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Northeast Normal University, Changchun, 29 May 2013. Defaults, Inferences, and the Limits of Contextualism Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21. Primary/secondary meaning distinction cuts across the explicit/implicit divide

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Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Northeast Normal University, Changchun, 29 May 2013

Defaults, Inferences,

and the Limits of Contextualism

Kasia M. Jaszczolt

University of Cambridge

http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013


Sources of information for
Sources of information for explicit/implicit divide

(i) world knowledge (WK)

(ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

(iii) situation of discourse (SD)

(iv)properties of the human inferential system (IS)

(v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC)



Mapping between sources and processes
Mapping between sources and processes explicit/implicit divide

WK  SCWD or CPI

SC  SCWD or CPI

WS  WS (logical form)

SD  CPI

IS  CD

DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of  with a subscript standing for the type of processing.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Two explicit/implicit divideexamples of applications


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Example 1 explicit/implicit divide

First-person reference in discourse


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013. 'First-person reference in discourse: Aims and strategies'. Journal of Pragmatics 48. 57-70.

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. in press. 'Contextualism and minimalism on de se belief ascription'. In: A. Capone and N. Feit (eds). Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.


The scenario
The scenario: Aims and strategies'.

(1) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.

(2)I am to blame. I completely forgot I was put in charge.

after Perry (1979: 3)


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

De se Aims and strategies'. reading


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

referential semantics conflates (1) with (2): Aims and strategies'.

(1) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.

(2) I am to blame.

x [to-blame(x)] (kasia jaszczolt)


Grammar produces the self referring function
? Aims and strategies'. Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.


Grammar produces the self referring function1
? Aims and strategies'. Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

T Aims and strategies'. he cognitive access to the self is present in

the semantics (in some form or other).


An argument from non pronominal expressions but not the one you expect
An argument from non-pronominal expressions Aims and strategies'. (but not the one you expect)

xPace Chierchia, cognitive access to oneself is not so ‘systematically’ excluded from the interpretation of non-pronominal expressions:

(3) Sammy wants a biscuit.

(4) Mummy will be with you in a moment.


Honorifics
Honorifics Aims and strategies'. :

  • Japanese and Thai: the first-person marker has the characteristics of both a pronoun and a noun. Pronouns and nouns are not morphologically different: like nouns, pronouns do not form a closed class; like nouns, they form the plural by adding a plural morpheme;

  • also e.g. Burmese, Javanese, Khmer, Korean, Malay, or Vietnamese.

    Typically: ‘slave’, ‘servant’, royal slave’, ‘lord’s servant’, ‘Buddha’s servant’ are used for self-reference with self-denigration;

  • Thai: 27 forms of first person (cf. ‘mouse’) (Siewierska 2004: 228; Heine and Song (2011));

  • Japanese: 51 form (Tanaka 2012);

  • Mandarin Chinese


Conflation of the nominal with the pronominal
Conflation of the nominal with the pronominal: Aims and strategies'.

  • Acoma (New Mexico), Wari’ (Brazil): no personal pronouns;

  • Generic one and arbitrary PRO:

    (5) One can hear the wolves from the veranda.

    (6) It is scary PRO to hear the wolves from the veranda.

    Generic one and arbitrary (non-controlled) PRO express ‘generalizing detached self-reference.’ Moltmann (2010: 440)


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

  • Counterfactuals: Aims and strategies'.

    ‘if I were you’ conveys second-person oriented advice: (Moltmann 2010: 453)

    (7) If I were you I would wait a couple of days before issuing a complaint.

    cf.

    (8) Wait a couple of days before issuing a complaint.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Spatial Aims and strategies'. deixis:

  • Thai phŏm1 nii2 ( ‘one male this’);

  • Japanese kotira, Korean yeogi, and Vietnamese hây (‘here’) used for self-reference;


Degrees of cognitive access to oneself
Degrees of cognitive access to oneself: Aims and strategies'.

(9)I think I put this book back on the shelf.

(10) I think I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.

(11)I put this book back on the shelf.

(12) I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.

 Conscious awareness is present to different degrees rather than as a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic.


An argument from conceptual shift
An argument from conceptual shift Aims and strategies'.

(13) ‘It1+t2 believe I should have prepared the drinks party. In a way It1 also believed that It1+t2 should have done it when It1 walked into the room. The fact is, the person appointed by the Faculty Board should have done it and as It1 later realised It1+t2 was this person.’


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Wiem Aims and strategies'. t1+t2, że to jat1+t2 powinnam byłat1+t2

know1SgPres that Dem INom should1SgFPast

przygotować te drinki. W pewnym sensie,

prepareInf thisAccPldrinkPlMAcc In certainSgMInstr senseSgMInstr

wtedy też wiedziałamt1, ponieważ miała je

then also know1SgFPast because be-toSgFPast theyNMAcc

przygotować osoba wybrana przez Radę Wydziału,

prepareInf personSgFNomselected by BoardSgFAccFacultySgMGen

a to jat1+t2byłam tą osobą.

and Dem INombeSgFPastDemSgFInstr personSgFInstr


An argument from 1 st person pronoun
An argument from 1 Aims and strategies'. st person pronoun

Kratzer(2009): pronouns can be ambiguous between a referential and a bound-variable interpretation

(14) I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children.

(15)Only I admitted what I did wrong.

(16) Only you can eat what you cook.


Restriction bound variable uses are rare restricted and differ from language to language
Restriction: Bound-variable uses are rare, restricted, and differ from language to language.

Tylko ja jeden przyznałem się do błędu.

only 1Sg soleSgMNom admit1SgPastMRefl to mistakeSgMGen

Tylko ja jedna tutaj potrafię zajmować się

Only 1Sg soleSgFNom here can1SgPres careInf Refl

swoimi dziećmi.

ReflPronPl Instr childPl Instr


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

differ from language to language. Grammatical foundation of self-reference cannot be excluded.


An argument from pro but not the one you expect
An argument from PRO (but not the one you expect) differ from language to language.

(17) Lidia wants to be a scientist.

no underlying ‘I’-reference ‘I want to be a scientist.’


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

(18) differ from language to language. Alice wants what Lidia wants.

underlying ‘I’-reference (self-attribution of property)

But:

(19) Lidia’s mother wants what Lidia wants and that’s why she is buying her lots of scientific books.

no underlying ‘I’-reference ( propositionalism)


Summary so far
Summary so far differ from language to language.

  • Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself does not fit into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.


Summary so far1
Summary so far differ from language to language.

  • Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself does not fit into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.

  • Instead, the device standardly used for this purpose in English, the first-person singular pronoun, can have other uses as well, and devices that specialise for other uses, such as common nouns and proper names, can adopt the function of reference de se.


Summary so far2
Summary so far differ from language to language.

  • Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself does not fit into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.

  • Instead, the device standardly used for this purpose in English, the first-person singular pronoun, can have other uses as well, and devices that specialise for other uses, such as common nouns and proper names, can adopt the function of reference de se.

  • This suggests that there is no clear indexical/non-indexical distinciton.

    (Jaszczolt 2012)


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

The cognitive access to oneself is differ from language to language.

?‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions’;

?‘systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns’;

x ‘systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds’;

‘associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

 lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs differ from language to language.


Reports de se de re about oneself
Reports differ from language to language.de se/de re about oneself

(20) Kasia believes that she is to blame.

quasi-indexical


A disclaimer non coreferential readings
A disclaimer: non-coreferential readings differ from language to language.

Kasiax believes that shex is to blame.

a strong tendency for coreference, van der Sandt’s (1992) (presupposition as anaphora)

grammar delivers contextualist default contents


Towards a pragmatic solution
Towards a (pragmatic) solution differ from language to language.

  • self-ascription (linguistic semantic)

  • self-reference (linguistic pragmatic)

  • self-attribution (epistemic)

  • self-awareness (cognitive)


Grammar conveys self awareness
? differ from language to language.Grammar conveys self-awareness

Allocation of self-awareness to grammar is a matter of an agreement as to what we want the grammar to do: capture strong tendencies or capture patterns that underdetermine meaning.

 minimalist or contextualist account


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

  • Proposal: We should differ from language to language.not ‘split’ the power of grammar into that pertaining to the system and that pertaining to how grammar functions in utterance processing.

    De se belief ascription provides strong support for a contextualist, but grammar-triggered construal


De se in default semantics jaszczolt 2013 in press
De Se differ from language to language.in Default SemanticsJaszczolt 2013, in press

Bel (x,’)

the individual x has the cognitive state represented as an embedded representation ’


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

  • CD differ from language to language. default status of de re

  • coreference x=y

    (iii)  de se (= from CD, WS)


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

?/ differ from language to language.In a sense, It1 believed It1+t2 was to blame. It1 just didn’t know that the person It1 referred to was It1+t2.


Merger representation
Merger representation: differ from language to language.

  • coreference: condition [y=x]WS

  • the lack of self-awareness: differentiation of indexing on x and y (CD vs CPI) and the non-default use of the belief operator (CPI)




Conclusions
Conclusions reading)

  • There is substantial cross-linguistic evidence that there is no reliable representation of self-awareness in the grammar or the lexicon. Instead, there is a lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-off, allowing for various degrees of salience of communicating cognitive access to oneself.

  • Self-awareness can be construed as conveyed by the grammar only when grammar is allowed to produce cancellable interpretations. This is best achieved on a contextualist account such as Default/Interactive Semantics.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Example 2 reading)

Conditional utterances and conditional thoughts

(with Chi-Hé Elder)


No strict correlation between the form of a conditional expression and the conditional meaning
No strict correlation between the form of a conditional expression and the conditional meaning

(i)Conditional sentences are not the only way to express conditional thoughts:

(1) Say one word against Margaret Thatcher and David will be offended.

(Ifyou say one word against MT, D will be offended.)

(2) Your money or your life.

(If you don’t give me your money I will take your life.)


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

(ii) Conditional sentences can be put to a variety of uses other than to express conditional thought:

(3) If you wouldn’t mind, could you close the door?

(4) If that’s a real diamond I’ll eat my hat!


A cross linguistic perspective
A cross-linguistic perspective other than to express conditional thought:

GuuguYimithirr (Australian, QNL): no overt conditionals

(5) The dog might bark. The postman might run away.

Evans & Levinson (2009: 443), after Haviland 1979


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Common ground other than to express conditional thought:

‘supposing p, then q’


Extending the scope two directions
Extending the scope: two directions other than to express conditional thought:

(i) to ‘non-ordinary conditional sentences’

(ii) to conditional thoughts in a non-conditional form


I a different roles of the antecedent
i.a. Different roles of the antecedent other than to express conditional thought:

(6) If you haven’t heard yet, the Queen attended the funeral.


I b different speech acts
i.b. Different speech acts other than to express conditional thought:

(7) If you rang her now she’d say yes. (advice)

(8) Be great if you would do that. (request)


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

  • hedging other than to express conditional thought:

  • indication of a speech act type

  • conventional expressions of politeness, …


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013
ii other than to express conditional thought:

(9) Give him a treat and he will be your friend for life.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

conditional sentence other than to express conditional thought:x

conditional thought 


Examples
Examples other than to express conditional thought:

Overt conditional

(10) Be great if you would do that.

(11) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.

(12) If you don’t mind me saying so, you look dreadful in this frock.

No overt conditional

(13) Snowing? Let’s go skiing.

(14) Touch his iPad and he will scream.

(15) The dog might bark. The postman might run away. (Guugu Yimithirr)


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

Compositionality on the level of interaction of processes ( other than to express conditional thought:interactive compositionality)

Different from:

Frege’s compositionality

‘Gestaltist’, pragmatic compositionality (Recanati 2004)

Compositionality of thought >> compositionality of language in Embodied Construction Grammar (e.g. Feldman’s 2010)


Conditionals in interactive semantics
Conditionals in Interactive Semantics other than to express conditional thought:


Representing conditional thought two dimensions
Representing conditional thought (two dimensions) other than to express conditional thought:

1.p ?PM

‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’

2. p ?SM

‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’ PM: ‘Please put your helmet on.’

3. pqWS, PM

‘If it rains, we will stay at home.’

4.pqWS, SM

‘If you are hungry, there is food in the fridge.’ PM: ‘Help yourself to food.’

5.pq, PM

‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’ PM: ‘If you touch his iPad, he will scream.’

?6. pq, SM

‘Please put your helmet on.’ SM: ‘If you put the helmet on, you will be safer.’


Fig 5 for 1 p pm if you leave the tea on a wobbly table
Fig. 5. other than to express conditional thought: for 1. p?PM ‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’


Fig 6 for 2 p sm if you d like to put on your helmet
Fig. 6. other than to express conditional thought: for 2. p ?SM‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’

PM: ‘Please put your helmet on.’


Fig 7 for 5 p q pm touch his ipad and he will scream
Fig. 7. other than to express conditional thought: for 5. pq, PM‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’


Conclusions1
Conclusions other than to express conditional thought:

  • The diversity of (i) uses to which conditional if can be put and (ii) ways of expressing conditional meaning can be represented in a radical contextualist account (IS).

  • The semantics of conditionals is best pursued when conditional thought is adopted as the object of study, where such conditional thoughts constitute primary or secondary meaning of an utterance that is expressed by a conditional or other sentence form.


Final word
Final word… other than to express conditional thought:

  • Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, sought at the level of Σs rather than WS.


Radical contextualism
radical contextualism other than to express conditional thought:

  • holistic (interactive semantics)

  • compositional (pragmatic compositionality)

  • ?algorithmic (merger representation)


Select references
Select References other than to express conditional thought:

  • Chierchia, G. 1989. ‘Anaphora and attitudes de se’. In: R. Bartsch, J. van Benthem and B. van Emde Boas (eds). Semantics and Contextual Expression. Dordrecht: Foris. 1-31.

  • Elder, C. 2012. ‘The underlying conditionality of conditionals which do not use if’. Cambridge Occasional Papers in Linguistics 6.

  • Heine, B. and K.-A. Song. 2011. On the grammaticalisation of personal pronouns. Journal of Linguistics 47: 587-630.

  • Higginbotham, J. 2003. Remembering, imagining, and the first person. In: A. Barber (ed.). Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 496-533.

  • Higginbotham, J. 2010. ‘On words and thoughts about oneself’. In: F. Recanati, I. Stojanovic, and N. Villanueva (eds). Context-Dependence, Perspective, and Relativity. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 253-282.

  • Huang, Y. 2000. Anaphora: A Cross-Linguistic Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2005. other than to express conditional thought:Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2006. ‘Defaults in semantics and pragmatics’. In: E. N. Zalta(ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2009a. Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2009b. ‘Cancellability and the primary/secondary meaning distinction’. Intercultural Pragmatics 6. 259-289.

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 215-246.

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2012. ' 'Pragmaticising' Kaplan: Flexible inferential bases and fluid characters'. Australian Journal of Linguistics 32. 209-237.

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013. 'First-person reference in discourse: Aims and strategies'. Journal of Pragmatics 48. 57-70.


Northeast normal university changchun 29 may 2013

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. in press. 'Contextualism and minimalism on other than to express conditional thought:de se belief ascription'. In: A. Capone and N. Feit (eds). Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

  • Jaszczolt, K. M. in progress. Interactive Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Kamp, H. and U. Reyle. 1993. From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

  • Kaplan, D. 1989. ‘Demonstratives’. In: J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds). Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. 481-563.

  • Kratzer, A. 1991. ‘Conditionals’. Reprinted in 2012, Modals and Conditionals. Oxford University Press. 86-108.

  • Kratzer, A. 2009. ‘Making a pronoun: Fake indexicals and windows into the properties of pronouns’. Linguistic Inquiry 40. 187-237. Lewis, D. 1979. ‘Attitudes de dicto and de se’. Philosophical Review 88. 513-543.

  • Maier, E. 2009. ‘Presupposing acquaintance: A unified semantics for de dicto, de re and de se belief reports’. Linguistics and Philosophy 32. 429-474.


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  • Moltmann, F. 2010. ‘Generalizing detached self-reference and the semantics of generic one.’ Mind and Language 25. 440-473.

  • Perry, J. 1979. ‘The problem of the essential indexical’. Noûs 13. 3-21.

  • Perry, J. 2001. Reference and Reflexivity. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

  • Perry J. 2012. ‘Thinking about the self’. In: J. Liu and J. Perry (eds). Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 76-100.

  • Recanati, F. 2012. ‘Contextualism: Some varieties’. In: In: K. Allan and K. M. Jaszczolt (eds). The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 135-149.

  • van der Sandt, R. A. 1992. ‘Presupposition projection as anaphora resolution’. Journal of Semantics 9. 333-377.

  • Schlenker, P. 2003. ‘A plea for monsters’. Linguistics and Philosophy 26. 29-120.

  • Schlenker, P. in press. ‘Indexicality and de se reports’. In: K. von Heusinger, P. Portner and C. Maienborn (eds). Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

  • Siewierska, A. 2004. Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.