CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 ABORIGINAL PEOPLE: ABORGINAL RIGHTS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW21 ABORIGINAL PEOPLE: ABORGINAL RIGHTS Shigenori Matsui

2. INTRODUCTION • What is the aboriginal right? • Is it absolute right or could it be restricted by the government? • What is the aboriginal title and treaty right?

3. I CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS R. v. Sparrow, [1990]

4. The word "existing" makes it clear that the rights to which s. 35(1) applies are those that were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. This means that extinguished rights are not revived… • Further, an existing aboriginal right cannot be read so as to incorporate the specific manner in which it was regulated before 1982. The notion of freezing existing rights would incorporate into the Constitution a crazy patchwork of regulations

5. The test of extinguishment to be adopted, in our opinion, is that the Sovereign's intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal right. • There is nothing in the Fisheries Act or its detailed regulations that demonstrates a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Indian aboriginal right to fish. • We would conclude then that the Crown has failed to discharge its burden of proving extinguishment.

6. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in this case held that the aboriginal right was to fish for food purposes, but that purpose was not to be confined to mere subsistence. Rather, the right was found to extend to fish consumed for social and ceremonial activities…it was contended before this Court that the aboriginal right extends to commercial fishing. In the courts below, the case at bar was not presented on the footing of an aboriginal right to fish for commercial or livelihood purposes. Rather, the focus was and continues to be on the validity of a net length restriction affecting the appellant's food fishing licence. We therefore adopt the Court of Appeal's characterization of the right for the purpose of this appeal, and confine our reasons to the meaning of the constitutional recognition and affirmation of the existing aboriginal right to fish for food and social and ceremonial purposes.

7. In response to the appellant's submission that s. 35(1) rights are more securely protected than the rights guaranteed by the Charter, it is true that s. 35(1) is not subject to s. 1 of the Charter. In our opinion, this does not mean that any law or regulation affecting aboriginal rights will automatically be of no force or effect by the operation of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Legislation that affects the exercise of aboriginal rights will nonetheless be valid, if it meets the test for justifying an interference with a right recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1).

8. There is no explicit language in the provision that authorizes this Court or any court to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that restricts aboriginal rights. Yet, we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute.

9. Section 35(1) suggests that while regulation affecting aboriginal rights is not precluded, such regulation must be enacted according to a valid objective… Implicit in this constitutional scheme is the obligation of the legislature to satisfy the test of justification. The way in which a legislative objective is to be attained must uphold the honour of the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the Crown and Canada's aboriginal peoples. The extent of legislative or regulatory impact on an existing aboriginal right may be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and affirmation.

10. The first question to be asked is whether the legislation in question has the effect of interfering with an existing aboriginal right. If it does have such an effect, it represents a prima facie infringement of s. 35(1). To determine whether the fishing rights have been interfered with such as to constitute a prima facie infringement of s. 35(1), certain questions must be asked. First, is the limitation unreasonable? Second, does the regulation impose undue hardship? Third, does the regulation deny to the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that right? The onus of proving a prima facie infringement lies on the individual or group challenging the legislation.

11. If a prima facie interference is found, the analysis moves to the issue of justification. This is the test that addresses the question of what constitutes legitimate regulation of a constitutional aboriginal right. The justification analysis would proceed as follows. First, is there a valid legislative objective?

12. If a valid legislative objective is found, the analysis proceeds to the second part of the justification issue. Here, we refer back to the guiding interpretive principle … the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal peoples. The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified.

13. The constitutional entitlement embodied in s. 35(1) requires the Crown to ensure that its regulations are in keeping with that allocation of priority. • Within the analysis of justification, there are further questions to be addressed, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry. These include the questions of whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being implemented.

14. How could the court decide whether there was an aboriginal right? • Is the framework established by Sparrow adequate?

15. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996]

16. “In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal, and now constitutional, status.”

17. “More specifically, what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in light of this purpose; the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”

18. “In light of the suggestion of Sparrow, supra, and the purposes underlying s. 35(1), the following test should be used to identify whether an applicant has established an aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1): in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right.”

19. Factors to be Considered in Application of the Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test • 1 Courts must take into account the perspective of aboriginal peoples themselves • 2 Courts must identify precisely the nature of the claim being made in determining whether an aboriginal claimant has demonstrated the existence of an aboriginal right • 3 In order to be integral a practice, custom or tradition must be of central significance to the aboriginal society in question • 4 The practices, customs and traditions which constitute aboriginal rights are those which have continuity with the practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact • 5 Courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims

20. 6 Claims to aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific rather than general basis • 7 For a practice, custom or tradition to constitute an aboriginal right it must be of independent significance to the aboriginal culture in which it exists • 8 The integral to a distinctive culture test requires that a practice, custom or tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that practice, custom or tradition be distinct • 9 The influence of European culture will only be relevant to the inquiry if it is demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition is only integral because of that influence. • 10 Courts must take into account both the relationship of aboriginal peoples to the land and the distinctive societies and cultures of aboriginal peoples

21. II FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS • Existing aboriginal right • R v. NTC Smokehouse [1996]

22. R. v. Gladstone, [1996]

23. R v. Sappier [2006]

24. Extinguishment

25. Prima facie infringement

26. Justification

27. III ABORIGINAL TITLE What is the nature of aboriginal title? Guerin v. The Queen [1984]

28. R v. Adams [1996]

29. “…the fundamental question to be answered in this case is as to whether a claim to an aboriginal right to fish must rest in a claim to aboriginal title to the area in which the fishing took place. In other words, this Court must determine whether aboriginal rights are inherently based in aboriginal title to the land, or whether claims to title to the land are simply one manifestation of a broader-based conception of aboriginal rights. The reasons of this Court in Van der Peet demonstrate that it is the latter characterization of the relationship between aboriginal rights and aboriginal title that is correct.”

30. “What this test, along with the conceptual basis which underlies it, indicates, is that while claims to aboriginal title fall within the conceptual framework of aboriginal rights, aboriginal rights do not exist solely where a claim to aboriginal title has been made out. Where an aboriginal group has shown that a particular practice, custom or tradition taking place on the land was integral to the distinctive culture of that group then, even if they have not shown that their occupation and use of the land was sufficient to support a claim of title to the land, they will have demonstrated that they have an aboriginal right to engage in that practice, custom or tradition. ”

31. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997]

32. “Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the right to engage in specific activities which may be themselves aboriginal rights. Rather, it confers the right to use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need be aspects of practices, customs and traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of aboriginal societies. Those activities do not constitute the right per se; rather, they are parasitic on the underlying title. However, that range of uses is subject to the limitation that they must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the particular group's aboriginal title. This inherent limit… flows from the definition of aboriginal title as a sui generis interest in land, and is one way in which aboriginal title is distinct from a fee simple.”

33. The idea that aboriginal title is sui generis is the unifying principle underlying the various dimensions of that title. One dimension is its inalienability. • Another dimension of aboriginal title is its source. It had originally been thought that the source of aboriginal title in Canada was the Royal Proclamation, 1763... However, it is now clear that although aboriginal title was recognized by the Proclamation, it arises from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples. • A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally. Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it is a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation.

34. “…the content of aboriginal title can be summarized by two propositions: first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures; and second, that those protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the group's attachment to that land.”

35. Aboriginal title at common law is protected in its full form by s. 35(1). This conclusion flows from the express language of s. 35(1) itself.. The provision, at the very least, constitutionalized those rights which aboriginal peoples possessed at common law, since those rights existed at the time s. 35(1) came into force. Since aboriginal title was a common law right whose existence was recognized well before 1982…, s. 35(1) has constitutionalized it in its full form.

36. The acknowledgement that s. 35(1) has accorded constitutional status to common law aboriginal title raises a further question - the relationship of aboriginal title to the "aboriginal rights" protected by s. 35(1). … aboriginal title is "simply one manifestation of a broader-based conception of aboriginal rights". Thus, although aboriginal title is a species of aboriginal right recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), it is distinct from other aboriginal rights because it arises where the connection of a group with a piece of land "was of a central significance to their distinctive culture."

37. This difference between aboriginal rights to engage in particular activities and aboriginal title requires that the test I laid down in Van der Peet be adapted accordingly. • In order to make out a claim for aboriginal title, the aboriginal group asserting title must satisfy the following criteria: (i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive.

38. The general principles governing justification laid down in Sparrow, and embellished by Gladstone, operate with respect to infringements of aboriginal title. In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be traced to the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.. In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title.

39. The manner in which the fiduciary duty operates with respect to the second stage of the justification test -- both with respect to the standard of scrutiny and the particular form that the fiduciary duty will take -- will be a function of the nature of aboriginal title. Three aspects of aboriginal title are relevant here. First, aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of land; second, aboriginal title encompasses the right to choose to what uses land can be put, subject to the ultimate limit that those uses cannot destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of aboriginal peoples; and third, that lands held pursuant to aboriginal title have an inescapable economic component.

40. How could the court find the aboriginal title? • R v. Marshall [2005]

41. IV ABORIGINAL TREATY RIGHTS What are the aboriginal treaty rights?

42. R. v. Marshall, [1999]

43. The Court of Appeal took a strict approach to the use of extrinsic evidence when interpreting the Treaties of 1760-61. … I think this approach should be rejected for at least three reasons. • Firstly, even in a modern commercial context, extrinsic evidence is available to show that a written document does not include all of the terms of an agreement.

44. Secondly, even in the context of a treaty document that purports to contain all of the terms, this Court has made clear in recent cases that extrinsic evidence of the historical and cultural context of a treaty may be received even absent any ambiguity on the face of the treaty. • Thirdly, where a treaty was concluded verbally and afterwards written up by representatives of the Crown, it would be unconscionable for the Crown to ignore the oral terms while relying on the written terms…

45. In the circumstances, the purported regulatory prohibitions against fishing without a licence …and of selling eels without a licence…do prima facie infringe the appellant's treaty rights under the Treaties of 1760-61 and are inoperative against the appellant unless justified.. • Further, the appellant was charged with fishing during the close season with improper nets... Such a regulation is also a prima facie infringement..

46. The appellant caught and sold the eels to support himself and his wife. Accordingly, the close season and the imposition of a discretionary licensing system would, if enforced, interfere with the appellant's treaty right to fish for trading purposes, and the ban on sales would, if enforced, infringe his right to trade for sustenance. In the absence of any justification of the regulatory prohibitions, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

47. R v. Marshall [1999]

48. R. v. Marshall II, [1999]

49. V DUTY TO CONSULT • Delgamuukw and the fiduciary duty • Duty of consultation

50. Haida Nation v. British Columbia [2004]