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This presentation explores the concept of survivability, defined as a system's ability to successfully fulfill its mission despite threats such as attacks, failures, or accidents. It emphasizes defense strategies like honeypots and server rotations aimed at deception, distraction, and redundancy. Key scenarios illustrate collaborative attacks and the importance of risk management. By analyzing attack stages, selecting ideal attackers, and employing dynamic topology reconfiguration, the aim is to bolster network resilience and maintain operational integrity even under adverse conditions.
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Research Direction Introduction Advisor: ProfessorFrank, Y.S. Lin Presented by YuPuWu
Agenda • Introduction • Problem description • Scenario
Definition of Survivability • We define survivability as the capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. We use the term system in the broadest possible sense, including networks and large-scale systems of systems. [1] • [1] R. J. Ellison, D. A. Fisher, R. C. Linger, H. F. Lipson, T. Longstaff, and N. R. Mead, “Survivable Network Systems: An Emerging Discipline,” Technical Report CMU/SEI-97-TR-013, November 1997.(Revised: May 1999)
Defense strategiesHoneypot • Existing Classifications • Lure • Defend(deception& intimidation ) • Study • [2] H. Debar, F. Pouget, and M. Dacier, “White Paper: “Honeypot, Honeynet, Honeytoken: Terminological issues”,” InstitutEurécom Research Report RR-03-081,2003
Defense strategiesHoneypot • Level of interaction classification • Low-Interaction • Mid-Interaction • High-Interaction • [3] H. Debar, F. Pouget, and M. Dacier, “White Paper: “Honeypot, Honeynet, Honeytoken: Terminological issues”,” InstitutEurécom Research Report RR-03-081,2003
Defense strategiesHoneypot • The objective of a false target is to distract or conceal something that someone else may search for (to gain access to, control, destroy, etc.) • [4] G. Levitin, and K. Hausken, “False targets efficiency in defense strategy,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 194, Issue 1, Pages 155-162, 1 April
Defense strategiesRotation • [5] Y. Huang, D. Arsenault, and A.Sood, “Closing Cluster Attack Windows Through Server Redundancy and Rotations”,Proc. IEEE CGRIDW'06.
Defense strategiesRotation • Outrunning Component Failures, which replicates key application components and intelligently places new replicas on suitable hosts upon noticing failures. • Attack Containment, which isolates host intrusions and network based distributed denial of service attacks and stops their propagation. • Continuous Unpredictable Changes, which tries toput strict time constraints on the usefulness of obtained attack information by constantly changing unpredictably. • [6] M.Atighetchi, P.Pal, F.Webber,and C.Jones, “Adaptive Use of Network-Centric Mechanisms in Cyber-Defense”,BBN Technologies LLC.
Agenda • Introduction • Problem description • Scenario
Attack Strategies • Compromise • PretendtoAttack • TestReaction • TakeOpportunity • [8] S.Braynov and M.Jadliwala, “Representation and Analysis of Coordinated Attacks”,” FMSE'03,2003,
RiskAvoidance&RiskTolerance • Risk Avoidance • Compromise • RiskTolerance • PretendtoAttack
Period, P • N:ThetotalnumbersofnodesintheDefenseNetworks. • F:ThetotalnumbersofnodewhichiscompromisedintheDefenseNetworks. • IfNis100andFis 10, the Period will be 90%.
SuccessRate, SR • SuccessRate(SR) =RiskAvoidanceCompromised/RiskAvoidanceAttacks • RiskAvoidance-CompromiseNodes : 10 • RiskTolerance-PretendtoAttack : 5 • CompromisedSuccessfully : 6 • (3CompromiseNodes : 3PretendtoAttack) • SuccessRate=30%
EarlyStage • EarlyStage
LateStage • LateStage
Selection Criteria • High Traffic & Low Defense Resource
No.ofAttackers • NumberofAttackers • M : Numberofselectedcandidates • M=4,Period=99%,Success Rate=100% • RiskAvoidance:6RiskTolerance:0 • M=25,Period=80%,Success Rate=0% • RiskAvoidance:6RiskTolerance:0
ChooseIdealAttackers • AttackEnergy • Budget&Capability • CorrespondingDefenseResourceforEachAttacker • Aggressiveness • AttackEnergy
ChooseIdealAttackers • ExampleChooseIdealAttacker • 100DefenseResource • 90~110CorrespondingDefenseResource • AppropriateAggressiveness • LowerBound(50%,0%) • IfSuccessRate(SR)islow,raisetheLowerBound. • IfSuccessRate(SR)ishigh,reducetheLowerBound.
VirtualMachine • VirtualMachine • VirtualMachineMonitor • LocalDefenseEffect • CoreNodecouldbeoneoftheVirtualMachines. • IfVMMwascompromised,allofitsVMwouldbecompromised,too.
Agenda • Introduction • Problem description • Scenario
Scenario CoreNodeCompromisedFalseTargetNextHop 7 DefenseResource Fake Traffic False Target & Fake Traffic Insider
G A D H K N L I B E O 7 9 9 4 3 5 8 5 M F C J
G A D H K N L I B E O 7 9 9 4 3 5 8 5 M F C J
G A D H K N L I B E O 7 9 9 4 D 5 8 5 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 5 5 C 9 9 7 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 5 5 9 9 7 C M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 5 5 B 9 9 7 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 A 5 B 9 9 7 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 A 5 B 9 9 7 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A 5 B 7 9 9 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 5 A 5 B 7 9 9 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A 5 B 7 9 9 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A B B 7 9 S M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A B B 7 9 S M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A B B 7 9 S M F C J