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Threat Support Directorate

Threat Support Directorate. TRADOC DCSINT. 1. UNCLASSIFIED. THREATS IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. 2. UNCLASSIFIED. OBJECTIVES. Describe the contemporary operational environment (COE). Describe the kinds of threats the US Army may face in the COE. 3.

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Threat Support Directorate

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  1. Threat Support Directorate TRADOC DCSINT 1

  2. UNCLASSIFIED THREATS IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2 UNCLASSIFIED

  3. OBJECTIVES • Describe the contemporary operational environment (COE). • Describe the kinds of threats the US Army may face in the COE. 3

  4. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT . A composite of all the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. IN SHORT: The factors and variables that affect where soldiers will live, work, and fight. 4

  5. THREAT Any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could be adversarial or challenge the security interests of the United States, its friends, or allies. IN SHORT: A potential adversary to the United States. 5

  6. COLD WAROPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR) . An organized force created by and from U.S. army units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force. AR 350-2 (1976) 6

  7. Today’s Army • Mission Focused on Soviet-Bloc Threat: • Soviet Union • Warsaw Pact • North Korea • Cuba • Forward-Deployed Forces Overseas • But We Fought Elsewhere Cold War Army HOW THE ARMY HAS EVOLVED • Many Possible Threats • CONUS-Based Forces • Capability to Move Our Forces • Broad Range of Missions Worldwide • Mobile and Lethal Forces The Army of 2010 and Beyond ? ? Bosnia Desert Storm Haiti Kosovo Panama Somalia 7

  8. CONTEMPORARYOPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR) . A plausible, flexible military and/or nonmilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing US forces. 8

  9. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT RUSSIA EU BOSNIA UNITED STATES CHECHNYA KOREA CHINA TURKEY JAPAN INDIA-PAKISTAN CUBA ALGERIA EGYPT MEXICO HAITI IRAQ IRAN SUDAN TAIWAN PANAMA COLOMBIA SOMALIA LIBERIA RWANDA BRAZIL INDONESIA SOUTH AFRICA AUSTRALIA 9

  10. ACTORS • Who are the actors (participants)? • Nation-states (countries). • Non-nation actors. 10

  11. NATION-STATE ACTORS • Core states (major powers). • Transition states (want-to-be). • Rogue states (hostile). • Failed or failing states (instability). • Countries can switch categories. • Multinational alliances and coalitions. 11

  12. NON-NATION ACTORS • Rogue actors: • Terrorist. • Drug-trafficking. • Criminal. 12

  13. NON-NATION ACTORS (Cont) • Third-party actors: • Civilians on the battlefield. • International humanitarian relief organizations. C.A.R.E. 13

  14. NON-NATION ACTORS (Cont) • Media agencies. • Multinational corporations: • Information. • Manipulation. • Help transition states build infrastructure. • Influence regional affairs for economic gain. • Concern about collateral damage. • Armed security forces. 14

  15. FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US • Major power with overall technological advantage. • Avoid direct fighting and rely on air campaign and standoff technology. • Depend on high technology. • Depend on information dominance. 15

  16. FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US (Cont) • Unwilling to accept heavy losses. • Sensitive to domestic and world opinion. • Lack of commitment over time. • Lack of cultural awareness. • Conduct predictable military operations. 16

  17. FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US (Cont) • Vulnerability of coalitions. • Vulnerability of force projection. • Depend on robust logistics. • Rely on contractor support. • Downsize after conflict. 17

  18. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE • Avoid your opponent’s strengths. • Use whatever advantages you may have against his weaknesses. • Our enemies are not going to fight “our kind of war.” 18

  19. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT TERRORISM AND RISING CRIME GLOBAL VILLAGE PHENOMENA TECHNOLOGY/ INFORMATION AGE ECONOMIC DETERMINISM & DEMOGRAPHIC TENSION ROGUE STATES SUB-NATIONAL GROUPS THREATENING CONDITIONS STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCES AND TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY/ WEAPONS PROLIFERATION POLITICAL DECONFLICTION ETHNO- LINGUISTIC PAN-NATIONALISM CULTURAL/ SOCIETAL CONCERNS DIMINISHED EFFECTS OF TIME AND SPACE MULTIPOLAR REGIONAL POWER CENTERS INCREASED RISK 19

  20. CRITICAL VARIABLES Operational Environment Nature & Stability of the State Information Economics Technology Makeup of Population Alliances & Coalitions Military Capabilities Time National Will Physical Environment External Organizations 20

  21. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT • Military forces are optimized for certain environments. • Less complex and open environments favor the US. • Enemies will try to use urban environments and other complex terrain to their advantage. 21

  22. NATURE AND STABILITYOF THE STATE • How strong or how shaky. • Where the real strength is. • Who is in charge. • Nature and aims of military campaign. • Kinds of threat present. 22

  23. MAKEUP OF POPULATION • Cultural, religious, ethnic. • Failed and failing states. • Devotion to a cause. • Refugees and displaced persons. • Urban environments (cities). 23

  24. ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS • Political, economic, military, or cultural. • Regional or global. • Opponents can influence our coalitions. • Add to military capability and broaden scale of military operations. • Unpredictability. • Nonaligned states. 24

  25. MILITARY CAPABILITIES • The most critical and most complex factor. • Foreign views: • US has overall technological advantage. • Others use this as guide to optimizing their own capabilities and negating ours. • Conventional against local or regional actors. • Adaptive (asymmetric) when US becomes involved. 25

  26. MILITARY CAPABILITIES (Cont) • Conventional: • US has significant advantage. • Head-to-head fight unlikely until they develop … • High-end forces may have equality or temporary superiority. • Adaptive (Asymmetric): • Exploit US weaknesses. • Technological surprise. • Deliberate or opportunity-driven. 26

  27. INFORMATION • Information-based society and information technology. • Computers. • Other information systems. • Information warfare. • Information systems attack. • Psychological warfare. • Deception. ? 27

  28. INFORMATION (Cont) • Media and global information flow. • Transparency (access to data). • Sway public and political opinion. • Situational awareness. • Home field advantage. • Commercial systems. • Human networks. 28

  29. TECHNOLOGY • Symmetric capabilities. • Level the playing field. • A few systems that are more advanced. 29

  30. TECHNOLOGY (Cont) • Asymmetric counters to our high-tech systems. • Less advanced systems in complex/urban settings. • Selected niche areas. • Low-cost, high-payoff new technologies. • Upgrades and hybrids. • Precision munitions. • Technological surprise. 30

  31. EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS • International humanitarian assistance. • Manmade and natural disasters. • Disease, hunger, and poverty. 31

  32. EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS(Cont) • Growing in influence and power. • Willingness to become involved in crisis situations. • Stated and hidden interests/objectives. • Favorable to US and provide assistance. • Adverse to US or create conflict. • Make mistakes. 32

  33. NATIONAL WILL • People, government, and military. • Objectives and duration of a conflict. • Victory often depends on will. • Attack the opponent’s national will and try to preserve your own. • US national will as a vulnerability—a strategic center of gravity. 33

  34. TIME • Time drives decision making and operations. • Opponents see time as being in their advantage. • Adjust the nature of the conflict. • Control US entry. • Dictate the tempo. • Outlast the US will to continue. 34

  35. ECONOMICS • “Haves” and “have-nots.” • Economic vs military superiority. • Ability to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operations. • Regional and global relationships can result in military or political assistance. 35

  36. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Operational Environment • Critical variables in operational environment. • Foreign views of the United States. • Military capabilities and threats. 36

  37. Nation-State Non-Nation Adaptive (Asymmetric) THREATS Threat:A potential adversary to the United States. • Capabilities. • Intentions. 37

  38. CENTRALASIANREPUBLICS RUSSIA TheTransition TheUnknown ? BOSNIA NEWALLIANCES HAITI IRAQImmediateProblem IRAN? CUBA Terrorism KOSOVO InformationWarfare AFRICA CounterDrugs Proliferation CHINAWhatNext…?(Taiwan) Israel- Palestinian- Syrian Dynamic KOREAWorstCase INDIAPAKISTAN THREATS IN TODAY’S OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Libya SASO MTW SSC 38

  39. Nation-state Non-nation Third-party actors Operational Environment Adaptive (Asymmetric) BOTTOM LINE The U.S. Army must be prepared to— • Go into any of these operational environments. • Perform its full range of missions. • In the face of a wide variety of possible threats. • At same time, deal with third-party actors. 39

  40. Questions? 40

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