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The Interagency Intelligence Disputes of 1963

A comprehensive analysis of the competing views on Diem's government, CIA & MACV, and the state and press during the turmoil of 1963.

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The Interagency Intelligence Disputes of 1963

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  1. The Interagency Intelligence Disputes of 1963 Mark Moyar 20 October 2006

  2. Competing views on Diem government CIA & MACV State & Press • ineptly handling the Buddhists • war effort going to deteriorate because of disillusionment among officers • taking appropriate measures to deal with Buddhist protesters • prosecuting war very effectively

  3. Buddhist protests begin 8 May 1963

  4. Tri Quang (left)

  5. Ngo Dinh Diem’s views • concessions will weaken power and prestige • concessions will lead to more demands • Buddhists intent on overthrowing government • Buddhists infiltrated by Communists

  6. Key Players CIA & MACV • General Paul Harkins (COMUSMACV) • General Maxwell Taylor (JCS Chairman) • John Richardson (CIA Saigon station chief) • John McCone (CIA Director)

  7. Key Players State & Press • Averell Harriman (Under Sec of State) • Roger Hilsman (Asst Sec of State for FE) • Henry Cabot Lodge (US Ambassador to SVN) • David Halberstam (New York Times reporter) • Neil Sheehan (UPI reporter)

  8. Sources CIA & MACV State & Press • Field personnel • Inspections • Informants & agents • Captured documents • Prisoner interrogations • Militant Buddhists • Café intellectuals • Pham Xuan An & Pham Ngoc Thao • Each other

  9. The Buddhist protesters CIA & MACV State & Press • Buddhists intent on overthrowing government • Buddhist complaints are dubious • Diem should resist Buddhist demands • Buddhists merely seeking freedom of religion • Buddhist complaints are legitimate • Diem should give in to Buddhist demands

  10. Pagoda raids – 21 August 1963 CIA & MACV State & Press • Generals promoted raids • Generals helped carry out raids • Raids were necessary cure for political problems • Diem and Nhu were sole masterminds of raids • Generals did not help carry out raids • Raids were foolish and alienated the people

  11. War in the countryside CIA & MACV State & Press • South Vietnamese armed forces fighting effectively • Strategic hamlet program thriving • Same, but effectiveness will decline because of political problems • Same, but effectiveness will decline because of political problems

  12. The Richardson controversy 13 September Lodge requests that Lansdale replace Richardson 17 September McCone blocks replacement 2 October Richard Starnes accuses Richardson of insubordination 4 October Halberstam reports Lodge’s discontent w/ Richardson 5 October Richardson transferred out of Saigon

  13. Consequences Generals Kim, Dinh, Don, Vy, Xuan (+ Conein)

  14. Consequences November 2, 1963

  15. Reality The Buddhists • Buddhists made false claims of religious persecution in order to destabilize the Diem government • When Diem tried to conciliate the Buddhists, he undermined his prestige and encouraged further Buddhist demands

  16. Reality The Buddhists (cont.) • Had Diem not acted against Buddhists, government would have succumbed to political failure • pagoda raids of August 21 conceived and executed by generals (whom State & media pushed into a coup)

  17. Reality The War • South Vietnamese armed forces and strategic hamlets perform effectively until November 1963 • Rapid deterioration occurs after November coup • Verified by U.S. Government, U.S. press, and Communist sources

  18. The need to skew history

  19. Historical Misperceptions VC summer offensive • Late summer, VC intensify attacks in Mekong Delta • But only in 4 provinces • More attacks in 4 provinces than other 37 combined

  20. Historical Misperceptions Hughes’s claims Hughes’s error • Jan to Jun 1963- 323 attacks per month • Jul to Sep 1963- 410 attacks per month • Therefore, nationwide attacks increased sharply starting in July • avg rate lower in first 6 months because of low numbers in January and February • June 410 July 407 August 368 September 503 October 369 • More attacks in four target provinces but fewer attacks in other 37 provinces

  21. Historical Misperceptions GVN weapon losses Total GVN weapon losses increase But only because of overrunning of strategic hamlets in Long An and Dinh Tuong Strategic hamlets in 2 other target provinces and rest of country doing well Strategic hamlet program in Long An and Dinh Tuong better than believed

  22. Historical Misperceptions December 1963 • GVN statistics “grossly in error” • But- U.S. had long mistrusted statistics and used other sources • McCone knew in December that problems confined to few provinces, and became much worse after coup • Junta falsified statistics

  23. Lessons Learned Viewing another country’s politics through an American lens is perilous. The strategic hamlet program was a real success, making it a model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations. The use of the press as a source of intelligence can be tempting to high officials, and can lead to catastrophe.

  24. The Interagency Intelligence Disputes of 1963 Mark Moyar 20 October 2006

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