Arrests and Searches Class 13
CASE OF THE DAY • State of Alaska v. Byron Kalmakoff, 2005 WL 2620213 (Alaska App.) • Issue: Does Blakely (and underlying Apprendi and Ring holdings) apply to Kent criteria? Must “amenability” be adjudicated by a jury in the juvenile court at a “reasonable doubt” standard? • Facts • Minor age 15 convicted of murder in adult court following waiver hearing • Shot his aunt twice, sexually assaulted her after shooting • State has automatic waiver at 16 for murder • Probable cause standard regarding both the alleged offense and amenability controls waiver decision
Burden is on defendant to show his amenability • Amenability defined as prospect of ‘rehabilitation’ prior to reaching age 20 • Kent standards are applied almost literally in AK statute • Def. alleges that Blakely requires trial for any ‘disputed fact’ that would increase a penalty beyond the prescribed statutory minimum’, and that waiver to criminal court exposes def. to greater punishment that he would receive in juvenile court • Difference in punishment was substantial • Trial court granted defendant’s motion to vacate criminal court conviction and return case to juvenile court for trial on amenability question
Court of Appeals reversed • Court cites a long list of cases concluding that Apprendi does not apply to waiver proceedings • Waiver is jurisdictional decision only, not a sentencing decision • But this question is untested since Blakely • Is waiver solely jurisdictional, when there now is consistent empirical evidence that waiver = longer and harsher sentences? • Do Blakely rules apply in prosecutorial waiver, or legislative waiver?
Arrest Authority • Authority to arrest parallels juvenile court authority to intervene • Not just limited to crimes • See TX and MN statutes • But it’s not an arrest, per se, it’s an “apprehension” (MN statute, for example) • Custody ≠ arrest, therefore no record of arrest • Search authority seems to be implicit in broader authority to stop a youth
Arrest and Probable Cause • Does probable cause requirement apply in stop, search or arrest of a juvenile? • Balance of particular right being asserted against goals of juvenile court (Lanes v State) • Apply Terry standard for probable cause? NY version? For kids, probable cause of what? • If no probable cause, is there justification for creation of a record? e.g., YG cards in NYC • Unique status of children before the law – protection and welfare interests permit police apprehension for non-criminal behaviors and criminal behavior • Both behavior and surroundings • Lanes recognizes adverse developmental impact of unjustified arrest, especially since it might lead to detention and deeper immersion into justice system (the durability of the diversionary instincts of juvenile justice), but not enough to curtail police authority (“avoid taint”) • Lanes also assumes that constitutional remedies in juvenile court (suppression of evidence, exclusionary rule) are sufficient to curb excesses by police
Balancing Tests for “Arrest” • Constraints on arrest that apply uniquely to children? • Limitations on separation of child from family • How to weigh collateral consequences in overall context of the case (risks and benefits)? • Separation from school, family • Exposure and stigma from legal intervention that affects notions of fairness and justice of legal authorities • Community protection • Avoid harm to self • State action is not a one-to-one substitute for parental authority, even when PA is weak, further justification is needed • But aren’t kids in need of greater protection, and therefore warrant more relaxed constitutional safeguards from intrusive authorities?
Constitutional Protections • Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections apply • Lanes asserts that probable cause requirement applies • Davis v Mississippi – fingerprinting allowed • Does Terry apply to juveniles, when the state’s interest goes beyond “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity and into special needs of children? – see Tyrell J. - not really….. • Do protections vary by context – e.g., on school grounds versus on streetcorner or other public area? • Example – Chicago gang loitering ordinance • Is it ok to conduct search incidental to curfew violation?
In re Tyrell: state can order conditions (that lead to warrantless search) even if improper for an adult • Justified by “interventionist” prong of juvenile court jurisprudence • Probation as special circumstance, reduced expectation of privacy (even if search condition unknown) • In re JG: warrantless search ok in the course of an authorized detention (arrest) • JG was reported missing (run away) by his mother • Apprehension ok to protect him from harm to himself • Search was conducted pursuant to apprehension and detention, not motivated by other elements of “reasonable suspicion” – but OK • Inventory searches ok, too • Limits on “crisis”?
Voluntariness, Competence & Search • Voluntariness essential in consent to search • Voluntariness is absence of coercion (Schenckloth v Bustamonte) • Juvenile and adult standard, not necessarily a “knowing choice” of options • Totality standard for consent, court can consider whether defendant understood that he or she had a right to refuse, but this is not essential to voluntariness • Different from waiver of trial rights, where standard is “Knowing, Intelligent and Voluntary” – need only be voluntary • Youthfulness doesn’t preclude “voluntary” – but see Haley • Competence of juveniles to consent to search? • Concern for competence depends on state interest (arrest not same as trial) • Immaturity not an exemption from consent • Not equivalent to a waiver of trial rights, where the standard is “knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” Only “voluntariness” is at issue
Raises the broad question about whether immaturity should be part of “totality,” and in what ways • For example, obedience to authority and desire to please authority figures is characteristic of “youthfulness” – what appears to be voluntary may in fact be simply immaturity (fear of refusing an “inherent authority,” doesn’t know she or he can refuse, etc.) • Could also be inability to understand the implications of consent • Grounds for constitutional social science argument? • In re J.M. (bus case) – did he understand? Was his consent voluntary? Did he understand his rights? • Special vulnerability of juveniles to intimidation by authority figures does not rule out voluntary consent • Variable effect of age on “voluntariness” • Was J.M.’s “deflection” a sign of maturity and sophistication, or a desire to please an authority figure? • Judge denied suppression, was overturned, case was remanded on issue of consent, what evidence will J use to decide? • Race and voluntary consent? See Mack dissent • These are essentially competence issues
Confidentiality • Diversionary and “Stigma Avoidance” rationales for maintaining confidentiality • Confidentiality as a fiction? Gault • The “space” between stigma avoidance and public safety creates room for discretion and individualization – U.S. v Hall • Applies to lineups, photographs, fingerprints, and criminal histories • “Prejudicial misidentification” – mistakes in lineups (see recent controversy in IL on sequential versus panel lineups)
Stigmatizing effects of process itself – does participation in lineup or fingerprint launch a self-labeling process? • Does the existence of a “dossier” itself label a youth to the police and the courts? • NYC – YG cards begin record, frame boundaries of suspicious population • Origins of a photo may be prejudicial to a jury (Commonwealth v Kent K.) or to a judge in a bench trial (no way to avoid, in reality)
States have created legislation – part of omnibus “get tough” legislation – that eliminates privacy wall around juvenile records • Public safety interests trump potential of stigmatizing effect of records disclosure and pretrial publicity • Broad range of conditions for fingerprinting and entry of fingerprints and/or court record into central repository • Is confidentiality and privacy beneficial to rehabilitation? • Mortgaging future employment or school access?