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Deregulation

Deregulation. Deregulation will lead to More competition More efficiency More welfare More innovation More risk Deregulation always requires reregulation of the new risks. Crisis in the financial system. The traditional banking model. Distribute and hold

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Deregulation

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  1. Deregulation • Deregulation will lead to • More competition • More efficiency • More welfare • More innovation • More risk • Deregulation always requires reregulation of the new risks

  2. Crisis in the financial system

  3. The traditional banking model • Distribute and hold • banks have financed mortgage lending through deposits (originate and hold) • Limit to the amount of mortgage lending. • Loans and default risk appear on the balance sheet • Bank needs capital to cover its risk • Screening, monitoring and information processing are of the essence

  4. The new model of banking • Originate and distribute model • Brokers sell the mortgages • Banks provide financing for the loan • But then repackage the loan and sell it to bond markets. • Hence the rise of new financial instruments • This process is called securitisation

  5. Economic advantages of originate and distribute model • Securitisation enhances secondary market for loans, which will enhance the credit supply • Investors get broader risk-return opportunities • Risks (theoretically) spread more broadly (system more capable of absorbing “stress”) • Research suggests that securitisation leads to lower spreads in consumer credit and softens interest-rate shocks for banks

  6. Risks of originate and distribute model

  7. Structured finance: instruments • RMBS – Residential Mortgage Backed Securities • CMBS – Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities • MBS – Mortgage Backed Securities • ABS – Asset Backed Securities • CDO – Collateralised Debt Obligations • CDS – Credit Default Swaps 7

  8. The magic of CDO’s • Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other structured credit were repackaged in CDO’s • Banks create special purpose vehicle (SPV) • Asset side: MBS • Liability side: Collateralized debt obligations (CDO) • Cut MBS in risk tranches, repackage them and sell as bonds (CDO) • Make even further derivatives (CDO’s of CDO’s) • Rating agencies rate these CDO’s, but nobody has a clue of their real value

  9. Cashflow waterfallorigin

  10. Cash waterfalldestination

  11. Why are banks interested in distribute and hold model? • Business proved extremely profitable for banks: • Banks get more balance-sheet flexibility which allows them to economize on capital (BIS rules) • They can lend without raising deposits or capital and without the cost of screening and monitoring • The risk does not appear on their balance sheet • They earn a fee for each mortgage they sold on. • They urged mortgage brokers to sell more and more of these mortgages. • All competitors do so, rational herdin.

  12. Why do banks take the bite I? • Lack of basic understanding of risks • Liquidity risk • Counterparty risk • Disaster myopia • Subjective probability of crisis depends on the frequency of an event • Subjective probabilities may be off mark with low frequency events and long time lapses • Certainly if there is a threshold heuristic

  13. Disaster myopia(Tverksy and Kahneman) Subjective probability of disaster Subjective probability = f(time since last crisis) Real probability Treshold heuristic time Last crisis

  14. How disaster myopia works? • How to compete with myopic banks in the absence of a crisis • This is almost impossible • So banks mimic each other’s behavior • So at the next crisis, the market is often dominated by myopic banks Herding behavior This may even be rational

  15. Implication • In the presence of competition, financialmarketswillalwaysbedriven to instability • Thismeans we need • Buffers in the form of capitalrules • Limitson bank models in the form of leverage and liquidityrules • Nottoomuchdepositinsurance, becausethisonlyreinforces the moral hazard problem • A resolutionmechanismthatactuallykills the myopicbanksif a crisis strikes

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