breaker P5: Protection System Failure P6: Overlapping contingencies [Non-gens, Two P1 Events] P7: Common Structure [2 circuits] Planning Events • Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and other controls are expected to automatically disconnect for each event. • Require Corrective Action Plans for inability to meet performance requirements

10. Table 1 Performance Requirements Category (P0, P1, … P7) Initial system condition Event Fault Type (3-phase or Single Line to Ground) BES Level (EHV or HV) Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed Non-Consequential Load Loss Allowed Planning Events, Table Components (Columns) Consequential Load Loss:All Load that is no longer served by the Transmission System as a result of Transmission Facilities being removed from service by a Protection System operation designed to isolate the fault. Non-Consequential Load Loss: Non-Interruptible Load loss that does not include: (1) Consequential Load Loss, (2) the response of voltage sensitive Load, or (3) Load that is disconnected from the System by end-user equipment.

11. Table 1 – Performance Requirements If the event analyzed involves BES elements at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level for stated performance criteria applies regarding allowances for interruptions of Firm Transmission Service and loss of Non-Consequential Load Planning Events, Table

12. TPL-001-1 EHV Performance Areas where “bar was raised” for EHV Single contingency (P2-2 & P2-3) Stuck Breaker (P4) Protection System Failure (P5)

13. Raising the EHV Bar WHY ? EHV is the backbone of the transmission system; it must be the strongest link EHV failures lead to major blackouts Even if probability is low, impact is high 13

14. AEP’s Perspective Eastern AEP (PJM) EHV system planned to a higher standard Contingencies are surrogates Normal ratings for single contingencies N-2 instead of N-1-1 Superimpose heavy transfers Multiple generators plus single or dbl circuit lines Result is a robust system with flexibility to accommodate unforeseen conditions 14

15. TPL-001-1 Other Relevant Changes Near term Off-peak steady state and stability studies specifically required Specific consideration of spare equipment strategy Explicit requirement to do near term short circuit analysis, meet performance requirements, and define corrective actions Specific requirement to assess proposed generation in long term horizon Requires consideration of outages and performance deficiencies on neighbors’ systems

16. TPL-001-1 Contingency Analysis Clarity Simulate removal of all elements that Protection and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect Consider impact of successful or unsuccessful high speed reclosing High speed reclosing is closing within one second Generator low voltage ride through Trip unit in simulation if voltage is less than ride through voltage limitations Ride-through can be known or assumed 16

17. Summary Build out of the CREZ 345 kV system will require a higher level of reliability New TPL Standard raises the bar, particularly for EHV FERC is a driver Must protect the backbone of the grid 17

18. Summary Simulation of contingencies must replicate actions of Protection Systems and controls New TPL standard will produce a more robust and flexible system 18

19. Questions ?