Can the Spread of Nuclear Weapons be Stopped?. ◘ Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory November 1, 2006 ◘ Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky. During Cold War. Deter with nuclear Triad: ICBM’s, Strategic Bombers. SNBM’s Nuclear war fighting abandoned in plan MAD Mutual Assured Destruction.
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Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
November 1, 2006
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky
Mutual Assured Destruction
Nuclear Use Target Selection
Risk = Probability x consequences
Not addressed in this talk
States can be deterred.
Terrorists can not.
No evidence that new proliferant states are greater or lesser risks for transferring nuclear weapons or the tools to make them to terrorists.
Presidential Debate: September 30, 2004
Mr. Lehrer: “…so it is correct to say that if somebody’s listening to this, that you agree…the single most serious threat you believe –both of you believe is nuclear proliferation.”
Mr. Bush: “I do –in the hands of a terrorist enemy.”
Mr. Kerry: “Weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation.”
Rate of 1 new NWS every 5 yrs
Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South Africa became NNWS
NPT in force
“I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” John Kennedy, 1963
Nuclear Weapons Programs begun before 1970 when NPT came into force, succeeded and are still ongoing
Programs ended by 1970
Programs ended after 1970
Romania South Africa
Spain South Korea
Taiwan Libya Yugoslavia
Intentions suspected but no NW program identified
Programs started after 1970
Succeeded and ongoing
Pakistan North Korea
Are suspected to be actively seeking nuclear weapons
Factions within advocated for/sought NW, but ceased by 1970
Inherited NW, but now non-NW State party to NPT
The physical facts:
“Latency” or likelihood of acquiring nuclear weapons
TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF NNWS
1951 (Dual Purpose)
Brazil approves new Constitution: no nuclear weapons
Argentina and Brazil elected civilian Presidents
Argentina andBrazil terminate weapons programs and signed mutual “peaceful uses” treaty, establishing bilateral monitoring agency
Quadrilateral Agreement: Argentina, Brazil, bilateral agency, IAEA
But centrifuge program continues. Domestic design more capable than P-1.
Claimed purpose: Prestige, Independence;
but large hydropower resources
1957 – 1979
1984 – 1988 Bushehr damaged by Iraqi bombardment
1985? or Pakistan and China signed
2 yrs later nuclear cooperation agreements
with Iran. Tech transfers by Khan Organization.
1995 Iran contracts with Russia to finish Bushehr
2002 Iranian dissidents reveal existence of Natanz enrichment facility and a heavy water production plant
2003 Iran suspends enrichment under pressure from EU
2004 Iran breaks centrifuge seals
2005 Iran resumes conversion
April ‘06 Iran claims 3.5% enrichment; running 164 centrifuges
1985 DPRK joins NPT
1991 US withdraws NW from South Korea
1992 DPRK concludes Safeguards Agreement with IAEA but IAEA
detected 90g diversion of plutonium
1993 DPRK announces intent to withdraw from NPT. IAEA demands more access to Yongbyon reactor.
Many US – DPRK diplomatic contacts
US and DPRK sign “Agreed Framework”
Many follow-on diplomatic moves
1998 South Korea “Sunshine Policy”
1998- 2000 Extensive diplomatic bilateral contacts, including visit by Secretary of State Albright to Pyongyang
2001 Secretary of State Powell declares to “pick up where President Clinton left off,” but retracts and diplomacy turns hostile.
2002 President Bush includes DPRK in “axis of evil” in State of Union speech.
Possible use of NW against DPRK included in Nuclear Posture Review.
KEDO groundbreaking for reactors
Asst. Secretary of State James Kelly visits Pyongyang. US claims that DPRK admitted to Kelly that it had an HEU enrichment program. DPRK denies this, stating they only claimed a right to enrichment. Translation problem?
DPRK enrichment program has disappeared from media.
KEDO suspends fuel oil shipments in response to US enrichment claims. IAEA challenges enrichment.
DPRK restarts reactor, removes IAEA seals, expels inspectors.
DPRK withdraws from NPT
DPRK tells US and China it has NW
Six Nation Talks; US refuses bilateral talks
DPRK tests NW
CTBT cited in all NPT Review Conferences
CTBT all countries cheat to extent possible without detection
CTBT Complied with by all countries
What won’t work in the long run
What may work
NWS give assurances to
+ Come to the assistance of a NNWS threatened or attacked with NW
– Not to attack a NNWS with NW unless the NNWS is allied with a NWS
What will help
US is strongest military power measured by conventional military strength and economic power
“You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool.”
…Rep. Ed Markey, 2006
“Never negotiate with the United States unless you have a nuclear weapon.”
…IndianDeputy Minister of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation Demands that every Nation concludes that its security and Well-Being are served better without nuclear weapons than with them.