slide1
Download
Skip this Video
Download Presentation
Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 23

Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 89 Views
  • Uploaded on

Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks. Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore. Agenda. Introduction Heterogeneous WSN Architecture

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about ' Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore' - harper-melendez


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
slide1

Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks

Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao

Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

slide2
Agenda
  • Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion
slide3
Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion
slide4
Wireless Sensor Networks
  • Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
slide5
Self-healing Group Key Distribution
  • Key Distirubtion & Management is Fundamental to Other Security Issues
    • Pairwise key distribution
    • Group key distribution
      • Self-healing group key distribution especially suits WSNs’ lossy channel.
slide6
Homogeneous WSNs
  • All Existing Work Consider Homogeneous WSNs
  • Homogeneous WSN
    • All sensor nodes have the same capability
    • Homogeneous WSNs have scalability problem. Theoretical and empirical studies have corroborated this
slide7
Hierarchical Self-healing Key Distribution
  • Motivated to Study Self-healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous WSNs
  • Hierarchical Self-healing Group Key Distribution
    • Adapting to the heterogeneous WSN architecture
slide8
Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion
slide9
Heterogeneous WSNs
  • Heterogeneous WSNs Are A Better Alternative to Homogeneous ones
    • The network is partitioned into groups, and each group is placed a group manager
    • Group managers have better capability than sensor nodes
    • A group manager acts an intermediary between sensor nodes and the base station
slide11
Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion
slide13
Key Generation

rK = [rk1, rk2]

mKi = [mk1, mk2]

=[h(Gi,rk1), h(Gi,rk2)]

gKi = …

slide14
Key Generation

reverse hash chain

foward hash chain

gKi[j] = kR[m-j+1]+kF[j]

kR[j] = hRj(mk1) = hR(hR(hR(…hR(mk1))))

kF[j] = hFj(mk2) = hF(hF(hF(…hF(mk2))))

slide15
Key Distribution

gKi[j] = kR[m-j+1]+kF[j]

  • mk2 is given to each sensor as seed sF for the forward hash chain
  • At the start of each session, the group manager generates kR[m-j+1] using mk1 as seed for the reverse hash chain, and broadcasts to sensors within its group
    • The broadcast scheme is essentially the Dutta et al.’s scheme, with a slight modification to rectify its weakness
slide16
Key Distribution
  • The reverse hash chain is used to achieve self-healing property
  • The forward hash chain is used to achive forward secrecy, i.e., sensors joined later cannot compute group keys of earlier sessions
slide17
Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion
slide18
Untrusted Group Manager

Untrusted Group Manager

  • For the basic scheme, group managers are assumed trusted.
  • However, group managers cannot be guaranteed trusted.
  • We consider some group managers are compromised in the extended scheme
slide19
Secret sharing of mk1

Secret sharing of mk1

  • In basic scheme, if mk1 is compromised, all sessions are compromised
  • We are left to secret sharing of mk1 among group managers; and compute kR[m-j+1] in a distributed way
  • The point is that hR() can be computed in a distributed way
slide20
Choice of hR()
  • Normal hash function cannot be used as hR()
  • We define hR()

hR(): ZN QRN

hR(x) = x2 (mod N)

  • mk1 is partitioned into t shares mk1 = s1.s2…st-1.st (mod N)

hRj(mk1) = (s1)2^j (s2)2^j(st)2^j (mod N)

slide21
Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion
slide22
Conclusion

Conclusion

  • Heterogeneous WSNs have better scalability and performance, as the introduction of powerful group managers provides shortcut for data transmission from sensors to base station
  • We proposed hierarchical self-healing group key distribution tailored to heterogeneous WSNs
  • Our constructions are based Dutta et al.’s idea
slide23
Q&A

Thank You!

ad