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CCSDS Security WG - . I. Aguilar, D. Fischer CCSDS Fall 2012 Meeting, Cleveland, USA 15/10/2012. Motivation.

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ccsds security wg

CCSDS Security WG -

I. Aguilar, D. FischerCCSDS Fall 2012 Meeting, Cleveland, USA15/10/2012

motivation
Motivation
  • The objective of this presentation is to share information concerning recent ESA activities and participation to conferences and workshops which is deemed relevant to the CCSDS Security Working Group.
    • Information.
    • Discussion of possible new areas for work.
topics
Topics
  • Physical Layer Security (IAS).
  • Ongoing Key Management Research at ESA-University of Waterloo (IAS/DF).
  • Directions in Authenticated Ciphers (DIAC 2012 Workshop) - Debriefing (IAS/DF).
  • ESTEL 2012 Conference - Debriefing (IAS).
  • SpaceOps 2012 Conference – Debriefing (DF).
physical layer security cryptographic spread spectrum 1
Physical Layer SecurityCryptographic spread spectrum (1)
  • As part of a general effort to strengthen TT&C links against denial-of-service attacks (jamming), ESA initiated research on two specific topics:
    • Cryptographic sequences to be applied on spread spectrum communications with multiple-user access capability and
    • Advanced synchronization techniques able to acquire such ultra-long codes under signal dynamic conditions (Doppler, jerk) experienced by various missions topologies as well as under stress (jamming).
  • Such research was funded with an activity of the ESA Technology Research Programme (TRP). Thales Alenia Space (Italy), a leading European supplier of ‘robust’ transponders, teamed up with Prof. J. Massey, a well-known authority on both pseudo-noise sequences and cryptography.
physical layer security cryptographic spread spectrum 2
Physical Layer SecurityCryptographic spread spectrum (2)
  • The research effort delivered good results. A family of pseudo-noise sequences that can provide both cryptographic strength and controlled cross-correlation, vital for multi-user access was identified.
  • Cryptographic Pseudo-Noise Sequences:
    • LetPNCRbe the cryptographically strong1 PN sequence that is assigned to every satellite.
    • LetPNMA(i)be the periodic1 PN spreading sequence whose first period corresponds to the phase of the maximal-length sequence that is assigned to theithsatellite.
    • Spreading sequencePN(i)used by the G/S for transmission to theithsatellite is the Hadamard productof PNCRand PNMA(i), i.e.,

PN(i) = PNCRPNMA(i).

physical layer security cryptographic spread spectrum 3
Physical Layer SecurityCryptographic spread spectrum (3)
  • Furthermore, techniques to quickly synchronize very long PN sequences were identified, analysed and evaluated.
    • Those techniques, based on frequency-domain signal processing algorithms (Generalized Zero Padding), have improved several orders of magnitude the performance compared with classical serial search techniques.
    • In combination with a clever 3-step acquisition protocol, they allow to transit from an already long PN sequence (2exp 22) to a cryptographic sequence in a few seconds.
  • Some details of the acquisition technique can be found on the following paper presented at MILCOM 2011.
    • Fast acquisition techniques for very long PN codes for On-Board Secure TTC transponders, L. Simone, G.Fittipaldi, I. Aguilar Sánchez.
physical layer security advanced tc coding 1
Physical Layer SecurityAdvanced TC Coding (1)
  • CCSDS Telecommand SpaceLink Protocol employs BCH code either in TED (triple error detection) or SED (single error correction) modes.
    • High integrity;
    • Somewhat limited coding gain;
    • Average White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel.
  • Such BCH codes are sub-optimal for spread spectrum modulations.
    • Poor performance under jamming, which produces burst errors.
  • Enhancement for cryptographic direct-sequence spread-spectrum modulation highly desirable.
    • Potential to increase robustness under interference/jamming.
  • Concatenation of convolutional (r=1/2, K=7) existing for a while in systems like TDRSS and used in missions like ATV
    • Improvement under AWGN condition;
    • Still too sensitive to burst errors.
physical layer security advanced tc coding 2
Physical Layer SecurityAdvanced TC Coding (2)
  • Can better codes be found to complement cryptographic direct-sequence spread-spectrum modulation?
    • Consider the particular requirements of TC protocol like the ability to encode from short (64 octets) to relatively large (1024 octets) blocks of data;
    • Consider most destructive jamming signals for direct-sequence modulation (e.g. pulsed jammer);
    • Consider coding literature;
    • Consider relevant CCSDS experience.
  • A study with Politecnico di Torino (Italy) and Univ. Politecnicadelle Marche (Italy) just initiated in September 2012.
    • Team has very strong record both on coding and CCSDS;
    • Targets mainly Binary Low Density Parity Check Codes (LDPC);
    • Considers as well NASA LDPC codes proposed for TC (in AWGN condition) but under jamming environment.
physical layer security secret channels
Physical Layer SecuritySecret channels
  • C. Shannon, the father of Information Theory, among other key works established the foundations of secret channel capacity;
  • A.D. Wynerbuilds on previous Shannon work on secret channels and produces another seminal paper
    • The Wire-Tap Channel, Bell System Technical Journal, 1975.
physical layer security why bother
Physical Layer SecurityWhy bother?
  • The design of proper ‘channel codes’ can increase the Rate of Equivocation (term defined by Shannon) of the eavesdropper;
  • In theory, no need for data encryption with such codes on a wireless channel!
    • Unbreakable, regardless of attacker’s computing power;
    • Mobile communications research community is very actively working on this subject;
    • Authentication also possible;
  • The cryptographers contender to quantum encryption, working on RF!
  • In the absence of my personal database on this topic (hard disk with all my files undergoing encryption at ESTEC!) present some slides from Vince Poor (Princeton) covering the topic.
    • http://wireless.vt.edu/symposium/2012/keynote/poor.html
on going key management research esa npi 1
On-going Key Management ResearchESA NPI (1)
  • ESA and the University of Waterloo (Canada) are working together on key management research for space missions under the ESA Network Partnering Initiative (NPI).
    • Each partner funds 50% of the research.
    • Research can be for a Ph.D. or post-doc.
  • Dr.MarcioJuliato (Univ. of Waterloo) is the lead researcher.
  • Project Co-supervisors:
    • Prof. Catherine H. Gebotys (Univ. of Waterloo);
    • I. Aguilar Sánchez (ESA/ESTEC).
  • Project Details:
    • Schedule:
      • 3-years, initiated summer 2011,
      • of which 1-year stay at ESTEC with visits to ESOC.
on going key management research esa npi 2
On-going Key Management ResearchESA NPI (2)
    • 3 Phases:
      • Phase 1, focusing on providing scientific basis for the determination of crypto periods for TC and TM secure communications links on space missions based on symmetric algorithms; 2 generic missions considered with GEO and LEO orbits;
      • Phase 2, looking at the use of trusted modules for key management/recovery;
      • Phase 3, investigating more complex mission topologies like those relying on space networks and the application of asymmetric algorithms to support key management.
  • Results of first phase:
    • Draft Technical Report produced;
    • Paper recently presented at IEEE AESS ESTEL 2012 Conference.
      • On the Specification of Symmetric Key Management Parameters for Secure Space Missions, MarcioJuliato, Catherine Gebotys, Ignacio Aguilar Sanchez.
directions in authenticated ciphers diac 2012 workshop 1
Directions in Authenticated Ciphers (DIAC 2012 Workshop) (1)
  • This workshop is part of ECRYPT, the European Network of Excellence in Cryptology; this is a network funded by the European Commission Seventh Framework Programme.
  • This workshop gathered top cryptographers and practitioners in industry and academia like
    • B. Preneel, Univ. KatoliekLeuven (Belgium);
    • P. Rogaway, Univ. of California at Davis, USA;
    • J. Daemen, STM Microelectronics, AES father;
    • A, McGrew, CISCO, USA (AES-GCM father);
  • The following website provides relevant information:
    • http://hyperelliptic.org/DIAC/
  • ESA presented a ‘white paper’ with a view to inform the research community and possibly trigger their interest about the particular requirements, issues, constraints and concerns of authenticated encryption:
    • Authenticated encryption in civilian space missions: context and requirements, I. Aguilar Sánchez, D. Fischer
directions in authenticated ciphers diac 2012 workshop 2
Directions in Authenticated Ciphers (DIAC 2012 Workshop) (2)
  • Feedback:
    • Space considered a user community at one (tough) end of the spectrum of user requirements (T. Lange dixit);
    • At opposite end one can find the so-called ‘lightweight cryptography’ (e.g. embedded processors);
    • Some surprise shown by the anticipated need for a MAC longer than 128 bits (D. McGrew);
    • Doubt raised about the true security strength given by a particular MAC length, triggered by conversation with P. Rogaway; apparently a 128-bit MAC would give 128-bit security (not 64-bit); question still to be solved!
    • NIST and some top non-European Universities (USA, Japan) actively involved in the Workshop;
    • Possibly a new competition for an advanced AE algorithm in the pipeline; certainly, a lot of interest by represented parties; however, who would fund it?
estel 2012 conference
ESTEL 2012 Conference
  • See http://www.estelconference.org/
  • Organised by IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society in Europe (a first!);
    • Broad scope: satellites, launchers, navigation, earth observation, ground systems, satellite networks,…
  • A Special Track on Security and Privacy…
    • Covering a broad range of security issues, well beyond space missions.
  • But a good Security Session in general program with papers like
    • Marcio’s paper on Key Management;
    • Cryptographic Transforms for a Lightweight and Efficient DVB Link-Layer Security Extension, Michael Nosterning, University of Salzburg;
    • Ignacio’s paper on Telecommunication Mission Security, including PR campaign for CCSDS Security!