1 / 30

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. Phillip J. Finck Idaho National Laboratory April 2, 2007. Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Options. Objectives of Advanced Fuel Cycles. Yucca Mountain Reference Case. Repository Benefits for Limited Recycle in LWRs.

Download Presentation

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.


Presentation Transcript

  1. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Phillip J. Finck Idaho National Laboratory April 2, 2007

  2. Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Options

  3. Objectives of Advanced Fuel Cycles

  4. Yucca Mountain Reference Case

  5. Repository Benefits for Limited Recycle in LWRs • Limited LWR recycling of plutonium and americium would allow a drift loading increase of about a factor of 2 • Subsequent burning in fast reactor needed to derive large benefits

  6. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Objectives are Stated in The National Security Strategy • The United States “will build the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to work with other nations to develop and deploy advanced nuclear recycling and reactor technologies. • This initiative will help provide reliable, emission-free energy with less of the waste burden of older technologies and without making available separated plutonium that could be used by rogue states or terrorists for nuclear weapons. • These new technologies will make possible a dramatic expansion of safe, clean nuclear energy to help meet the growing global energy demand.”The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March, 16, 2006): 29.

  7. Key Elements of the U.S. Nuclear Energy Strategy Include Domestic Efforts: • Expand nuclear power to help meet growing energy demand in an environmentally sustainable manner. • Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel that do not separate plutonium, with the goal over time of ceasing separation of plutonium and eventually eliminating excess stocks of civilian plutonium and drawing down existing stocks of civilian spent fuel. Such advanced fuel cycle technologies will substantially reduce nuclear waste, simplify its disposition, and help to ensure the need for only one geologic repository in the United States through the end of this century. • Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced reactors that consume transuranic elements from recycled spent fuel.

  8. Supporting the GNEP Strategy Requires New Facilities, Technology Development and R&D Geologic Disposal Spent Fuel(63,000 MTHM) Addl.RecyclingReactors Existing LWR Fleet AdvancedRecyclingReactor ProcessStorage AdvancedSeparation FR Fuel ExpandedLWR Fleet Industry led,Lab Supported 2020-2025 Support for Industry-led effortand R&D for GNEP beyond 2020-2025 Advanced FuelCycle Facility Technology Development and R&D DOE Lab led, NRC, Universities, Industry,International Partners

  9. For the Initial GNEP Operation We Envision Three Supporting Facilities Nuclear fuel recycling center (CFTC) Advanced recycling reactor (ABR) Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility

  10. Key Elements of the U.S. Nuclear Energy Strategy Include International Efforts to: • Establish supply arrangements among nations to provide reliable fuel services worldwide for generating nuclear energy, by providing nuclear fuel and taking back spent fuel for recycling, without spreading enrichment and reprocessing technologies. • Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced, proliferation resistant nuclear power reactors appropriate for the power grids of developing countries and regions. • Develop, in cooperation with the IAEA, enhanced nuclear safeguards to effectively and efficiently monitor nuclear materials and facilities, to ensure commercial nuclear energy systems are used only for peaceful purposes.

  11. International Expansion of Nuclear Power is Underway http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,460011,00.html

  12. An International Fuel Service is an Essential Part of Reducing Proliferation Risk • Fuel Suppliers:operate reactors and fuel cycle facilities, including fast reactors to transmute the actinides from spent fuel into less toxic materials • Fuel Users:operate reactors, lease and return fuel. • IAEA:provide safeguards and fuel assurances, backed up with a reserve of nuclear fuel for states that do not pursue enrichment and reprocessing

  13. International Partnerships are Critical to GNEP Success • Develop the basis for an assured fuel supply concept with other nations • IAEA or similar international organization administered mechanism to provide supply reliability in cases that could not be resolved in the commercial market, facilitation of new commercial arrangements when supply interrupted for some reason other that safeguards compliance • Eligibility based on • safeguard compliance, nuclear safety standards, and reliance on international market without indigenous enrichment and reprocessing • Foster specific R&D and technology collaborations through interactions with National Laboratories to address critical areas U.S. – Russia agreement • Complete international agreement on GNEP Statement of Principles • Hold GNEP meeting for other interested nations thereafter.

  14. GNEP: Critical Technology Issues

  15. GNEP – “Why” and ”Why NOW” • There is a rapidly expanding global demand for nuclear power • Without some global regime to manage this expansion many more “Iranian” situations will likely appear • A global regime is forming up with Russia, France, Japan and China having both the will and the means to participate. • The United States, through GNEP, is leading the formation of this global regime but we do not have the means to participate in its execution. • Unless the United States implements the domestic aspects of the GNEP program we will suffer significant consequences in our energy security, industrial competitiveness and national security. • There are potential repository benefits, but the international need for GNEP is compelling. • The United States must act decisively and quickly to implement GNEP or face the real possibility of having no influence over the certain future global expansion of nuclear energy.

  16. ABR, ALWR, and LWR Capacity for 2.4% Nuclear Power Growth Rate

  17. Comparison of SNF Storage and Disposal for Once-Through and Recycling scenario

  18. NEA/OECD Working Party on Scientific Issues of the Fuel Cycle includes studies of User/Supplier scenarios

  19. Near-term Focus is Input to the Secretarial Decision Package for June 2008 • Deployment options. Comparison with partner states • Economic and business payoffs • Effect of uncertainties in technology development • Input to business plan • Role of nuclear (with GNEP) in global energy picture • Integrated waste management strategy • Provide input to NEPA and PEIS activities

  20. Development of Advanced Spent Fuel Processing Technologies for GNEP

  21. ABR Technology Development • Addresses Technology Development for ABR Prototype • Performs feasibility studies for select ABR Prototype components • Steam generator testing, accelerated aging of critical materials and components, passive fission gas monitoring , etc. • Performs key features testing of ABR Prototype critical component • pump performance testing, fuel handling machine testing, reactor shutdown system testing, seismic isolation bearing testing, water flow simulation stability testing, etc. • Performs testing of key ABR Prototype plant components to verify performance characteristics and safety responses in a prototypical environment • Primary pump testing, control rod drive mechanism testing, fuel handling system operations, testing, and recovery, qualification of structural materials, performance of reliability testing of shutdown systems, etc. • Ends with ABR Prototype safety tests • Addresses economic issues of fast reactors • Develops and tests advanced fast reactor features that can contribute to improved economic performance • Requires an infrastructure to support technology testing and development

  22. Fast Reactor Support Facilities Infrastructure • U.S. lacks the infrastructure to test large sodium components in a prototypic environment • ETEC’s Liquid Metal Engineering Center has been decommissioned • General Electric no longer has sodium testing facilities • ANL has some – some active/some inactive – but not for very large components • France and Japan reportedly have some testing capability but condition is unknown. • ABR Program must support rebuilding of U.S.-based sodium component testing infrastructure to support ABR component development to: • Provide for prototypic testing environment for sodium components • Provide for personnel training on sodium handling, sodium component operations, and maintenance

  23. Fast Reactor Support Facilities Infrastructure (Cont’d) • Development of ABR Prototype and successor ABRs may require additional support facilities (examples) • Water loop testing facilities for component testing • Targeted research and development facilities for lab-scale testing • Materials Testing Capability • Driver Core Fuel Manufacturing Facility

  24. Technical Risk Evaluation

  25. The initial post irradiation examination (PIE) of metal and nitride fuels irradiated in ATR is completed. • Essential post-irradiation examinations of the AFC-1 fuels are completed. • ATR irradiation of AFC-1D (metal), AFC-1G (nitride) and AFC-1H (metal) transmutation fuel samples continued. • Comprehensive review of the U.S. fast reactor fuel experience compiled into a white paper.

  26. Metal and oxide TRU fuels are candidates for the first generation transmutation fuel. Candidates for First Generation Transmutation ( < 20 years) Metal Fuel • Successful small-scale fabrication and irradiation on limited amount of samples • Large-scale fabrication without loss of Am must be demonstrated • Fuel-clad interactions at high burnup must be investigated • Effect of lanthanides on FCCI must be addressed Oxide Fuels (powder processing) • Successful small-scale fabrication and irradiation on limited amount of samples (France, Japan) • Effect of group TRU on fabrication process unknown • Effect of lanthanides on fabrication • Large-scale fabrication amenable to hot-cell operations must be developed • Limitations on linear power Back-up Options for Initial Candidates • Am recovery and use in moderated targets • Fabrication using powder metallurgy • Development of advanced clad materials (liners) • Driver fuel and MA targets • Sphere-pac or vibro-pac fuel technology Risk trade-off: fabrication versus performance • Driver fuel and MA targets Long-Term Options (2nd or 3rd Generation) for Increased Efficiency ( > 20 years) • Nitride • High TRU loading potential • Fabrication process requires further work • N-15 enrichment. • Dispersion • High burnup potential • Fabrication process requires further work • Separations process must be developed

  27. To achieve fuel qualification tests using LTAs, considerable developmental testing is required. PHASE III • Demonstrate fabrication process • Validate fuel performance specifications • Validate predictive fuel performance codes 0 2 12 8 4 18 14 10 6 16 20 PHASE II • Optimize the fuel design • Fuel Specification and Fuel Safety Case • Fuel properties measurements with variance • Predictive fuel behavior models and codes Phase IV: Qualification LTA Tests DBA Transients Tests Transient Response Tests Phase III: Design Improvements & Evaluation Undercooling Tests (2 Clad T) High-Power Tests (2 LHGR or Fuel T) Fabrication Variables Tests Design Parameters Tests Scoping Transient Tests Phase II: Concept Definition & Feasibility Scoping Tests II (prototypic) PIE Scoping Tests I (screening) Fuel Candidate Selection 0 2 12 8 4 18 14 10 6 16 20 Time (years)

  28. Transmutation fuel development is considerably more challenging than conventional fuels. • Multiple elements in the fuel U, Pu, Np, Am, Cm • Varying thermodynamic properties e.g. High vapor pressure of Am • Impurities from separation process e.g. High lanthanide carryover • High burnup requirements • High helium production during irradiation • Remote fabrication & quality control • Fuel must be qualified for a variable range of composition • Age and burnup of LWR SNF • Changes through multiple passes in FR • Variable conversion ratio for FR Legacy SNF From LWRs LWRs Reprocessing TRU Fuel Fabrication TRU Fast Burner Reactors Reprocessing

  29. Microstructure Initial distribution of species Initial stoichiometry Thermal conductivity Thermal expansion Specific heat Phase diagrams Fission gas formation, behavior and release Materials dimensional stability – Restructuring, densification, growth, creep and swelling Defect formation & migrations Diffusion of species Radial power distribution Fuel-clad gap conductance Fuel-clad chemical interactions Mechanical properties Fuel performance prediction requires integral understanding of multiple phenomena. Dynamic properties: Changes with irradiation, temperature, and time. Nonlinear effects:Initial condition dependence (fabrication route).

  30. A parallel analytic and experimental development assures implementation shortly after the first LTAs. FY’06 26 08 18 14 10 24 20 16 12 22 Fuel Simulation Platform Available Development of Fundamental Models Phenomenological Tests Verification & Validation Integration of Models Analysis of LTA & variants Qualified fuel, process and models Irradiation of LTA(s) LTA(s) available for ABR LTA fabrication Fabrication Process development & Design Process Optimization AFCF Available Pin Irradiation Fast-Spectrum Test Facility Available Selection of 1st generation fuel type & process Sample/Rodlet Irradiation Hot-cell rodlet fabrication capability FY’06 26 08 18 14 10 24 20 16 12 22 Time (years)

More Related