Increasing Work and Earnings Among Families in Social Housing James A. Riccio

1. Increasing Work and Earnings Among Families in Social HousingJames A. Riccio Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion2012 Welfare-to-Work Conference Birmingham, UK

2. MDRC • Not-for-profit social policy research organization • Based in NYC • Rigorously evaluates (and sometimes helps design) innovative social policies • Pioneered large-scale random assignment evaluations of social programs • Mission: Build evidence to improve the lives of low-income families

3. Topics • General theme: • Is social housing a good “platform” for intervention to improve work outcomes for low-income families? • Evidence from the US: • Jobs-Plus: A place-based employment intervention for residents of public housing (social housing) • Evidence from the UK: • ERA (Employment Retention and Advancement demonstration): Results for social housing residents • More evidence from the US: • NYC Work Rewards demonstration for “Housing Choice Voucher” recipients (like Housing Benefit) • Final reflections

4. National Jobs-Plus Demonstration • Target group: Residents of public housing (estates) • Place-based employment intervention • Multi-component, “saturation” strategy 4

5. Origins of Jobs-Plus—poverty and place Build mixed-income communities “from within” • Response to growing concentration of joblessness, underemployment, welfare receipt, and poverty in public housing and surrounding neighborhoods Public and private sponsors: • US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) • The Rockefeller Foundation • Other public and private funders 5

6. Jobs-Plus sites Diverse housing developments in 6 cities: Baltimore Chattanooga Dayton Los Angeles St. Paul Seattle Randomly allocated developments within each city to program and control groups Local partnerships and collaboration: • Public housing authorities • Welfare agencies • Workforce agencies • Residents • Other service agencies Mandatory partners 6

7. Jobs-Plus model: Comprehensive approach 3 components: • Employment and training services Convenient on-site “job centers” • New rent rules to “make work pay” Rent rises less as earnings grow • Community support for work Neighbor-to-neighbor outreach (“Community coaches” share info about work) “Saturation-level” outreach and assistance • Aim to assistance all working-age residents 7

8. 1. Employment and training component • Job assistance and service brokering on-site, where people live • Creates easier opportunities and many informal opportunities to meet with, advise, encourage, and assist residents: • Often on a “drop-in” basis at the Jobs-Plus office • In the neighborhood (e.g., on a corner; at events) • At residents’ homes • Staff closer to residents’ day-to-day lives • More holistic understanding of family problems, support networks, and neighborhood conditions 8

9. 2. Rent reform • Making work “pay” for everyone through new rent rules • With traditional “30-percent-of-income” rule, earnings are implicitly “taxed” at 30% • New rent rules: “Flat/fixed” rents (with income-based rents as “safety net” if job loss) 9

10. 3. Community support for work • Promote “neighbor-to-neighbor” support for work, with aid of resident outreach workers • “Building captains,” “community coaches… • share informationon job and training opportunities, other services, and financial incentives • encourage participationin Jobs-Plus and employment • add legitimacy to the program and open up further informal avenues of helping other residents 10

11. Community support for work (cont.) • Foster integration of housing services and employment assistance • Housing authorities promote employment from time new residents move in—message “comes with tenancy” • Housing authorities link employment assistance with efforts to head off evictions over nonpayment of rent • Housing authorities must transcend traditional, nearly exclusive focus on housing management 11

12. 3 sites allowed “full test” of JP concept Dayton, Los Angeles, and St. Paul: Positive effects • Offered and sustained the full Jobs-Plus “package” • Strong housing authority commitment • ~ 3 of 4 working-age residents took advantage of services, rent incentives • Infused development with self-sufficiency message Seattle: Positive short-term positive effects • Early exit from demo because of reconstruction Baltimore and Chattanooga: No effects • Incomplete implementation 12

13. 1998 cohort = focus of impact analysis • All nondisabledworking-age residents • Living in Jobs-Plus or comparison developments in October 1998 (random assignment of developments) • Includes recent arrivals and longer-termers in 1998 • Includes those who moved or stayed after 1998 • Long-term comparative interrupted-time series analysis, using Unemployment Insurance wage records • Sample size:ProgramComparisonTotal 2,123 2,651 4,774 13

14. Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites) Post-program period

15. Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites) Post-program period

16. Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites) Post-program period

17. Earnings impacts through 7 years (full implementation sites) All results statistically significant 17

18. Earnings impacts for subgroups 18

19. Earnings impacts by age group (during program) 19

20. Replication efforts New York City • Now serving 3 large public housing developments • A key feature of Mayor Bloomberg’s new “Young Men’s Initiative”: Will include up to 8 new Jobs-Plus sites San Antonio, Texas • Operating on 1 large public housing development Obama administration (HUD) • Proposing federal expansion in new budget 20

21. UK ERAUK Employment Retention and Advancement Demonstration Impacts by housing status Focus today on ND25+ group (largest effects)

22. Transatlantic collaboration Evaluation sponsor • UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) US Research Partner • MDRC UK research partners • Policy Studies Institute (PSI) • Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) • National Institute for Economic & Social Research (NIESR) • Office for National Statistics (ONS) Lessons traveled in both directions!

23. UK ERA Target groups Unemployed and entering New Deal welfare-to-work program: (1) New Deal Lone Parents (NDLP) • New Deal 25-Plus (ND25+) Working part-time (lone parents): (3) Working Tax Credit (WTC) group

24. UK ERA model Operates within Jobcentre Plus centers • Separate staff • In some offices, separate post-employment teams 33-month program: • If unemployed at intake, get job placement through New Deal w-t-w program (~ 9 months) • Post-employmentfor all who work: 24+ months of “in-work” job coaching and support from “Advancement Support Advisors” 24 months of financial incentives

25. Financial incentives Retention bonus  £ 400 3 times/yr for for sustained full-time work 2 yrs (£ 2,400 total) Tuition assistance if combine training + work£ 1,000 Tuition bonus if complete training up to £ 1,000 In-work emergency funds £ 300/worker

26. The pilot sites 6 districts (Total N = 16,000 people): • 4 districts in England • (E. Midlands, London, NE England, NW England) • 1 in Scotland • 1 in Wales Spread across 58 local offices (where random assignment took place)

27. ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline Random assignment PRE- employment POST-employment ERA New Deal Welfare-to-work + advancement focus In-work support + incentives ERA JOB New Deal intake Regular New Deal Welfare-to-work JOB Control Random assignment

28. Program group employment rates 61% WTC % Employed Months after Random Assignment

29. “Outcomes” vs. “impacts”

30. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Cumulative employment outcomes for ND25+ control group Ever worked in 5 years Months worked in 5 years ERA Control ERA Control 30

31. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Impacts on employment outcomes Ever worked In 5 years Months worked in 5 years + 2.2 pp* (+ 4%) + 1.1 months** (+ 8%) ERA Control ERA Control 31

32. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Impacts on earnings trends Earnings(£) Control group Tax Year

33. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Impacts on earnings trends 5-year cumulative impact: £1,814 ** (+ 11%) Earnings(£) ERA group ERA ended for all by October 2007 (earlier for some) Control group Tax Year

34. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Impacts on ever worked within 5 years after random assignment Family housing Social housing Private housing ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control

35. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Impacts on ever worked within 5 years after random assignment Family housing Social housing Private housing - 1.9 †† ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control 35

36. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Impacts on cumulative 5-year earnings,by housing status at baseline Family housing Social housing Private housing ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control 36

37. ND25+: Long-term unemployed Impacts on cumulative 5-year earnings,by housing status at baseline Family housing Social housing Private housing £703 ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control 37

38. New York City’sWork Rewards Demonstration • Target group: Low-income households with “Housing Choice Vouchers” • Alternative to public housing • Rent subsidies to help families pay rent in private housing market • Tenants pay 30% of their income for rent • Many don’t work, or are underemployed 38

39. Evaluation goals • Testing 2 interventions: • Do the interventions improve economic security? • Family Self Sufficiency Program (FSS) • Case management • “Escrow savings accounts” (asset-building) • 5-year program • FSS+ Workforce Incentives • Incentives adapted from UK ERA • Cash rewards for full-time work: $150/month • Cash rewards for education/training completion • Rewards available for 2 years

40. Evaluation design: 3-way random assignment • Recruited volunteers from housing roster • N = 1,455 households; 1,603 adults FSS-only Voucher-holders sign up Random Assignment FSS + incentives Control group 5 years of follow-up (ongoing)

41. Cumulative impacts on earnings within 2.5 years after entering program

42. Cumulative impacts on earnings within 2.5 years after entering program ††

43. Subgroup earnings trends Subgroup: Not working at baseline Control group Note: Earnings include $0 for non-workers

44. Subgroup earnings trends Subgroup: Not working at baseline Incentives end FSS + Incentives FSS-Only Control group Note: Earnings include $0 for non-workers

45. New federal study of FSS • MDRC launching test of national Family Self-Sufficiency Program (FSS) in 15+ cities • Opportunity to test whether subgroup patterns hold elsewhere. • But no special workforce incentives (unless we can raise other funding)

46. Earlier US welfare-to-work studies • Studies of mandatory welfare-to-work programs for lone parents in the US (from the 1990s, early 2000s) looked at housing subgroups • General pattern: Effects of welfare-to-work programs were larger for welfare recipients living in public housing or with rent vouchers than for other welfare recipients without housing subsidies.

47. Final reflections • Growing evidence: Employment interventions can work for public/social housing and other rent-assisted groups • Implement UK ERA for long-term unemployed in social housing? • Encouragement for linking housing and work policies—and, hence, for inter-agency collaboration • Strategies that combine services + incentives may work best • Place-based interventions, such as Jobs-Plus, offer multiple avenues for engaging families • However, strategies to promote work advancement remain elusive and call for more innovation and testing

48. Final reflections (continued) • Building further evidence for policy US: • Longer-term impact testing of services, incentives, and rent reform for subsidized tenants • Study replication of Jobs-Plus in public housing UK: • Confirm impact of ERA for long-term unemployed in social housing under new welfare reform; test a refined model? • Test a place-based work intervention (like Jobs-Plus)? Both: • Continue search for effective advancement strategies