US Asian Policies

1. December 29, 2011 US Asian Policies

2. Basic question of why North Korea was treated differently than Iraq by the Clinton and Bush administrations: Both were seen as “rogue states” who refused to abide by international conventions and norms, including important problems of proliferation and the funding of terrorists. Both were viewed as posing significant threats to US security interests. Both, along with Iran, were listed by Bush as part of the “Axis of Evil”. But Iraq was invaded when it did not satisfy US demands for inspections, while North Korea was apparently rewarded by renewed negotiations when it revealed it had cheated on the 1994 agreement. Howard: Why Not invade North Korea

3. Howard argues that realism cannot provide an adequate explanation. • Both possessed the means of damaging US interests (including threats to regional allies), but North Korea had more means than did Iraq and should have been the higher priority • Actually processed plutonium • Engaged in proliferation activities • Test-fired long range misssiles • If the explanation has to do with deterrence, then one must look at the potential for the use of weapons. Bush, in arguing that Iraq posed a unique threat, signals that his administration thought that the Iraqis were likely to use any WMD’s they possessed, while the North Koreans were not. • Thus we must look for explanations for this difference in perception. Explanations

4. Howard argues that constructivism is the only approach that provides this answer, as it gives us the tools by which to understand perceptions and to comprehend how it is that the US and North Korea became socialized in one set of norms and vocabulary, and the US and Iraq became socialized in a different set. History is also important, in that there is a particular historical beginning and practice of the norms and expectations in each relationship, and the history of the sets of relations have been quite different since the early 1990s. Answer

5. Neither side wanted a replay of the Korean War when problems of nuclear proliferation became topical in the early 1990s. • The result is a history of negotiation and agreement that includes: • Consultation with South Korea and Japan on the part of the US • Involvement by the PRC and Russia • Attempts to get the North Koreans to give up their nuclear programs by providing them with alternative sources of energy and trade goods • Engagement with North Korea by exposing them, at least to a limited degree, to the outside world in the form of workers and agreements that regulate construction and other work that are part of the larger negotiating framework • Weapons development systems are interpreted in this framework as bargaining chips, and the revelation of new systems, or cheating on prior agreements on the part of North Korea is seen as a signal for help rather than as a real threat. North Korea

6. Since the 1990s, relations between the US and Iraq have been carried out in the contexts of war, coercion and confrontation Negotiations have concentrated on unconditional disarmament and the ending of WMD programs No fly zones and other military type activities ongoing on the part of the US Revelations regarding WMD’s seen as evidence of Iraq’s bad faith and to pose a real threat to the US and its allies. Iraq

7. It is difficult to foresee the future of US-China relations, and there is considerable disagreement as to whether those relations will be peaceful 10 to 20 years in the future. While the debate has been carried out by a wide variety of people, positions generally fall along the generic lines of IR theory, with people adopting liberal, realist and constructivist positions to think through the possibilities. Each position, despite general tendencies in one direction or another, have generated arguments that point to both optimistic and pessimistic outcomes. Friedberg: US-China Relations

8. Will economic interdependence build ties between China and the West or will trade be subordinated to other issues. Does the PRC’s membership in a variety of international organizations (APEC, East Asia Summit) as well as other structured contacts (such as military to military talks) establish common interests, remove misconceptions and improve communications, or will these be overshadowed by nationalism and ideology? Liberalism

9. Democracy: • Will China democratize or continue to be an authoritarian regime? • Will the transition to democracy prove dangerous? • If it does democratize, will it be a liberal democracy that the US recognizes as a democracy, or something else that the US, as a “crusading liberal democracy” treat as a non democracy? • Would a democratic China be less nationalistic and bellicose, or more nationalistic than the current leadership? Liberalism

10. As an emerging power, will the PRC act as have other emerging powers in the past (seek to gain a greater share of influence, remake the world order) or will it act differently? Are China’s territorial and other aims limited and thus not likely to involve contact with the US and upset the world order, or extensive? Will the China’s power continue to rise, thus giving the US reason to target it, or will its growth slow such that it will remain objectively much less strong than the US, though comparatively stronger in relation to the US than previously? Will the US and China find themselves in a security dilemma scenario and thus an arms race, or will the fact that they will be in a bipolar situation in Asia lead to a better understanding of each other’s capabilities and intentions? Realism

11. Will interactions in the international stage lead to China’s socialization into and acceptance of existing international norms or its desire to overturn those norms and a refusal to change intellectually on the part of its leadership? Constructivists

12. The TRA came about not because the executive branch wanted to replace the cancelled mutual defense treaty with something else, but from a mixture of different motives in Congress: Desire to continue informal relations in area of security as well as politics and economics Fear that cancelling treaty without something in its place would make US look unreliable to its allies Unhappiness with executive’s lack of consultation when moving to normalize relations with the PRC Desire to see to Taiwan’s security Goldstein and Schriver: Origins of the TRA

13. When it came to discussing what the US would do if Taiwan was threatened by the PRC, explicit language was defeated and more ambiguous language inserted: Didn’t want US to be trapped by a cross-straits crisis Didn’t want to imperil normalization with PRC Need to consult with Japan and South Korea in event of a crisis Did not want to strengthen the presidency by granting it powers to act in such an emergency without consulting Congress Language of TRA

14. General attempt to insert Congress into realm of foreign policy But weak in terms of oversight and the acquisition of information from the executive, which is typical of such forays Stronger in terms of demanding a say with regard to sale of defensive weapons than in contributing to a policy debate over how to react to a crisis in the straits. General effect of contents of tra

15. Presidents have generally done what they have wanted to do, only occasionally giving in to Congress’s protests: • Little Congressional input with regard to weapons sales. • Reagan’s joint communique with PRC regarding slowing and ending arms sales. • Clinton’s “four noes” History

16. Weakness is due to: Generally disadvantaged position of Congress Divisions within Congress over Taiwan, China and on partisan lines Ambiguity of security language in TRA Only when it was able to team up with the Pentagon did it make some of its arguments felt with regard to weapon sales. Congressional weakness

17. In general, origins and actions in the name of the TRA by Congress over time: Display a desire by Congress to be involved in foreign policy related to Taiwan Attempts by some to clarify US security commitments and get rid of “strategic ambiguity” stance Attempts by some to slow or spoil closer relations with the PRC Use by some of the issue of Taiwan, the TRA, Taiwan security and arms sales to Taiwan to balance off ideologically distasteful but (economically) pragmatic votes on permanent normal trade relations with the PRC and allowing PRC to join the WTO. Congress and the Tra

18. Proposal to withdraw all security assurances to Taiwan in exchange for PRC cancelling all its US debt. Taiwan not relevant to real US security interests. Taiwan will merge with mainland anyway Most important part of strength is economic, and this would lead to the cancellation of ten percent of US sovereign debt. Kane: To save our economy, ditch taiwan