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Authenticated QKD protocol using one-time ID PowerPoint Presentation

Authenticated QKD protocol using one-time ID

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Contents

- Introduction
- Authentication with one-time ID
- Quantum Key distribution
- Security proof
- Conclusion

1. Introduction

- QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) protocols
- Advantage
: Unconditional security

- Disadvantage
: Vulnerability to the Man-in-the middle attack

- Advantage

1. Introduction(2)

- Miloslav Dusek, Ondrej Haderka, Martin Hendrych, and Robert Myska, PRA, 60, 149-156 (1999)
- Bao-Sen Shi, Jian Li, Jin-Ming Liu, Xiao-Feng Fan, Guang-Can Guo, Physics Letters A 281 83-87 (2001)
- Guihua Zeng and Weiping Zhan, PRA, 61, 022303 (2000)
- Daniel Ljunggren, Mohamed Bourennane, and Anders Karlsson, PRA, 62, 022305 (2000)
- Takashi Mihara, PRA, 65, 052326 (2002)

2. Authentication with one-time ID

- Preparation
- Each user register him to the arbitrator
: secret user and one-way function

- One-way authentication key of a user, Alice is
where is a count.

- If is 1, then the Hadamard operator is applied, else the identity operator is applied to the ith qubit.
- If does not have enough length to encode the qubits, then can be used, where .

- Each user register him to the arbitrator

2. Authentication with one-time ID (2)

- Procedure of the authentication
- Alice request a secure communication with Bob to the arbitrator.
- The arbitrator prepares GHZ tripartite states.
- He encodes Alice’s and Bob’s particles of GHZ states with and , respectively.
where is Alice’s authentication key

and is Bob’s.

2. Authentication with one-time ID (3)

- Procedure of the authentication(2)
- The arbitrator sends the encoded qubits to Alice and Bob respectively.
- Alice and Bob decode their qubits with their authentication key and selects some bits.
- Alice and Bob measure the bits and compare the results.
- If the results are same, they can authenticate each other and do the following key distribution procedure. Otherwise they abort the protocol.

2. Authentication with one-time ID (4)

- Transformation of the GHZ states

3. Quantum Key distribution

- Procedure of the key distribution
- Using the remaining particles after authentication, Alice and Bob randomly make an operation either or on each particles, respectively.
- Alice sends her particles to the arbitrator and Bob sends his to Alice.
- The arbitrator perform C-NOT operation, where the control qubit is his and the target qubits is from Alice.
- The arbitrator measures each qubits(Alice’s and his) and announces the measurement outcomes are same(O) or not(X).

3. Quantum Key distribution (2)

- Procedure of the key distribution (2)
- Alice measures the GHZ particles received from Bob.
- Using the information published by the arbitrator, Alice can find Bob’s sequence of the operations.
- The Bob’s sequence of the operations can be used as a raw secret key.

Alice

Bob

Eve

4. Security proof- Man-in-the middle attack
- In the authentication process
- Eve introduces errors
with probability ¼

for each check bit

in the authentication

procedure.

- On knowing
the hash function,

Eve can estimate only

some bits of hashed value.

- Eve introduces errors

- In the authentication process

4. Security proof (2)

- Intercept-resend attack
- Intercepts both the qubits heading to Alice or Bob in the authentication and the qubits heading to Alice or the authentication in the key distribution.
- When Eve intercepts one-side in the key distribution,
the probability of detection is 3/8.

- When Eve intercepts both-side in the key distribution,
the probability of detection is 7/16.

- But she cannot be aware of the exact key since Alice and Bob’s information of operations are not exposed to Eve.

- When Eve intercepts one-side in the key distribution,

- Intercepts both the qubits heading to Alice or Bob in the authentication and the qubits heading to Alice or the authentication in the key distribution.

4. Security proof (3)

- Intercept-resend attack (2)
- Intercept only the qubits transmitted in the key distribution
- Eve only can know Alice and Bob use same operation or not.
- The probability of inferring correct key is .

- Intercept only the qubits transmitted in the key distribution

4. Security proof (4)

- Eve Eavesdrops Alice’s (Bob’s) qubits transmitted to the arbitrator (Alice) after Alice and Bob make operations on decoded GHZ states

5. Conclusion

- QKD with authentication using one-time ID is proposed.
- Authentication with one-time ID can be used on the various fields of quantum cryptography.
- The neutrality of the arbitrator is important for the security of the proposed scheme.
More research on this problem are needed.

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