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Simulating social, economic and political decisions in a hunter-gatherer group. The case of “Prehistoric” Patagonia . Juan A. Barceló , Florencia del Castillo , J.A.Cuesta, J.M.Galán, L. Mameli, F.Miguel, J.I. Santos, X.Vila.
and political decisions
in a hunter-gatherer group.
The case of “Prehistoric” Patagonia.
Juan A. Barceló, Florencia del Castillo,
J.A.Cuesta, J.M.Galán, L. Mameli, F.Miguel, J.I. Santos, X.Vila
UNIVERSITAT AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA UNIVERSIDAD DE BURGOS UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III - Madrid
Los pueblos indígenas.Ciencia Hoy, vol. 2 N° 7. 1990.
Why groups of people are the way they are?
in terms of how agents acted when they became integrated into a single group.
The concept of Productivity
The complex interplay of social actions, agents and their products explains ethnicity by showing how social aggregation fit into a causal structure, that is to say, a vast network of interacting actions and entities, where a change in a property of an entity dialectically produces a change in a property of another entity.
Social /Political Science History
Simulating requires to execute
a mechanism,which, given the properties
of the constituent components and of the environment, gives rise to the phenomena
AN ENHANCED MODEL
Model: bayesian network
ETHNICITY IS AN EMERGENT PROPERTY OF SOCIAL GROUP DYNAMICS
ETHNICITY is not the direct consequence of territorial mobility, because agent mobility is not a pure random walk, but it is mediated by.
1) the history of previous interactions,
2) the degree of cultural similarity,
3) the payoffs derived from cooperation (collective hunting, material exchange, social reproduction) and
4) the costs generated by internal social conflict.
Historically, aggregated social groups have been less frequent than small bands of individuals, basically by the cost due to inequalities arising in all social conglomerates.
Only if some individuals within the group increase their own productivity and the absolute volume of their production above a critical threshold, they can invest such a plus-value to increase coercion, and hence maintain ever increasing levels of social inequality.
Without a dramatic change in technology (i.e. agriculture, pastoralism) we think that this social change is mostly infrequent.
Contrary to traditional Fisher / Cavalli-Sforza “wave of advance” model, population dispersal not only depends on demography, but it is socially mediated. This is a complex social mechanism characterized by the dialectical relationship between.
A) the higher payoffs of cooperation,
B) the local carrying capacity,
C) the level of technological development and
D) the risk of increasing social stress when surplus accumulates and wealth became unequally distributed.
3A. 3B WÜNÜN A KENA 4-5. AONIKENK 10. CHONO
2. PEHUENCHE 1. MAPUCHE
6. SELKNAM 7 HAUSH 8. YAMANA 9. ALAKALUF
Bounded rationality in ethnicity formation
The similarity between two interacting individuals is increased
as a consequence of repeated interactions, and that the probability of positive interactions increase as a result of the increase of cultural similarity seems a good starting point for simulating the emergence of ethnic and cultural differentiation in the prehistoric past.
THE PRODUCTION OF SUBSISTENCE AND INSTRUMENTS + REPRODUCTION OF PEOPLE AND SOCIAL NORMS
SOCIAL, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC DECISIONS BASED IN CRITERIA OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY
The Complexities of Apparent Simplicity