240 likes | 391 Views
This paper presents an innovative RFID security method that addresses key requirements such as indistinguishability, forward security, and resistance against replay attacks and tag killing. The protocol comprises a writing, authentication, and ownership transfer process, ensuring ownership transferability without compromising privacy. The paper analyzes existing challenge-response and hashing-based schemes, comparing their efficiencies, and highlights the proposed method's unique features, including no additional memory requirements for tags and robust security measures. This comprehensive approach enhances RFID security in various applications.
E N D
An Efficient and Secure RFID Security Method with Ownership Transfer Authors: Kyosuke Osaka, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kenichi Yamazaki, Osamu Takahashi Source: Computational Intelligence and Security, 2006 International Conference on Presenter: Hsin-Ruey Tsai
Five requirements • 1. Indistinguishability • 2. Forward security • 3. Resistance against replay attack • 4. Resistance against tag killing • 5. Ownership transferability
Indistinguishability • No adversary can distinguish output from RFID tags.
Forward security • Even if present data on RFID tags are leaked to an adversary, past data still remain secure. No tamper resistance
Resistance against replay attack • No adversary can succeed in a replay attack that spoofs a legitimate RFID tag.
Resistance against tag killing • RFID tags shall be resistant against a large number of incoming queries. no additional memory no upper limit
Ownership transferability • Ownership is transferable without violation of previous and present RFID tag owner’s privacy.
Analysis of Previous Schemes • Challenge–Response Type Schemes • Ohkubo Type Schemes • Other Type Schemes
Proposed Method • The protocol of the proposed method consists of: • • A writing process • • An authentication process • • An ownership transfer process
FS & RA • Because of updated by changing symmetric key. Even if Eki (ID) is leaked to the adversary, neither the ID nor Ekj(ID) leaks to the adversary, where i> j. Unless the ID is leaked, the encryption function E satisfies the one-wayness. This means that the adversary cannot compute Ek j (ID) from Eki(ID) unless the ID is leaked.
TK & OT • 1. Tags require no additional memory for storing random numbers each reading a tag. • 2. Tags have no upper limit of reading tags • 1. A protocol to be able to securely change an owner’s key used for encryption is built into the RFID system. • 2. Owners can change their key at any time..