PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence

PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence Week 17: Separation as a Solution? Partition and Secession; Federalism and Autonomy

Lecture outline • Introduction: Territorial solutions to violent ethnic conflict • Methods of ethnic conflict regulation (again) • Types of ethnic wars • Outbreak of intrastate conflicts by type and period, 1946-2004 • Territorial solutions to ethnic conflict in our case studies (?) • Separation as a Solution – Partitioning to Peace? • Concepts and clarifications • Secession and the right of national self-determination • Pro-partition arguments • Criticisms of partition theory • An inconclusive debate • Federalism and Autonomy Arrangements as Means of Conflict Management • Definitions and types • Federalism and autonomy • Merits of federalism (and autonomy arrangements) • Dangers of federalism (and autonomy arrangements) • Another inconclusive debate • Summary

Part I: Introduction: Territorial solutions to violent ethnic conflict

Methods of ethnic conflict regulation (again) I. Methods of eliminating differences: • genocide; • forced mass-population transfers; • partition and/or secession [focus of today]; • integration and/or assimilation. II. Methods of managing differences: • hegemonic control; • arbitration (third-party intervention); • cantonisation and/or federalisation [secondary focus of today]; • consociationalism or power-sharing. (McGarry and O’Leary, 1997)

Types of ethnic wars • Ethnic wars between an incumbent government and ethnic challengers can be distinguished according to the goals of the insurgents: whether they want to replace the existing government with a new regime, or to create a new sovereign nation-state or autonomous region out of a portion of the existing one (see Mason and Fett 1996). • Ethnonational conflicts “whose protagonists aim at establishing a new ethnic state or autonomous region … are among the most deadly and protracted of all ethnopolitical conflicts” (Gurr 2000: 276). (Although not all – think about Quebec, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro.)

Outbreak of intrastate conflicts by type and period, 1946–2004 (Buhaug 2006)

Territorial solutions to ethnic conflict in our case studies (?) • Sri Lanka: Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike disavows 1926 promises of federalism as option to devolve power to the Tamils, following violent protests surrounding the Sinhala Only Act from 1956 (Rudolph 2003); • federalism remains the political goal of moderate Tamil leaders until 1976; • Tamil insurgents fight for an independent and, since 2002, an autonomous Tamil homeland in a large-scale ethnic war between 1983 and 2009.

Territorial solutions to ethnic conflict in our case studies (?) (2) • The former Yugoslavia: federal from 1943 until its disintegration in the 1990s; • from its successor states, only Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted federal structures - although it can be argued that the Dayton Agreement also established a de facto partition of BiH (O’Leary 2007).

Territorial solutions to ethnic conflict in our case studies (?) (3) • Northern Ireland: The partition of Ireland goes back to the Government of Ireland Act of 1920; • the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922 establishes the Irish Free State as a British dominion, and gives the six most heavily unionist and Protestant northern counties the - soon utilised - option “to opt out”; • in 1949, the Republic of Ireland is declared, but Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom – as it does until today.

Territorial solutions to ethnic conflict in our case studies (?) (4) • Rwanda: With nearly one million victims of the 1994 genocide, the destruction of trust and the perpetuation of the security dilemma, is the physical separation of Hutus and Tutsis, and the establishment of an ethnically Tutsi state (with Tutsis from both Rwanda and Burundi) the only alternative to another genocide (cp. Kaufmann 1996)?

Part II: Separation as a Solution – Partitioning to Peace?

Concepts and Clarifications • Movements for territorial self-governance typically described as separatist or secessionist movements. Used as interchangeable terms which can “embrace movements seeking a separate region within an existing state, as well as those seeking a separate and independent state” (Horowitz 2000: 232), though more usually referring to independence movements. • Partition: closely related to secession; secession involves withdrawal from an existing state whilst partition is imposed or agreed. • Terms are sometimes used interchangeably and sometimes entail imposition of a new international boundary whilst other times they do not (depending on whom one is reading!).

Concepts and Clarifications (2) • For Kaufmann (1998), “[s]ecessions are new states created by the unilateral action of a rebellious ethnic group.” • In contrast, partitions are “separations jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party” (ibid.: 125). • Partition theory does not argue for the dissolution of any/all multi-ethnic states but only of those that have already produced mass violence. Partition and separation are hence seen as a last resort to solve the “most intense ethnic conflicts” (Kaufmann 1998: 120).

Concepts and Clarifications (3) Partition • Some historical e.g.s: Ireland, India, Pakistan, Palestine/Israel, Cyprus. All have seen ongoing ethnic conflict. • Irish case: partition instituted at time of granting independence to the south as a way to avoid threatened civil war by Irish unionists, but the way borders were drawn and the political structure that was set up paved the way for ongoing ethno-national grievances and violence.

Concepts and Clarifications (4) Secession • Secessionist claims to statehood can often be placated with much less: regional autonomy, federalism, power-sharing at the centre. BUT agreements hard to reach and often collapse. • Timing: if such proposals come after war/violent action, may foster continued secessionism. “An early, generous offer of autonomy, made before extreme separatist organizations outflank moderate leaders, may avert secession” (Horowitz 2000: 625). • Disincentives to secession: dispersion of separatist group’s population outside borders of separatist region and regional subsidies/investments that secessionist area would lose if it left the state (Horowitz 2000).

Secession and the Right of National Self-Determination • Contemporary political philosophers have neglected question of secession and act as though states are eternally fixed. More commonly discussed in 16th/17th century works on the state (Beran 1984). • Question of secession now subsumed into concept of national self-determination: right of peoples/ nations “to rule themselves through the laws and governmental apparatus of their own independent state, … which presupposes a right to secede from an existing state” (George 1993). • Doctrine of right of national self-determination developed in Europe in 19th century from idea of individual self-determination. Recognised by UN but ambiguously (Dahbour 1993).

Secession and the Right of National Self-Determination (2) • Problems with notion of a right to national self-determination: • Implied right to secession clashes with principle of territorial integrity of states; • No agreed and universal criterion of nationhood; • No agreed procedure for determining the national territory where independent nation-state is to be; • Presumption that best socio-political system is one ethnically conceptualized nation per territorially bounded state can lead to more clearly drawn distinctions between groups and more conflict and violence.

Pro-partition arguments Chaim Kaufmann’s (1996; 1998) arguments for partition • Unlike ideological identities, ethnic identities are difficult (if not impossible) to change; these ethnic identities are reinforced at times of violent ethnic conflict; • ethnic wars foster security dilemmas that intensify violence and motivate “ethnic cleansing”; these security dilemmas are greatest where ethnic settlement patterns are intermixed;

Pro-partition arguments (2) Chaim Kaufmann’s (1996; 1998) arguments for partition • “Stable resolutions of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves. Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reasons and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians” (Kaufmann 1996: 137); • ethnic civil war destroys possibilities for ethnic cooperation in a multi-ethnic state; “solutions that aim both to restore multiethnic civil politics and to avoid population transfers, such as institution building, power sharing, and identity reconstruction, cannot work during or after an ethnic civil war because they do not resolve the security dilemma created by mixed demography” (Kaufmann 1998: 122).

Pro-partition arguments (3) Arguable advantages of partition • facilitates postwar democratisation; • prevents war recurrence; • significantly reduce residual low-level violence (Sambanis 2000). • “If the short run is so problematical, if the constraints on policy innovation are many, if even grand settlements need patchwork readjustment, perhaps it is a mistake to seek accommodation among the antagonists. If it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state, even if this necessitates population transfers” (Horowitz 2000: 588).

Criticisms of partition theory Criticisms of Kaufmann specifically • His analysis is methodologically flawed (Sambanis 2000); • he bases his arguments too much on the security dilemma as motivation for ethnic violence (ibid.), and assumes that it is self-perpetuating; • relies on primordialist assumptions that ethnic identities are fixed, and assumes ethnic groups to be homogeneous entities; • underestimates the possibilities of institutional design (Horowitz 2003).

Criticisms of partition theory (2) Criticisms of partition theory more broadly • Horowitz (2000): secession/partition are unlikely to produce ethnically homogeneous or harmonious successor states because: • Majority of secessionist regions are ethnically heterogeneous, not homogeneous. Ethnic identity is not static; changes with social and political environment and esp. with territorial boundaries. • Ethnic diversity within secessionist region is often what triggers secession in first place; this diversity is made a political issue by secessionist movements. Bad treatment of ethnically different populations after independence is expected and increased conflict likely.

Criticisms of partition theory (3) • Question of what happens to co-ethnics whom secessionists leave behind in the rump state. As in the successor state, the rump state faces a new political context where old cleavages are deepened and new ones opened. • Secessionist warfare exacerbates ethnic tensions within the secessionist region. Contending groups within the region may fight each other as well as one or more fighting central government; reduces prospects for post-secession/partition good relations.

Criticisms of partition theory (4) • Since successor states are unlikely to be ethnically homogeneous, there may arise new majority-minority antagonisms within them (Horowitz 2003); • tensions between conflicting parties might continue in the form of interstate war (Sambanis 2000); since partition places an international boundary between former domestic antagonists and creates 2 states and 2 militaries, domestic conflict may be transformed into international one (Horowitz 2000); • demonstration effects might cause new ethnic wars (Fearon 2004);

Criticisms of partition theory (5) • forced population transfers are too costly in terms of human rights and human suffering (Kumar 1997; Sambanis 2000); • “carving up” of sovereign states and establishment of rump states may create greater risks than benefits for the international system (Fearon 2004); • Sambanis (2000), based on his work with a huge civil war data set, argues that partition does not help prevent recurrence of ethnic war or violent ethnic antagonism; concludes that ethnic diffusion in a larger multiethnic state is more likely to prevent war recurrence and violent ethnic antagonism.

An inconclusive debate • There is no conclusive empirical evidence to support either those arguing in favour or against partition; • whether we argue for or against partition as a solution to “intense” ethnic wars ultimately depends on what we believe are the causes of ethnic identity formation and ethnic conflict emergence, and whether reconciliation in postwar societies is possible; • and even if we were to agree that partition is the best means to solve ethnic wars, it is usually unlikely to be feasible from a policy-making perspective.

Part III: Federalism and autonomy arrangements as means of conflict management

Definitions and types • Federal political systems combine principles of shared rule and self-rule, i.e. shared government and autonomous action by distinct constituent units of government (Watts 1998; Fleiner et al. in Blindenbacher et al. 2003). • “Territorial autonomy … describes self-governance of a demographically distinct territorial unit within an existing unitary state” (Wolff 2010; note that his definition is in fact more sophisticated than this).

Definitions and types (2) Various types of federal arrangements: • Symmetric and asymmetric federal arrangements (Watts 1998); • polycommunal [aka ethnofederal], mixed or non-communal federal arrangements (Sisk 1996).

Federalism and autonomy • There is an unusual consensus in the academic debate that federalism and/or autonomy arrangements are a suitable means to manage violent ethnic conflict: • Consociationalists favour federalism/communal autonomy (particularly polycommunal federalism), as it reinforces the plural nature of society and deviates from majority rule by allowing the minority to rule over itself in specific areas of exclusive concern (Lijphart 1977); • proponents of integrative power-sharing argue that federalism/autonomy arrangements can foster ethnopolitical stability by creating multiple levels of government (Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2006; Roeder 2009) BUT are often critical of ethnofederalism (Roeder 2005; 2009).

Merits of federalism (and autonomy arrangements) • Federalism localises ethnic conflict; • fragments and crosscuts ethnic identities [as long as they are not strictly polycommunal]; • protects ethnic minorities from the direct hegemony of larger ethnic groups; • promotes state-based identities as a cleavage that is independent of and competitive with ethnic identities; • and devolves federally controlled resources to territorial constituencies. (Suberu, 2001, on federalism in Nigeria)

Merits of federalism (and autonomy arrangements) (2) • They increase the number of settings for peaceful bargaining (Bermeo 2002); • by creating multiple levels of government, they disperse points of political victory, decrease thresholds for political gains and increase opportunities for political representation (Cohen 1997); • combines the best of both worlds, as it allows us to preserve the larger state whilst recognising minority national identities (Kymlicka 2007).

Dangers of federalism (and autonomy arrangements) • Federalism serves to foster competition over powers and resources between the centre and periphery as well as among constituent units (Suberu 2001); • regional parties can foster regional identities that may be mobilised for ethnic conflict or secessionism (Brancati 2009);

Dangers of federalism (and autonomy arrangements) (2) • federalism and autonomy arrangements, especially if designed along ethnic lines, may encourage secessionism (Roeder 2009); • ethnofederalism cements ethnic cleavages and thereby keeps ethnic conflict alive (ibid.; remember similar criticisms against consociationalism); • problems of majoritarianism can develop within federal/autonomous units (Sisk 1996).

Another inconclusive debate • There has been “surprisingly favorable attention” (Roeder 2009: 203) to federal or autonomy arrangements as means to manage ethnic conflict, but surprisingly few analyses to investigate the merits of such arrangements compared to unitarism (Bermeo 2002). • Ultimately, one may agree with Horowitz “that federalism can either exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict” (Horowitz 2000: 603).

Another inconclusive debate (2) • Federalism or autonomy arrangements are unlikely to be an effective or ineffective tool for conflict management per se. Rather, their effects ultimately depend on factors such as: • their design (including state boundaries and the competencies of constituent units) (Zagar 2005); • their ethnic composition (Horowitz 2000); • the origins of federalism (Bermeo 2002); • the regime type (ibid.); • and the behaviour of political elites (Malesevic 2000).

Part IV: Summary

Summary • All our case studies are affected by questions about the feasibility of territorial solutions to violent ethnic conflict. • Federal and autonomy arrangements have received much positive attention as means to manage ethnic conflict because they foster minority rule and increase opportunities for political representation. • Partition, as a last resort to solve intense ethnic wars, promises to solve the ethnic security dilemma, and to enhance the prospects of both sustainable peace and stable democracy.

Summary (2) • Proponents of either federal and autonomy arrangements or partition as territorial “solutions”/management tools of violent ethnic conflicts have been criticised for similar reasons, e.g. that the endorsement of such strategies encourages further secessionism and that they merely transfer conflicts to a different level (but do not solve ethnic antagonisms). • Not surprisingly, the debates about the merits and pitfalls of federal and autonomy arrangements on the one hand, and of partition on the other have remained inconclusive to date, as their effects ultimately depend on a variety of contextual factors, such as the ethnic composition of federal units or the pervasiveness of the ethnic security dilemma.

PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence