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Flexauc : Serving Dynamic Demands in Spectrum Trading Markets with Flexible Auction

Flexauc : Serving Dynamic Demands in Spectrum Trading Markets with Flexible Auction. Peng Lin, Xiaojun Feng , Qian Zhang, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology INFOCOM 2014. Outline. Background System Models Flexible Auction Design Theoretical and Simulation Results

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Flexauc : Serving Dynamic Demands in Spectrum Trading Markets with Flexible Auction

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  1. Flexauc: Serving Dynamic Demands in Spectrum Trading Markets with Flexible Auction Peng Lin, XiaojunFeng, Qian Zhang, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology INFOCOM 2014

  2. Outline • Background • System Models • Flexible Auction Design • Theoretical and Simulation Results • Future Works and Conclusions

  3. Limited Spectrum Resources

  4. Secondary Spectrum Trading

  5. Secondary Spectrum Trading Spectrum Auction

  6. Secondary Spectrum Trading Spectrum Auction Service Provision

  7. Observations • WSPs may have flexible demands and valuations of the channels in the auction.

  8. Observations • Existing works cannot enable flexibility via an computationally efficient scheme • Many works assume at most one winning for any buyer, e.g • TRUST, INFOCOM’09 • TAHES, INFOCOM’12 • GROUPON, INFOCOM’13 • Exponential overhead via VCG auction or Combinatorial auction

  9. One Key Target of this Paper • Enable Flexible auction (Flexauc) while preserving efficiency

  10. Outline • Background • System Models • Flexible Auction Design • Theoretical and Simulation Results • Future Works and Conclusions

  11. System Model and Key Notations • Spectrum holder (SH) • Number of channels: • Bandwidth of each channel: • WSPs, ()

  12. System Model and Key Notations • Spectrum holder (SH) • Number of channels: • Bandwidth of each channel: • WSPs, () • ’s bids in the auction:

  13. System Model and Key Notations • Spectrum holder (SH) • Number of channels: • Bandwidth of each channel: • WSPs, () • ’s bids in the auction: • The SH decides winners and payment for each channel

  14. Truthfulness • One of the most important properties an auction should achieve. • The buyers bid with their true valuations.

  15. Outline • Background • System Models • Flexible Auction Design • Winner Determination • Payment Mechanisms • Theoretical and Simulation Results • Future Works and Conclusions

  16. Winner Determination • Sort the bids in descending order • The highest bids are the winning bids Winning bids

  17. Payment Mechanism • Traditional clearing-price payment mechanism is not truthful can manipulate the clearing-price Clearing-price Winning bids

  18. Payment Mechanism:Uniform Pricing Scheme • Set the unit price as the highest bid from a buyer who wins no channel Winning bids Uniform price

  19. Payment Mechanism:Uniform Pricing Scheme • Limitation • What if we cannot find such a “loser” in the auction? • If , we can always find one such “loser”

  20. Payment Mechanism:Partial Uniform Pricing Scheme • Set the unit price for as the highest bid from another buyer that is lower than ‘s winning bids Price for Winning bids Price for

  21. Outline • Background • System Models • Flexible Auction Design • Theoretical and Simulation Results • Future Works and Conclusions

  22. Truthfulness and Social Welfare • Flexauc is truthful with either the uniform pricing or partial uniform pricing payment mechanism • Flexauc maximizes social welfare

  23. Computational Efficiency • The time complexity of Flexauc is Polynomial with both N and C (). • The partial uniform pricing scheme provides higher revenue for the spectrum holder than the VCG pricing scheme.

  24. Simulation Settings • Total bandwidth: 50MHz • Number of channels: 5-20 • Number of WSPs: • Metrics: • Utility of the WSPs • Revenue of the SH • Social welfare

  25. Truthfulness • : utility when bids truthfully • : utility when bids untruthfully

  26. Comparison of Payment Mechanisms • We treat the VCG payment scheme as a base line and calculated the revenue of the spectrum owner.

  27. Comparison with Non-flexible Auction • Baseline: a buyer submit the same price for all channels and wins one channel

  28. Outline • Background • System Models • Flexible Auction Design • Theoretical and Simulation Results • Future Works and Conclusions

  29. What about the Strategy of the Spectrum Holder? • In this work, is fixed before the auction. • What if the spectrum holder can determine how to partition the spectrum, given a fixed total bandwidth? • Can its revenue further improved?

  30. Conclusions • Flexauc enables the flexible demands and valuations in the secondary spectrum auction. • We proposed two new payment mechanisms which are both truthful and computationally efficient. • The partial uniform pricing mechanism achieves higher revenue for the seller than the VCG scheme

  31. Thanks!Questions? Flexauc: Serving Dynamic Demands in Spectrum Trading Markets with Flexible Auction XiaojunFeng xfeng@cse.ust.hk

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