1 / 19

AND A CHANGING ULSTER, 1969-2007

AND A CHANGING ULSTER, 1969-2007. A community in the position of having what it wants (Unionists) Defending against a community trying to change the status quo (Nationalists) This dynamic has been at work since 1798, overlaid upon covenantal ethnic identity of 17 th c

dewei
Download Presentation

AND A CHANGING ULSTER, 1969-2007

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. AND A CHANGING ULSTER, 1969-2007

  2. A community in the position of having what it wants (Unionists) • Defending against a community trying to change the status quo (Nationalists) • This dynamic has been at work since 1798, overlaid upon covenantal ethnic identity of 17th c • The Orange Order is a prime custodian of the defensive 'No' tradition • Reflects the nature of Ulster Protestant covenantal "nationalism", as with Israeli (Roshwald 2006)

  3. Orange Loyalists and Orange Rebels • Orangeism, UUP, Church of Ireland (now includes all mainline churches): mainstream "loyal Unionist" institutions • But a rebel strand ( as well as a 'civic Unionist' one) also runs through these institutions • Orangeism: a tussle between 'loyal' and 'rebel' traditions and their alternative usable pasts

  4. Conservative but not Militant • The loyal impulse: say 'No', but do so within the established law and institutions • Orange 'Loyal' tradition: most conservative on Constitution and concessions; but anti-militant • Paisley and paramilitary traditions: more flexible/original on Constitution; more militant

  5. Rebel 'Yes' Unionism • Lindsay Crawford (IOO first GM) – accepts Home Rule • Ian Paisley – own Irishness, would consider United Ireland if reformed (Nov 1971) • Bill Craig – voluntary coalition, Irish dimension (treaty relationship), 1975 • New Ulster Political Research Group, "Common Sense": power sharing, also Ulster independence, UDA-linked, 1978-80s • Peter Robinson – An End to Drift (1987)- power sharing • Ian Paisley does a deal with Sinn Fein to relaunch institutions (2006-7) • Why?: Anti-establishment, Ulster indepentist, left-wing, less tradition-bound

  6. Orange 'No' Unionism • Orange Loyal Unionism was the driving force behind anti-reformist sentiment (i.e. 1969-74, 1986, 1998) • Paisley and paramilitaries played auxiliary role. Ulster would have said 'no' without them • The Order consistently opposed the more erratic (often progressive) Unionism of the paramilitaries and DUP

  7. Orangeism and the Agreement (1998) • GFA signed 10 April, referendum to be held 23 May • GFA discussed at Grand Lodge, 15 April • 10 speak against the Agreement, 5 in support (including David McNarry, who tried to invoke Trimble's toughness as a guarantee) • Delegates express amazement at Trimble: 'was David Trimble out of his mind?.....'

  8. At Grand Lodge, Molyneaux ...stated that he had ‘no axe to grind’ (presumably against Trimble), but that he and [Martin] Smyth were ‘totally opposed to the Agreement’. Furthermore, Molyneaux wanted action to ‘disarm the mechanism’ of the GFA and sought Orange backing to put the government under pressure not to proceed. He pointed out that the Order could not wait five weeks but had to act in the first two weeks when Trimble was vulnerable.

  9. [Martin] Smyth …[told]… his audience that he was 'shellshocked’ by the Agreement, and had been assured before he left (presumably referring to the Unionist party headquarters) that nothing would be decided. Citing Sunningdale, he cautioned that there would be ‘no democracy’ under the GFA, that the Unionist people were being ‘led like a lamb to the slaughter’, and that he would argue against the GFA at the next UUC meeting. He urged the Order to get its people out to the polls ‘to vote as we want them to vote’.

  10. Molyneaux now put a resolution in front of the 100-odd assembled delegates: ‘The Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland takes note of the acceptance by the participants to the talks process of the document of 10th April 1998 but failing clarification of certain vital issues cannot recommend it to the people of Ulster.’ This statement was endorsed by 76–10, with 1 abstention

  11. 'The Agreement…is prisoner-driven'…said Dennis Watson, [and] was unacceptable from a ‘moral/christian viewpoint’. Blair took a different view, however, and argued that ‘[we have to] accept that, but judgements have to be made. It [the GFA] will do more to preserve life and bring justice to people.’ Blair tried to express sympathy for the Orangemen’s feelings by offering that ‘emotionally most people find this [forgiving violent offenders] most difficult. Attacks on halls must also be a problem for you.'

  12. The Orange Role in Bringing Down the GFA • Focused upon Trimble, and, later, the UUP • Smyth leadership challenge (2000) • No-Confidence motions in Trimble's leadership. Antrim 1999; Grand Lodge 2004; • Sponsor of challenges to Trimble in UUC

  13. Frustrating UUP party reforms • UUP attempts at reform. Party president Cunningham urges tighter discipline and efficiency • Orange Refusal to pay new £100 delegate fee • Difficulty arranging date to meet UUP executive to discuss reform • David Brewster recommends dragging out appeal procedure re fees 'for as long as possible' and ensure Orange delegates vote against reforms

  14. I deeply regret that for the last two years, since Joe Cunningham’s death, we have been bogged down in a continually frustrating set of discussions with the Orange Order. We have gone round in circles and eventually ended up back at square one, the Order not being prepared to accept the need for change. Your Rules Committee will now decide . . . whether to allow this roadblock to stymie many of the other changes we want to implement. I am convinced that this party should not allow one particular interest group to prevent progress. But I have to face the reality that the Order’s opposition would make it unlikely that we can obtain the necessary two-thirds majority . . . do we go for the radical and complete set of new rules favoured by Joe Cunningham? Or do we go for a hot patch of compromise changes, which leaves the need to modernise the linkage with affiliated bodies to another day? - James Cooper, UUP Chairman, 19 Oct 2002

  15. Breaking the Link • Considerable switch of allegiance at Grand Lodge level to DUP in the period 2001-2005 (Weir, Watson, McCausland) • Orange vote is as much if not more DUP than Unionist average • Order sees itself as a bridge between DUP and UUP 'antis'. Natural home for anti-GFA UUP men (Smyth, Nelson, Brewster) • Rapprochement with Free Presbyterianism (1998): 56-38 vote; IOO (2003); Paisley • Breaking of Link: 82-16 vote in 2005

  16. St. Andrews and Beyond • Striking Grand Lodge silence on St. Andrews & Paisley-Adams concordat • Natural role would be to reflect the considerable disquiet and shock of 'principled No' Unionists • Criticism muted by the fact that 'No' Unionism is in disarray as a result of DUP's capture of the conservative Unionist vote • Order's first concern is parading, constitutional issues a close second

  17. Waiting to see what happens on parading (review of PC; possible 'deal' on Drumcree) • If no deal on parading (as seems likely), then what? • Chuminess with SF will not play well. Conflictual image will • Honeymoon for DUP will only last as long as they remain sufficiently obstructionist and defensive of Unionist interest • Constitutional or policy concessions to Nationalism without movement on parading will lead to strong Orange criticism • The Order will help to reshape the DUP along the lines of traditional loyal Unionism, taming its radical and independent side • Thus Orange will help to stiffen sentiment against any 'normalisation' of politics and relaxation of the ethnic cleavage • Portends lack of Unionist-Nationalist agreement in contentious policy areas (i.e. strand 3), and continued sectarian haggling over the spoils handed over by HM Treasury

  18. AND 'NO' UNIONISM SINCE 1998

More Related