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Sweden and the Nuclear Security Summit Process

Sweden and the Nuclear Security Summit Process. Jan A. Lodding Deputy Director Disarmament and Non-proliferation Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Prepared for the Nordita /KTH/LANL Workshop on Competing Orders in Functional Materials, 4 June 2013.

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Sweden and the Nuclear Security Summit Process

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  1. Sweden and the Nuclear Security Summit Process Jan A. Lodding Deputy Director Disarmament and Non-proliferation Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Prepared for the Nordita/KTH/LANL Workshop on Competing Orders in Functional Materials, 4 June 2013

  2. Swedish priorities – disarmament and non-proliferation • Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (DPRK, Iran, etc.) • Achievable steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons • Support the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) • Promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) • Follow-up to New START, tactical nukes • Active participation in the IAEA Board of Governors(2011-2014) – Strengthen the Safeguards system, promote the Additional Protocol; Strengthen global nuclear safety and security; contribute to technical cooperation (food and water security) • Chemical Weapons Convention, Syria situation • Arms Trade Treaty

  3. President Obama’s April 2009 Prague Speech “..We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security…We know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay. So today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year.”

  4. Nuclear Security SummitWashington, 2010 • Heads of state or government from 47 participating States • IAEA, UN, EU • Final communique + plan of action • Politically binding commitments

  5. NSS Washington 2010 • “…commit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism” • “…welcome and join President Obama’s call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years”

  6. NSS Washington 2010 “…fundamental responsibility of States… • to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control; • to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes; • and emphasize the importance of robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security;”

  7. NSS Washington 2010 • “Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions • agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as appropriate; and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible”

  8. NSS Washington 2010 • 2005 amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) • UN Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) • Central role of the IAEA • Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT ) and G8 Global Partnership • Participation of Industry “…continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture”

  9. NSS Seoul 2012 • 53 participating States • FN, IAEA, EU, Interpol • Final Communique and plan of action • New elements: spent fuel, radioactive waste; radioactive sources; relations between safety and security (Fukushima) • Sweden announced transfer of processed plutonium to the US within the framework of the Global Treat Reduction Initiative

  10. NSS Seoul 2012 – national reports Swedish national report on implementation: • Ratification of the 2005 amendments to the CPPNM • Financial support to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund • Swedish participation in the G8 Global Partnership and in the GICNT, including through nuclear security projects • IPPAS-mission to Sweden in 2011 • National reviews related to physical protection

  11. Next Summit – The Hague 2014 • Final summit? • IAEA – continued central role, natural venue • IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security, 1-5 juli 2013 (SE participating)

  12. Next Summit – The Hague 2014 • Industry symposium and academic seminar planned in the margins of the 2014 NSS (Also during Washington and Seoul summits)

  13. Sweden’s view of the NSS process • Highest political level attention--mobilization. • Global threat – requiring global cooperation. • Support for wider adherence to legally binding international instruments (CPPNM, ICSANT). • Politically bindning commitments – follow-up through national reports (Sweden to analyze at G8 Global Partnership meeting in London next week. • Cooperation that increases pressure to deliver, and to show transparency, i.e. regarding legal frameworks.

  14. Swedish priorities • Preventing nuclear terrorism – prioritized element of the wider disarmament and non-proliferation agenda • “All” materials – important to protect all sensitive nuclear material (civilian and military) • Support for minimizing the use of HEU • Transparency – builds confidence in domestic regulatory framework and protective measures • Focus on follow-up regarding commitments made

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