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TWO DAYS OF ELECTIONS

TWO DAYS OF ELECTIONS. July 9, 2009 Asheville, N.C. SAMPLE AUDIT COUNT. § 163‑182.1.  Principles and rules for counting official ballots.

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TWO DAYS OF ELECTIONS

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  1. TWO DAYS OF ELECTIONS July 9, 2009 Asheville, N.C.

  2. SAMPLE AUDIT COUNT • § 163‑182.1.  Principles and rules for counting official ballots. • (b)(1)       Provide for a sample hand‑to‑eye count of the paper ballots or paper records of a statewide ballot item in every county. The presidential ballot item shall be the subject of the sampling in a presidential election. If there is no statewide ballot item, the State Board shall provide a process for selecting district or local ballot items to adequately sample the electorate. The State Board shall approve in an open meeting the procedure for randomly selecting the sample precincts for each election. The random selection of precincts for any county shall be done publicly after the initial count of election returns for that county is publicly released or 24 hours after the polls close on election day, whichever is earlier. The sample chosen by the State Board shall be of one or more full precincts, full counts of mailed absentee ballots, full counts of one or more one‑stop early voting sites, or a combination. The size of the sample of each category shall be chosen to produce a statistically significant result and shall be chosen after consultation with a statistician……….

  3. How the Samples are Chosen for Hand-to-Eye Count • At their April 13, 2006 meeting, the State Board of Elections, after consultation with a UNC-CH Statistics PhD., Dr. William Kalsbeek, voted that two precincts be selected at random by the statistician, from each county for the required sample. The statistics to be provided to the statistician for random selection would consist of all precincts, one-stop sites, and also included mail-in absentees for each county. • For even year primaries and elections, a listing of all possible samples of all precinct voting places, county mail-in absentee voting, and one-stop absentee voting places is produced and sent to the SRU Survey Research Unit at UNC-CH whom we contract with to run the analysis of the General Election sample audit counts. 3,197 samples were sent to them for the November 2008 election. These samples were loaded into a computer data base controlled by the SRU. • Based upon statistical standards, the SRU determines the number of sample audit counts needs statewide including what counties need to sample audit more than two samples based upon the results of their prior counts. Adding these additional samples has been approved by the State Board of Elections.

  4. How the Samples are Chosen for Hand-to-Eye Count • The day after the election primary, a representative of the SBE hold a public meeting at the offices of the SRU where a “seed number” is selected to enter into the computer data base loaded with a random selection software program. Notice of this meeting has been duly posted well in advance. The “seed number” is solicited from persons attending the meeting other than the SBE representative or a SRU employee. The “seed number” is entered along with the number of samples to be selected, and the software program produces a list of randomly selected samples to be counted by the counties. Until that time, no entity or person is aware of either the seed number or the samples randomly selected. That information is then communicated to the counties, so they can prepare the start the sample audit count. • For municipal and special elections, the number of samples, the ballot item to be counted, and which samples are to counted are determined and communicated to the counties by the SBE office.

  5. Help Us by Auditing Correct Selections, You Did Good in November 2008 • In our previous work on the election recount projects, we have identified a variety of irregularities (see Kalsbeek & Zhang, 2006, 2008; Kalsbeek, Zhang & Sun, 2008). For example, there were counties that either omitted one of the selected sample precincts in its recount process or supplied more recount data than required. There was also a situation in which one county ignored the sample selected by us and conducted recounts on a sample they had selected. This time we did not see any irregularities in the November 2008 data set.

  6. Findings From the Report on the November 2008 Sample Audit Count • Candidate vote count discrepancy rates among precincts were generally higher for the M100 machines (5.50% to 20.41% among candidates) than for the iVotronic machines (0.00% to 1.86%). • It seems that M100 machines tend to undercount the election votes. Yet due to a relatively small number of iVotronic machines in the sample, the claim that iVotronic machines perform better than M100 machines was not firmly grounded. • A consistent pattern merged from these four samples. M100 machines continued showing more discrepancies in election counts than iVotronic machines. However, the analysis conducted specifically to compare the accuracy of M100 and iVotronic did not lend strong support to the claim that iVotronic outperforms M100 with regard to election count accuracy • We can conclude from these results that the statistical probability that Obama in fact defeated McCain in the North Carolina election is higher than 99.9 percent.

  7. Recounts • § 163‑182.7.  Ordering recounts. (a)       Discretionary Recounts. – The county board of elections or the State Board of Elections may order a recount when necessary to complete the canvass in an election. The county board may not order a recount where the State Board of Elections has already denied a recount to the petitioner. CBE’s cannot order a recount except as authorized by the statute. A desire to “double check “ a surprising result is not a basis for a recount. The rules as to “recounts” are found in Chapter 9 of the NCAC.

  8. Recounts • Follow the recount procedures from The Precinct Uniformity Manual, Chapter 4, • If the recount is part of a district or statewide recount you must adhere to the timeframes and deadlines you are given to perform and conclude the recount since your recount is part of the sum total. • IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS AS TO PREPARING FOR, CONDUCTING, OR REPORTING RECOUNTS CONTACT THE SBE OR YOUR DET.

  9. WHY CHALLENGE? To Prevent Persons from Unlawfully Voting and to Protect the Integrity of the Election. SEE GS 163-84 THROUGH GS 163-90.3 FOR CHALLENGE LAW. SEE GS 163-289 FOR LAW AS TO MUNICIPAL CHALLENGES. Challenges are covered in The Precinct Uniformity Manual in Chapter 14. Also there is a very good Election Day Challenge PowerPoint on the CD geared to training precinct workers. Thanks to New Hanover County for this PowerPoint.

  10. Reasons for Election Day Challenges Under GS 163-87 • Age of Voter • Voter is Dead • Citizenship of Voter • Person has already voted in that election • Person is NOT who they say they are • RESIDENCY

  11. Issues of RESIDENCY • One must be a resident of the state, county, precinct, municipality or district in which they are voting • A person may have an actual abode (residence) in one place and his permanent established home (domicile) in another, domicile being the place to which the person intends to return • Domicile for voting purposes exist when a voter has abandoned their prior home & is residing elsewhere and has a present intention of making that place his home and has no intention presently to leave that place

  12. Abstracts The document that authenticates the election results.

  13. Contents of Abstracts • County name • Election Type • Election Date/Canvass Date • # votes for each candidate/issue for each precinct • # absentee votes for each candidate/issue • # provisional votes for each candidate/issue • County totals for each candidate/issue • Signatures of board of elections members, • Certified by officer authorized to administer oath

  14. Prepared in triplicate 1 – County board of elections 1 – County Clerk of Court 1 – State Board of Elections, then filed with Secretary of State

  15. The Final Product • Abstracts represent the work of the boards of elections for the entire year. • The official election result is all that most people think we do. We need to get it right – the first time.

  16. CANVASS • Canvass is defined in GS 163-182.5 • The entire process of determining the votes have been counted and tabulated correctly and resulting in the authentication of the official election results.

  17. The board of elections conducting the canvass has authority: • To send for papers • To send for persons • To examine them • Pass on legality of disputed ballots

  18. Custody Exchange – election night • All Precinct supplies • Poll books • Machine memory cartridges • Ballots, all types

  19. Day after election • Locate all items for audit from precinct supply boxes • Account for all ballots • Compare precinct returns to ENR • Audit/reconcile; eligible voters – those who voted – election results • Research Provisional Ballots

  20. Canvass meeting • At CBE office, unless CBE unanimously votes to designate another site. GS 163-182.5 • An open meeting – anyone can attend and watch – must not interfere with the board’s work • Board prepares (signs) Abstracts They are permanent public documents which you • Retain one copy • File one copy with county clerk of superior court • File one with SBE; which is later filed with Secretary of State

  21. Remember! Humans (elections people) will make errors, however, we need to limit the number of self-inflicted wounds through • Generally accepted audit procedures • Consistent security practices • Good public relations

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