Vertical monopoly
Download
1 / 26

Vertical Monopoly - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 145 Views
  • Updated On :

Vertical Monopoly. Econ 311. Vertical Monopoly. Bad Economist Joke: Q: What’s worse than one monopolist? A: Two monopolists How does monopoly power work in vertical markets? What is the double marginalization problem? How can we fix the double marginalization problem?.

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'Vertical Monopoly' - hamlin


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript

Vertical monopoly1
Vertical Monopoly

  • Bad Economist Joke:

    • Q: What’s worse than one monopolist?

    • A: Two monopolists

  • How does monopoly power work in vertical markets?

  • What is the double marginalization problem?

  • How can we fix the double marginalization problem?


Key lessons part 1
Key Lessons: Part 1

  • Profit Maximizing Pricing

    • Monopoly pricing

    • Look forward, reason back (for upstream firm)


Key lessons part 2
Key Lessons: Part 2

  • Integration:

    • How much value is created by integrating?

    • Who captures this value?

  • Contracting:

    • How much value is created through franchise fees?

    • Now who captures this value?


Double marginalization
Double Marginalization

  • Consider two independent firms, upstream (monopoly wholesaler) and downstream (monopoly retailer), that each have market power

  • Each firm then prices at a mark-up over marginal cost.

  • Recall that pricing above MC yields deadweight losses

  • Now these are being incurred twice!


Double marginalization1
Double Marginalization

  • If upstream and downstream merge, then upstream ceases to try to capture surplus from downstream.

  • Upstream prices (transfers) at MC.

  • One deadweight loss eliminated.

  • Like picking money up off the table!


Numerical example
Numerical Example

  • Retail demand P=24-Q

  • Upstream manufacturer with MC=4

  • Downstream retailer buys from wholesaler and incurs no other costs per unit.

  • In an integrated firm MCintegrated=4

  • First consider monopoly problem of an integrated firm.


Integrated firm
Integrated Firm

  • P=24-Q

  • TR=24Q-Q^2

  • MR=24-2Q

  • MR=MCintegrated => 24-2Q=4 =>Qm=10, Pm=24-10=14


2 firms
2 firms

  • Key point 1: For any wholesale price W charged by upstream manufacturer, MC of downstream retailer is W.

  • Downstream retailer is a monopolist that sets MCr=MRr => W= 24-2Q

  • Key point 2: Downstream market MR curve is the upstream market inverse demand curve (i.e., to sell each additional unit wholesale price must be reduced by 2)


2 firms1
2 firms

  • TRw of upstream firm is (24 –2Q)Q

  • MRw of upstream firm is 24-4Q

  • MRw=MCw => 24-4Q=4; Qw=5; W=24-10=14

  • W is MC of downstream firm

  • Downstream firm sets MCr=MRr=> W=24-2Q

  • 14=24-2Q => Qr=5; Pr=24-5=19


Double marginalization analysis graphically
Double Marginalization Analysis Graphically

Retail

Price

Retail Demand

24

Quantity

24


Double marginalization problem
Double Marginalization Problem

Retail

Price

24

Marginal Revenue

Of retailer=demand

Of wholesaler

Quantity

24


Double marginalization problem1
Double Marginalization Problem

Retail

Price

24

4

Marginal Cost

Quantity

QC =20

24


Double marginalization problem2
Double Marginalization Problem

Retail

Price

24

Marginal Cost

Quantity

QC

QC = 20

24

QM = 10


Double marginalization problem3
Double Marginalization Problem

Retail

Price

Wholesale profits

24

Wholesale Price

14

Wholesale

Margin

4

Marginal Cost

Quantity

QC = 20

24

QM = 10

QDM=5


Double marginalization problem4
Double Marginalization Problem

Retail

Price

Retail profits

24

19

Retail

Margin

Wholesale Price

14

4

Marginal Cost

Quantity

QC = 20

24

QM = 10

QDM = 5


Welfare is reduced
Welfare is reduced

  • Everyone is worse off under double marginalization

  • Firms are worse off in terms of industry profits:

    • Under Double Marginalization

      • 5 units x ($19 - $4) = $75

    • Under Monopoly

      • 10 units x ($14 - $4) = $100


Consumers are worse off too
Consumers Are Worse Off Too

Retail

Price

Surplus Under double marginalization

24

Wholesale Price

Marginal Cost

Quantity

QC

24

QDM

QM


Consumers are worse off too1
Consumers Are Worse Off Too

Retail

Price

Surplus Under monopoly

24

Wholesale Price

Marginal Cost

Quantity

QC

24

QDM

QM


Experiment
Experiment

  • In the experiment, I used the retail demand function equal to P=12-Q.

  • Wholesaler’s marginal cost MCw=4

  • Wholesaler’s demand W=12-2Q

  • As a result, W=8, Qw=2

  • And Pr=10, Qr=2

  • How do theoretical predictions compare to experimental evidence?


Experiment1
Experiment

  • Treatment 1: Integrated Vertical Monopoly (1 firm)

  • Treatment 2: Wholesaler and retailer as 2 monopolies.


Classic example gm and fisher body
Classic Example: GM and Fisher Body

  • Fisher body had custom machines and dies to produce car bodies for GM

  • GM’s chassis were likewise customized for Fisher’s bodies.

  • There was upstream and downstream market power (double marginalization problem)

  • GM acquires Fisher body


Contractual solutions
Contractual Solutions

  • Using “two-part tariffs” can also overcome the double marginalization problem.

  • Recipe for Two-Part Tariffs

  • Part 1: Maximize value created

  • Part 2: Use the fixed fee to capture value


Two part tariffs in action
Two-Part Tariffs in Action

  • Part 1: Maximize Value Created

    • The wholesaler can set the wholesale price at marginal cost

    • This maximizes the size of industry profits

  • Part 2: Capture Value

    • It can then use the franchise fee to capture the bulk of this additional value created.


Other issues
Other Issues

  • How should competition authorities in government view this type of firm behavior?

  • Are there other contractual forms that might solve this problem?

  • Why might some firms solve the problem by merging while others prefer contracts?


ad