A Texas Size Exodus Plan B (The Rita Experience)

1. A Texas Size ExodusPlan B(The Rita Experience) Sally G. Wegmann, P.E.

2. Overview • 2005 Plans—Traffic Management • The Rita Experience • Role of ITS • Recommendations and Changes TxDOT has no enforcement or decision powers but provides support. The same TxDOT employees that will be called upon to set up and work the evacuation efforts are the same ones that will do the after event damage assessment and clean up. A tremendous amount is being asked of the DOT family. Every event will be different. From the beginning, there be ongoing adaptations, changes, and modifications as the event unfolds. Public expectations will always be greater than what is realistic given finite resources, equipment, manpower, logistics and system limits. There will be problems!!!!! Last Major Hurricane to hit the Houston area was Alicia in 1983. Allison was only a tropical storm.

3. The 2005 Evacuation Plan In Effect for Rita • Law had recently changed from voluntary to directed evacuation • DPS/OEMs had not approved changes when hurricane season started/plan was in flux • Decision structure did not change—each county judge was the decision maker for their county • Plan for evacuation only for storm serge zones—800,000 to 1.1 million people (included six (6) hospitals and several licensed assisted care/nursing homes, and approximately 20,000 people without adequate transportation) • Evacuation plans to (not through or beyond) Houston –everything north of IH 10 not in the serge zone • Focus of resources (manpower and equipment) close to the coast

4. 2005 “New” Advertised Evacuation Routes • IH 45 (the central evacuation corridor and the primary evacuation route) construction just before Dallas • SH 146 (eastern evacuation corridor) 70 miles of 1 lane facility just north of IH 10 • US 290 with1 lane due North to Waco, two (2) lanes due west to Austin • IH 10 was not a designated evacuation route for Houston! But these overlap with evacuation routes for other Gulf Coast regions……and they were evacuating as well.

5. What really happened • An estimated 2.5 to 3 million people evacuated; approx. 50,000 with no transportation. • People brought their pets and livestock rather than leave them. • Families took multiple vehicles and unnecessary items. • People and vehicles suffered from high humidity/heat (100+ degrees). • All 100 or so hospitals evacuated or severely reduced operations. • All known assisted care/nursing homes evacuated. • There was nobody in retail left to support the evacuation. • Identified shelters filled and next facilities were 200 + miles away.

6. Hurricane Rita 23 Calls for Evacuation 22 21 20 9 19

7. Evacuation was supposed to be Zones

8. Who evacuated? • Coastal residents living in the surge zones • Residents living in known flooding areas (100 year flood plain) • Area residents influenced by fear/actions of others • Allison’s floods, Katrina effect • Lack of power (heat and humidity) • Followed their neighbors lead Post surveys indicated that 70% left out of fear of flooding and wind. Life with out air conditioning in the Gulf Coast region can be pretty uncomfortable.

9. Images from Allison($5 billion in damages, 22 deaths,Up to 36 inches of rain)

10. Hurricane Katrina Images

11. Did our original plans work as expected? • Qualified YES--targeted residents in Galveston and costal areas were evacuated to Houston within the time frame that had been estimated • Designed for 800,000 – 2.5 million left • Challenges • Hurricane path forecast • Announcement of planned evacuation call came at 11AM for 6 PM when Houston was in a normal congested work day traffic pattern • Available, trained personnel were doing their normal jobs • Facilities beyond Houston were 200-250 miles away • Special needs (disabilities, medically fragile, those without personal transportation resources, pets) • Complacency, lack of personal planning (fuel, water, destination, multiple vehicles) • Confusion re role responsibilities, implementation plans • Lack of inter and intra communication means • Abandoned vehicles, roadside aid • Contra-flow – political NOT engineering based decision

12. Major construction projects on IH 10 and IH 45 complicated exodus

13. Fuel/Retail Store Availability • $3.00 Gas (and today????) • Reduction of gas supply-minimize loss from water intrusion • Station personnel also evacuating • Fear of availability • Lack of “green” money

14. Local elected officials were watching it all through the Traffic Management Center cameras.

15. A Plan Change • Elected officials felt the pain and frustrations • Decision to contra-flow on the interstate routes (IH 10 & IH 45) made Thursday morning at 2 AM • Later added US 290 • Also wanted to do US 59, uncontrolled access roadway—plan almost implemented but better judgment prevailed • Took approximately 10 hours from devising plan to implementation—manpower, equipment, setup and safety sweep

16. Contra-flow • Contra-flow moved the queue and gave feeling of movement; back of queue was moved out of storm serge area • Lane balance issue with Contra-flow decision- large urban freeway capacity design still only feeding into 4 lane rural design, bridges had no shoulders so shoulder lanes were not an option • No significant interchange infrastructure to terminate without built-in delay

17. IH 45 Traffic During Contra-Flow(10 main lanes +2 frontage rd lanes + 1 HOV= 13 lanes to 4 lanes)

18. IH 45 by Friday (Storm hit early Saturday)

19. However, now the traffic was outside the urban area going through sections with limited facilities and manpower/equipment resources.

20. Was contra-flow the magic bullet? Did increase capacity but not by 100% and reduced length of backup but consider: • More people than those in danger evacuated (overreaction) • More vehicles and personal belongings than necessary • More accidents/head-on collisions (at least 1 fatality) • Diversion of law enforcement resources to handle traffic management • Within the metro area, normal traffic volume exceeded roadway capacity • Increased congestion and backups resulting from traffic entering and exiting the stream of evacuees on major highways (food, gas, facilities) • Restricted mobility of responders • Interchanges and ramp infrastructure for inbound lanes not designed accommodate conversiion to handle outgoing traffic • Bottlenecks resulting from lane drops • Bottlenecks at termination points • $$$$$$

21. Wednesday – 10pm - Traffic

22. Thursday – 10am - Traffic

23. Thursday – 10pm - Traffic

24. I-45 Travel Times

25. ITS during the Evacuation • Traffic Monitoring • Camera • Automated Vehicle Identification (AVI) System • Radar Detection Devices, Traffic Data Collection • Active Incident Mangement • Traveler Information Dissemination • Dynamic Message Signs • Highway Advisory Radio • Web Site (www.houstontranstar.org)

27. Dynamic Message Sign and Highway Advisory Radio Usage • Shelter Info • Detour Info • Ferry Operations • Tolls suspension on Toll roads • Directional information • Food and Gas Info

28. Web Usage • Internet bandwidth demand peaked at over 30 megabits per second • On Sept. 22 the website handled over 4 million page accesses compared with 300,000 on a typical Thursday • The unique user count for the same time period was close to 200,000 vs. a typical day of 25,000 • There were over 30,000 links to the website (per Google)

29. Lessons Learned About ITS • Validation of role of TranStar as the common platform for first responders by providing the ability to collect and distribute information • Ongoing institutional ties and team efforts built by the “TranStar” concept maximized the ability to respond • ITS is not just necessary in the metropolitan area but also the surrounding counties • Decision makers at all levels and locations need to receive the same real time data

30. Post Rita Survey Results • Even after their experience, 62% would evacuate again for another Cat 4 storm • 62% of the residents residing in the storm surge evacuation zones left • 42% of those living in non evacuation zones left • 33% left on Wednesday and 50% left on Thursday • 50 % completed trip in 10 hours • 21% spent 20 or more hours evacuating on Thursday with1 in 10 returning home

31. Recommendations/Changes--Results from the Governor’s and H-GAC’s Regional Committee and TxDOT’s After Event Assessments (Realistic and feasible given cost, logistics, risk, support?) Executive Order RP 57: regional unified command structure based on counties within MPO plus Cities of Houston and Galveston—committee of 15, 1 liaison to the State (Governor’s) OEM Traffic Management Coordination (expanded) Group to meet regularly Active traffic management along designated routes to destinations as conditions change—rural/urban coordination, sharing of resources Use of Regional Incident Management System, Web EOC for communication between TMC and OEM Revised contra-flow plan in place including rural areas, staff and equipment needs identified, use of shoulder lanes

32. More…. • Need for regional radio communication system—700-800 MHZ • Communication other than cell phone for first responders • Cell phone priority and for whom? • Internet Service Provider priority for fuel • Procedures to handle abandoned vehicles (locations close to the corridor, tow companies, fees, etc.) • Planning/funding needs to prioritize improvements along hurricane evacuation routes (available shoulder lanes, lane balance, merge points, congestion locations, capacity, etc.) • ITS in the rural areas, more data collection capability, statewide information dissemenaiton • Statewide ITS information support

33. 2006 Hurricane Evacuation Cameras

34. Rural Locations along Freeways Rural Locations along Arterials using Signal Detection Cameras

35. Evacuation call now to be by Zip Codes.

36. More …. • Expanded manpower and equipment needs: use of National Guard, DPS from other regions, other DOT districts—buddy districts • Logistical challenges: where to house, how to provide relief for field personnel – looking at at least 72 hours • The personal needs of the first responders • Roadside aid (fuel, mechanical assistance, water and facilities, first aid, pets) • Improved signage and pavement marking, managed egress/ingress • ITS in the rural areas, information along routes for decision makers, travelers, media • Data collection for evaluation • Public education • Coordinated media • Wind refuges • Transportation plans for special need buses return trips • Pet transport issues • Training, training, training—statewide, local, inter and intra agency

38. Will people do it again? • The TxDOT/TTI survey says: • 19% will leave for a Category 2 event • 43% will leave for Category 3 or greater • 8.5% said that they had a bad experience • 1.9% said that they will be better prepared • 9% commented on people who did not need to evacuate • 54% commented on the traffic • 27% commented on gas, food and comfort facilities • 9% had remarks concerning the media and its impact on the evacuation

39. Questions ??