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Explore insights from phishing attacks on Hungarian banks and Estonia, and recommendations for robust national and EU policies to enhance cybersecurity. Learn about responses to attacks, policy proposals, and the importance of cooperation, communication, and exercises.
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Ferenc Suba J.D., MA Chairman of the Board PTA CERT-Hungary Vice-chair of the MB ENISA LARGE SCALE ATTACKSLessons learnt Proposals for National and EU Policy
1. Large phishing attack against Hungarian banks: 7 banks in HU, for 2 weeks, „foreign” attacks from international botnet administered by 4 virtual domain name servers (all abroad, from Asia, Europe, Americas) 2. Attacks on Estonia (international aspects): attacks from 4000 compromised machines (cca. 50% from the Americas, 12 from HU) Large scale attacks
Phishing in HU (national+ international response): - PTA-CERT Hungary as coordinator - With the help of CERT community+ HU Banking ISAC - Localisation +shutting down of VDNS (all abroad) - Within 4-12 hours - Notification of ISPs via national CERTs - Notification of clients from the banks - Filing a case against unknown persons at the police Estonian crisis (international response): - Finnish national CERT + US CERT as coordinators - With the help of CERT community - Localisation + cleaning of compromised machines - Within 2 weeks (after FIRST and TF-CSIRT involvement) - Notification of ISPs, system administrators via national CERTs The response
Not enough or lacking: - Preparedness - Early warning - Manpower - Coordination - Communication with international partners - Media work National policy: - Goverment support (national strategy, responsible HLO, money) - Crisis management plan - Early warning system - National CERT - National coordination body (private sector, policy makers, law enforcement, CERTs) - Involvement of international CERT community - Communication plan - Regular exercises Lessons learntProposals for National Policy
- History: joint comexes with banks since early 2006 - Great leap forward: large phising attacks in Dec 2006 - Constituents: CERT-HU, Law Enforcement, Banking Assoc. of HU, Financial Supervisory Authority - Activity: information sharing, exercises, recommendations, coordination - Results: TLP, Advisory, complex exercises (simulated DDos attack, insider attack) - Future: FSA recomm. on the security of internet banking, coop. with similar ISACs (GOVCERT.NL, AUSCERT, DHS) Financial ISAC in Hungary
Reason: proprietary systems are vulnerable, too! Keywords: CO-OPERATION, COMMUNICATION, EXERCISE USA: ISAC Model (branch specific co-op. under DHS) Europe: EU-SCSIE (Shell, Electrabell, Swissgrid, EDF, CERN, SEEMA, Melanie, CERT-Hungary) Global: Meridian Process Control WG Hungary: CIIP WG (MOL, Paks, MAVIR, Telco, CERT-Hungary) CIIP in Energy Sector
- No legally binding international agreements - Basic instrument: Memorandum of Understanding for co-operation - reasons: legally binding procedures too slow + flexibility - FIRST: two faces: association incorporated according to Californian law + conference = annual general meeting - ICAAN: association incorporated according to Californian law - Future at international level: Governments enter into this area of international co-operation (e.g. NATO Cyberdefence Policy) - Future at national level: Act on Information Security, Government Decision Legal instruments of International Collaboration, future
Thank you! ferenc.suba@cert-hungary.hu PTA CERT-Hungary www.cert-hungary.hu Puskás Tivadar Közalapítványwww.neti.hu ENISA www.enisa.europa.eu