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Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication in the Mobile Environment

Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication in the Mobile Environment. Jiannong Cao, Lin Liao, Guojun Wang Pervasive and Mobile Computing 2 (2006) 2007. 11. 8 Kim Pyung. Introduction. IP Multicast Saves a great deal of bandwidth

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Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication in the Mobile Environment

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  1. Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication in the Mobile Environment Jiannong Cao, Lin Liao, Guojun Wang Pervasive and Mobile Computing 2 (2006) 2007. 11. 8 Kim Pyung

  2. Introduction • IP Multicast • Saves a great deal of bandwidth • Needs group key management in a scalable and secure manner • Scalability • Under the mobile Internet environment • Frequent moving, joining and leaving, and the large size of a group • 1-affects-N phenomenon ( re-keying message, # of enc/decryption ) • Security • Backward / forward confidentiality Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  3. System Model and Assumptions • Scalable and Hierarchical key management(SHKM) • S : multicast source • F: forwarding node, subgroup manager • CA : Centralized authority Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  4. SHKM : Main idea • Hierarchy by subgroup priority ordering • Fi » Fj • Initiation : RSA algorithm • Randomly chosen TEKs by SGM • The parameters for derivation of the lower group’s TEK from CA • changing residue ej, related factor гij Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  5. SHKM : Key Generation SGM Si chooses the TEK ki CA gets (PK, SK) by RSA PK : public key EPK(ki) DSK(ki) changing residue : ei = ki2 mod n ( n is secret ) if Sj » Si, related factor : гji= h(Zkj ei mod P)  ki Si CA Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  6. SHKM : Key Derivation TEK : kj requests for access Si parameters : ei, гji Ekj( ei, гji ) check Sj » Si ? Dkj ( ei, гji ) TEK of Si : ki = h(Zkj ei mod P)  гji Sj CA Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  7. SHKM : Key Modification • the relationship : Sj » Sl » Si key modification : kl  kl* el* = ( kl*)2 mod n гjl* =h(Zkj el* mod P)  kl* гli* = h(Zkl*ei mod P)  ki Only direct successor and predecessor of Sl Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  8. SHKM : Protocol analysis • Adding a new subgroup • A new subgroup Si into an existing multicast group • the changing residue ei, related factor г(CA) • No re-keying message and No re-generation of a new TEK for whole group  Scalable • vs Key Graph ? • Backward confidentiality? Sh » Si (new) » Sj » Sk » Sl Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  9. SHKM : Protocol analysis • Deletion of a subgroup • For the higher-priority subgroups • Delete the changing residue e, related factor г(CA) • No re-key message • For the lower-priority subgroups • New TEK for lower-priority subgroups • New changing residue e, related factor г(CA) • vs Centralized protocols ? - the cost transferred to CA Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  10. SHKM : Protocol analysis • Leaving of subgroup members • Multiple leaving about h, (mi, mi+1, …, mi+h-1) in Sl • New TEK kl* for Sl  new changing residue el(CA) • For the higher-priority subgroups • New related factor г(CA) • For the lower-priority subgroups • New TEK for lower-priority subgroups • New changing residue e, related factor г(CA) Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  11. SHKM : Protocol analysis • Joining of a new subgroup member • New TEK kl* for Sl  new changing residue el (CA) • For the higher-priority subgroups • New related factor г(CA) • For the lower-priority subgroups  backward confidentiality • New related factor г(CA) Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  12. SHKM : Protocol analysis • Migration of member between subgroups • First entry delayed re-keying + periodic (FEDRP) • A TEK timer table for members residing outside the subgroup • Leaving or timer expire  “Reset” • A lower re-keying rate Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  13. Attack Analysis • Continuous attack (in Lin’ scheme) ki is exposed Sj » Si гji = Zkj IDi mod P  ki ki = Zkj IDi mod P  гji ki*= Zkj IDi mod P  гji*  ki*=h( Zkj ei*mod P )  гji* • Sibling attack Sj » Si andSj » Sl h( Zkj ei* mod P ) = гji*  ki h( Zkj el* mod P ) = гjl*  kl Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  14. Evaluation n : # of group users s : # of groups t : # of ave successors m : # of ave dir-successors r : related factor computation e : changing residue computation Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

  15. Conclusions • No re-keying messages, but some reporting messages • Reduced enc/dec cost compared with decentralized  transferred to CA • The defense of malicious attacks Scalable Key Management for Secure Multicast Communication

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