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Fisheries Management Performance and the Ecosystem Challenge. Jon G. Sutinen Mark Soboil University of Rhode Island USA. Three take-home messages. Rights-based management works well superior conservation & economic benefits outperforms traditional management
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Fisheries Management Performanceand theEcosystem Challenge Jon G. Sutinen Mark Soboil University of Rhode Island USA
Three take-home messages • Rights-based management works well • superior conservation & economic benefits • outperforms traditional management • Resist the alliance of short-term interests • fundamental source of failure • reforms are needed • Plan carefully your EBFM approach
The OECD Study • OECD. 1997. Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Economic Aspects of the Management of Living Marine Resources. Paris • Assembled evidence and expert analysis from • 24 OECD Member countries • more than 100 fisheries • 4 years to complete
Evidence • Management histories for each fishery • a chronological description of the management measures applied, and • corresponding outcomes observed in the fishery • biological • economic • social • administrative
Output Controls Competitive Total Allowable Catch (42 cases) Individual Quotas (55) Vessel Catch Limits (19) Input Controls Limited Licenses (40) Individual Effort Quotas (23) Other Gear & Vessel Restrictions (45) Management Measures • Technical Measures • Size & Sex Controls (49) • Time & Area Closures (52)
Biological exploitation status of resource stocks Economic net benefits producers processors distributors consumers Social perceived equity life style class divisions Administrative research data quality industry cooperation enforcement Consequences
Competitive Total Allowable Catch (OECD 1997) • Race-to-fish • shortened seasons • market gluts • Over capacity • more & larger vessels • more HP, larger hull, etc. • Increased costs • harvesting and processing
Update on TACs • Supports findings of OECD (1997) • race-to-fish • over capacity • Substantial reductions in TACs • Applied to new species • Japan • European Union
Limited LicensesOECD (1997) • Did not control fishing capacity • Did not stem over-exploitation • Increased harvesting costs • Some initial allocation problems
Time & Area Closures • OECD (1997) • Closures not effective in assuring conservation • though evidence was weak • Update • Several new & enlarged closures • e.g., Mediterranean bluefin tuna • U.S. closures on Georges Bank & Gulf of Maine • improved abundance of sea scallops • recovery of yellowtail flounder
Size & Sex restrictionsOECD (1997) • Do not mitigate the race-to-fish • Increased enforcement costs and/or problems • Some evidence that • the average size of fish landed increases • discards increase
Individual Fishing QuotasOECD (1997) • IFQs • potent & valuable tool • controlling exploitation, • mitigating the race-to-fish • generating sustainable economic benefits • reducing the number of participants in a fishery • serious side effects • initial allocation of quota • economic and social disruption (real & imagined) • enforcement and compliance.
Individual Fishing QuotasOECD (1997) • IFQ management • more conservation and economic benefits than other management measures • more social & administrative problems than other measures • non-IFQ management measures • far less conservation & economic benefits than IFQs • fewer social and administrative difficulties than IFQs
Why do IFQs perform so well? • IFQs are ‘rights-based’ • provide fishing rights that are exclusive • exclusive rights of use mitigate • race-to-fish • user conflicts • excess capacity • provide a claim on the future • a willingness to sacrifice to conserve stocks
Update on IFQs • Results supported by NRC(1999) study • Worldwide trends • towards the use of IFQs • especially in fisheries formerly under competitive TAC management • towards cost recovery • user fees • users pay in proportion to benefits received
Update on IFQs • Worldwide trends • Solutions are being found • initial allocation • enforcement • equity & disruptions • Collective rights (U.S., Canada) • Community Development Quotas • Conservation Cooperatives • Community-based organizations
Status of world fisheries Over exploited 28% Fully exploited 47% Grade: C- Under exploited 25% Source: Garcia, 2001
Status of world fisheries • Excess fishing capacity • Product waste • Low incomes & tax revenues • User conflicts • Etc. Grade: F
Why this poor record? • Why don’t we have a better record of management? • Why haven’t managers chosen more effective management methods? • rights-based measures • meaningful user participation • Do we lack the knowledge? • Do we lack the funds?
Possible Reasons • FAO • Uncertainty • status & dynamics of fishery resource stocks • Poorly defined objectives • Institutional weaknesses • Short-term social & economic needs • vs. long-term sustainability • Governance Incentives
Executive Branch Fisheries Agency Legislature Fisheries Management Authority Stakeholders Fishermen, Communities, Environmentalists Fisheries Governance System
Fisheries Management Authority Fisheries Governance System Legislature Executive Branch Fisheries Agency Stakeholders Fishermen, Communities, Environmentalists
Legislature Executive Branch Fisheries Agency Fisheries Management Authority Stakeholders Fishermen, Communities, Environmentalists Fisheries Governance System • Multiply by • – user groups • – gear types • – locations • – agencies • – jurisdictions • Governance is a complex system or network of organisms • the ‘ecology of governance’
Causes of governance failure • Alliance of short-term interests • fishing industry • dominant stakeholders • without secure fishing rights • resist short-term sacrifice • no assurance of long-term benefits • elected officials • short-term election cycles (2, 4, 6, years) • concerned with short-term consequences • responsive to special interests
Question • Will governance & management institutions perform better under ecosystem-based management?
Ecosystem-based fisheries management • Increases the complexity of governance system • greater number & diversity of competing users • more demands on interagency collaboration & coordination • Will EBFM increase or decrease • the chances of failure? • Plan carefully • governance incentives must be properly aligned • balance long-term and short-term interests
Conclusions • Fishery governance systems • biased against conservation of resources • Reforms are needed • to block the causes of governance failure • alliance of short-term interests • to adhere to first principles of • effective fisheries management • rights-based methods • good government
Reforms • Devolution • resource users should • share the rights & responsibilities of management • bear full consequences of decisions • Role of government • oversight of management • not operational decision-making
Reforms • Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishery Policy Making • abstain from political interference • in operational decision-making • i.e., insulate managers • set objectively measurable long-term objectives • exercise firm oversight of long-term performance