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Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification

Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification. Michael Schapira (Yale and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Joan Feigenbaum (Yale) and Aaron D. Jaggard (DIMACS). Starting Point: Agents’ Privacy in MD.

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Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification

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  1. Approximate Privacy:Foundations and Quantification Michael Schapira (Yale and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Joan Feigenbaum (Yale) and Aaron D. Jaggard (DIMACS)

  2. Starting Point: Agents’ Privacy in MD • Traditional goal of mechanism design: Incent agents to reveal private information that is needed to compute “good” outcomes. • Complementary, newly important goal: Enable agents not to reveal private information that is not needed to compute “good” outcomes. • Example (Naor-Pinkas-Sumner, EC ’99): It’s undesirable for the auctioneer to learn the winning bid in a 2nd–price Vickrey auction.

  3. Privacy is Important! • Sensitive Information: Information that can harm data subjects, data owners, or data users, if it is mishandled • There’s a lot more of it than there used to be! • Increased use of computers and networks • Increased processing power and algorithmic knowledge • Decreased storage costs • “Mishandling” can be very harmful. • ID theft • Loss of employment or insurance • “You already have zero privacy. Get over it.” (Scott McNealy, 1999)

  4. . . . xn-1 x3 xn x2 x1 Private, MultipartyFunction Evaluation y = f (x1, …, xn) • Each i learns y. • No i can learn anything about xj • (except what he can infer from xiand y ). • Very general positive results.

  5. Drawbacks of PMFE Protocols • Information-theoretically private MFE: Requires that a substantial fraction of the agents be obedient rather than strategic. • Cryptographically private MFE: Requires (plausible but) currently unprovable complexity-theoretic assumptions and (usually) heavy communication overhead. • Not used in many real-life environments • Brandt and Sandholm (TISSEC ’08): Which auctions of interest are unconditionally privately computable?

  6. Minimum Knowledge Requirements for 2nd–Price Auction 0 1 2 3 bidder 2 0 1 2 3 2, 0 1, 0 winner price bidder 1 2, 1 1, 1 2, 2 1, 2 input(2,0) 1, 3 Perfect Privacy Auctioneer learns only which region corresponds to the bids. ≈

  7. Ascending-Price English Auction bidder 2 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 bidder 1 Same execution for the inputs (1,1), (2,1), and (3,1)

  8. Perfect Privacy for 2nd–Price Auction[Brandt and Sandholm (TISSEC ’08)] • The ascending-price, English-auction protocol is perfectly private. • It is essentially the only perfectly privateprotocol for 2nd–price auctions. • Note the exponential communication cost of perfect privacy!

  9. Worse Yet…(The Millionaires’ Problem) millionaire 2 x2 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 millionaire 1 x1 f(x1,x2) = 1 if x1 ≥ x2 ; else f(x1,x2) = 2 The Millionaires’ Problem is not perfectly privately computable.[Kushilevitz (SJDM ’92)]

  10. So, What Can We Do? • Insist on achieving perfect privacy. • sometimes there is no reasonable alternative • can be costly (communication, PKI, etc.) • Treat privacy as a design goal. • alongside complexity, optimization, etc. • We need a way to quantify privacy.

  11. Privacy Approximation Ratios (PARs) • Intutitively, captures the indistinguishability of inputs. • natural first step • general distributed function computation • Other possible definitions: • Semantic (context-specific) • Entropy-based

  12. Outline • Background • Two-party communication (Yao) • “Tiling” characterization of privately computable functions (Chor + Kushilevitz) • Privacy Approximation Ratios (PARs) • Bisection auction protocol: exponential gap between worst-case and average-case PARs • Summary of Our Results • Open Problems

  13. Two-party Communication Model Party 1 Party 2 x1 {0, 1}k x2  {0, 1}k f: {0,1}k x {0,1}k {0,1}m q1 qj {0,1} is a function of (q1, …, qj-1) and one player’s private input. q2 ••• qr-1 qr = f(x1, x2) Δ s(x1,x2) = (q1,…,qr)

  14. Example: Millionaires’ Problem 0 1 2 3 millionaire 2 1 0 1 2 3 2 2 2 millionaire 1 1 1 2 2 A(f) 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 f(x1,x2) = 1 if x1 ≥ x2 ; else f(x1,x2) = 2

  15. Monochromatic Tilings • A region of A(f) is any subset of entries (not necessarily a submatrix).A partition of A(f) is a set of disjoint regions whose union is A(f). • A rectangle in A(f) is a submatrix.A tiling is a partition into rectangles. • Monochromatic regions and partitions

  16. Bisection Protocol In each round, a player “bisects” an interval. millionaire 2 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 millionaire 1 Example: f(2,3) A communication protocol “zeroes in” on a monochromatic rectangle.

  17. Perfectly Private Protocols • Protocol P for f is perfectly private with respect to party 1 if f(x1, x2) = f(x’1, x2) s(x1, x2) = s(x’1, x2) • Similarly, perfectly private wrt party 2 • P achieves perfect subjective privacy if it is perfectly private wrt both parties. • P achieves perfect objective privacyif f(x1, x2) = f(x’1, x’2) s(x1, x2) = s(x’1, x’2)

  18. Ideal Monochromatic Partitions • The ideal monochromatic partition of A(f) consists of the maximal monochromatic regions. • This partition is unique. 0 1 2 3 1 0 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1

  19. Characterization of Perfect Privacy • Protocol P for f is perfectly privacy-preservingiffthe tiling induced by P is the ideal monochromatic partition of A(f). 0 1 2 3 bidder 2 0 1 2 3 2, 0 1, 0 winner price bidder 1 2, 1 1, 1 2, 2 1, 2 1, 3

  20. Objective PAR (1) • Privacy with respect to an outside observer • e.g., auctioneer • Worst-case objective PAR of protocol P for function f: • Worst-case PAR of fis the minimum, over all P for f, of worst-case PAR of P. |R (x1, x2)| |R (x1, x2)| I MAX (x1, x2) P

  21. Objective PAR (2) • Average-case objective PAR of P for f wrt distribution D on {0,1}k x {0,1}k : • Average-case PAR of f is the minimum, over all P for f, of average-case PAR of P. [ ] |R (x1, x2)| |R (x1, x2)| I ED P

  22. Bisection Auction Protocol (BAP)[Grigorieva, Herings, Muller, & Vermeulen (ORL’06)] • Bisection protocol on [0,2k-1] to find an interval [L,H] that contains lower bid but not higher bid. • Bisection protocol on [L,H] to find lower bid p. • Sell the item to higher bidder for price p.

  23. Bisection Auction Protocol (BAP) bidder 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bidder 1 A(f) Example: f(7, 4)

  24. Objective PARs for BAP(k) • Theorem: Average-case objective PAR of BAP(k) with respect to the uniform distribution is+1. • Observation: Worst-case objective PAR of BAP(k) is at least 2 . • Conjecture: The average-case objective PAR of 2nd-Price-Auction(k) is linear in k wrt all distributions. k 2 k/2

  25. Proof (1) 0 2k-1 2k-1 • ak= number of rectangles in induced tiling for BAP(k). • a0=1, ak = 2ak-1+2k ak = (k+1)2k 0 Δ 2k-1 2k-1 The monochromatic tiling induced by the Bisection Auction Protocol for k=4

  26. Proof (2) Δ • R = {R1,…,Ra } is the set of rectangles in the BAP(k) tiling • RI = rectangle in the ideal partition that contains Rs • js= 2k - |RI| • bk=SR js k Δ s Δ s Δ s

  27. Proof (3) |RI(x1,x2)| (+) 1 • PAR = S • = S = S 22k |RBAP(k)(x1,x2)| (x1,x2) . |RI| 1 1 s |Rs| |RI| 22k 22k |Rs| s Rs Rs number of (x1,x2)’s in Rs contribution to (+) of one (x1,x2) in Rs

  28. Proof (4) 0 2k-1 2k-1 • bk = bk-1+(bk-1+ak-12k-1) + ( S i ) + ( S i ) • b0=0, bk=2bk-1+(k+1)22(k-1) bk = k22k-1 0 2k-1-1 2k-1 2k-1 i=0 i=1 2k-1 The monochromatic tiling induced by the Bisection Auction Protocol for k=4

  29. Proof (5) S= S (2k-js) = (ak2k-bk) = ( (k+1)22k- k22k-1 ) = k+1- = + 1 1 1 |RI| 22k s 22k 1 22k 1 22k k 2 k 2 QED

  30. Bounded Bisection Auction Protocol (BBAP) BBAP(r): • Do (at most) r bisection steps. • If the winner is still unknown, run the ascending English auction protocol on the remaining interval. • Ascending auction protocol: BBAP(0)Bisection auction protocol: BBAP(k)

  31. Average-Case Objective PARs for 2nd-price Auction Protocols 4 2k+1 8 2 16 2 +1 2 (3*2k) 3

  32. Subjective PARs • Objective privacy= privacy wrt an outside observer • Subjective privacy =privacy wrt the other party • In the millionaires’ problems we (mainly) care about subjective privacy. • Similar definitions.

  33. Subjective PARs (1) • The 1-partition of region R in matrix A(f): { Rx1 = {x1} x {x2s.t. (x1, x2)  R} } (similarly, 2-partition) • The i-induced tiling of protocol P for f is obtained by i-partitioning each rectangle in the tiling induced by P. • The i-ideal monochromatic partitionof A(f) is obtained by i-partitioning each region in the ideal monochromatic partition of A(f).

  34. Subjective PARs (1) The 1-partition of region R in matrix A(f): { Rx1 = {x1} x {x2s.t. (x1, x2)  R} } (similarly, 2-partition) millionaire 2 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 I I I R1 (0, 1) = R1 (0, 2) = R1 (0, 3) I I R1 (1, 2) = R1 (1, 3) millionaire 1 P (Ri defined analogously for protocol P)

  35. Subjective PARs (2) • Worst-case PAR of protocol P for f wrti: • Worst-case subjective PAR of P for f: maximize over i {1, 2} • Worst-case subjective PAR of f: minimize over P • Average-case subjective PAR wrt distribution D: use ED instead of MAX |Ri (x1, x2)| |Ri (x1, x2)| MAX (x1, x2) I P

  36. Average-Case PARs for the Millionaires Problem 1 2 k +1 1 2 2

  37. Other Results • More PARs for these problems. • PARs of other problems • public-good • truthful-public-good[Babaioff-Blumrosen-Naor-Schapira] • set-disjointness • set-intersection • Other notions of privacy: first steps • Semantic definitions( What is better, {1, 8} or {4, 5} ? ) • Entropy-based definitions

  38. Open Problems • Upper bounds on non-uniform average-case PARs • Prove/refute our conjecture! • Lower bounds on average-case PARs • PARs of other functions of interest • Extension to n-party case • Other definitions of PAR • We take first steps in this direction. • Relationship between PARs and h-privacy[Bar-Yehuda, Chor, Kushilevitz, and Orlitsky (IEEE-IT ’93)]

  39. Thank You

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