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Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream

Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream. Xi Jinping: Fifth Generation. “Princeling” -- son of Xi Zhongxun , second tier leadership of Mao and post-Mao period Father was jailed during Cultural Revolution, rehabilitated under Deng Xiaoping

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Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream

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  1. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream

  2. Xi Jinping: Fifth Generation • “Princeling” -- son of Xi Zhongxun, second tier leadership of Mao and post-Mao period • Father was jailed during Cultural Revolution, rehabilitated under Deng Xiaoping • Xi Jinping was exiled to countryside for six years during Cultural Revolution • Despite suffering, Xi is a member of the “red aristocracy”

  3. Xi Jinping: Fifth Generation • Governor of Fujian province 1999-2002 • Governor and Party Secretary of Zhejiang province from 2002-2007 • Vice-President and member of Politburo Standing Committee in 2007 (heir apparent) • Supervised Beijing Olympics 2008 • Good, not spectacular, career

  4. Xi Jinping: Fifth Generation • General Secretary in 2012 • Chairman of Central Military Commission 2012 • President in 2013 • Referred to as “core leader” in 2016, terms previously applied only to Mao and Deng

  5. Anti-corruption Drive • Xi launches major anti-corruption effort in late 2012 (Jiang and Hu had their versions) • Quoted Confucius: “Govern with virtue and keep order through punishments.” • Promised to “root out tigers and flies” • Has often spoken about returning morality and proper behavior to the CCP

  6. Anti-corruption Drive “He has instead embarked on an apparent effort, unprecedented in the modern world, to transform the people who make up the state, rather than the structure of the state itself. He appears to be betting that transforming the moral character of officials will enable him to leave intact the institutional structure of the one-party state. But is such a feat even possible? It’s clear from his public statements that Xi is mindful of the precedents of China’s imperial past, and is turning to the example of centuries-ago rulers for inspiration on how to discipline a large, unwieldy, and unaccountable bureaucracy.” “How to Discipline 90 Million People,” The Atlantic 2015

  7. Anti-corruption Drive • Xi announces regulations in 2012 to curb expenditures on official banquets, overseas trips, motorcades, spending on cars and residences, and other extravagances • Lower officials have been fined or fired for infractions including drinking at work, gambling, lying, using their office for financial gain, and not responding to letters from the people • Party members should reduce perks and focus on serving the people

  8. Anti-corruption Drive • 1.5 million officials punished since 2013, 410,000 in 2016 • Punishment includes warnings, fines, demotions or expulsion from CCP • 40-50,000 expelled from CCP and turned over to courts for prosecution • Approximately 200 high party officials have received jail sentences • 1500-2000 other party officials have received jail sentences

  9. Anti-corruption Drive • Very popular with Chinese people • Several popular television programs focusing on investigators of party/government corruption

  10. Anti-corruption Drive • Significant resistance from party officials, including former leadership • Xi’s motives seem to combine a sincere belief in the need for significantly reducing corruption and a convenient method of attacking rivals within the party (especially those with ties to former leader Jiang Zemin)

  11. Anti-corruption Drive • Real questions over the ultimate effectiveness of these efforts because corruption is so widespread among party officials • Party officials are involved in state-owned enterprises or receive “pay-offs” from truly private businessmen

  12. Anti-corruption Drive “It’s not that simple. China’s political economy has been deliberately designed to ensure that Party members and officials are the primary beneficiaries of economic growth and opportunity. From this century onward, the Party’s strategy to remain in power is based largely on becoming the primary dispenser of commercial and career opportunity in the country. … Business and political success is widely viewed as interchangeable. A large number of those entering politics, or just joining the Party, do so on the expectation that they will benefit materially. This is the true social and political contract between the CCP and the country’s elites.”

  13. Anti-corruption Drive “In short, Xi cannot truly clean up the system without undermining the authority of his beloved Party. He can use the palpable fear he has generated to restrict ostentatious display of outrageous wealth, restrict capital flight out of the country, or eliminate political opponents or else keep them anxious and cowed. But he cannot clean up China or the Party if that were ever his intention in the first place.” “Why Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Won’t Work” Forbes 2016

  14. Anti-corruption Drive • Xi talked about continuing and increasing anti-corruption efforts at 19th Party Congress in Fall 2017 • A new supra-agency, the National Supervision Commission, was created in 2018 • Headed by close ally of Xi Jinping with wide powers to investigate corruption in party and non-party actors

  15. New Cult of Personality • Many observers believe that Xi is the strongest Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping • Has received twice as much coverage in People’s Daily newspaper than former leader Hu Jintao • Seems to be moving away from collective leadership tradition

  16. New Cult of Personality • Videos, songs and poems about Xi’s leadership • Xi engages in many public relations actions among the Chinese people, spending time with the common citizens • Xi’s book The Governance of China has sold 5 million copies

  17. New Cult of Personality • Xi has been cautious but has made numerous positive comments about Mao’s legacy • Positive and negative comments on the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth • Especially focus on Mao’s leadership strength

  18. New Cult of Personality • Emphasize certain Maoist concepts like the mass line, morality of the party and ideological purity • Wants to be a strong leader like Mao not pursue Mao’s policies • Careful about which aspects of Mao’s legacy he emphasizes

  19. New Cult of Personality • Early visit to rural area where he was exiled during Cultural Revolution • Praised his father’s ties to Mao even though his father was persecuted during Cultural Revolution • Has used extreme anti-Western rhetoric as did Mao

  20. New Cult of Personality “The Communist Party of China will hold high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought forever in pursuing the Chinese nation’s rejuvenation…Party members should adhere to and make good use of the ‘living soul’ of Mao Zedong Thought, namely seeking truth from facts, the ‘mass line’ and independence.” Many aspects of Maoist Thought and Maoist policies that Xi HAS NOT embraced

  21. New Cult of Personality • Much attention paid to Xi’s marriage to well-known former folk singer Peng Liyuan • Chinese “First Lady” is new phenomenon • Chinese people seem quite interested in nature of their relationship • “Uncle Xi” and “Mama Peng”

  22. New Cult of Personality • CCP recognizes Xi as “core leader” in October 2016 (term only applied to Mao and Deng) • Provincial and local party leaders and state media have spoken of Xi as the “core leader” • “Staunchly safeguard, support and be faithful to General Secretary Xi Jinping, the core.” • Building power taking precedence over reform policy

  23. New Cult of Personality • Guiding principle of "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" was introduced and added to constitution at 19th Party Congress • Joins Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory as part of Chinese constitution • 14 points which outline vague principles for CCP control and serving the Chinese people

  24. New Cult of Personality • Combination of rejection of “dull leaders” Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the charismatic personality of Xi Jinping, the new modern media of China, Xi’s goal to accumulate more power, and a desire among many Chinese for a “relatively strong” leader • Much debate on the significance and extent of this phenomenon

  25. New Cult of Personality • 95% of Chinese citizens expressed confidence in Xi Jinping’s handling of domestic issues • 94% of Chinese citizens expressed confidence in Xi Jinping’s handling of foreign policy issues • GMO Research, 2014

  26. Party Strongman • Personality cult and anti-corruption drive have eliminated many rivals and enhanced Xi’s popularity with average citizens • Many observers note that Xi is the strongest leader since Mao and Deng • He has created a number of commissions with himself at the head

  27. Party Strongman • Supra-ministerial committees to centralize policy-making • Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms • Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization • Central Leading Group for Military Reform • National Security Commission of CCP • Others

  28. Party Strongman • Close ties to the military in addition to chairmanship of CMC • Previous party-military positions • Spends considerable time on military inspection tours

  29. Party Strongman • Considerable evidence that Xi will stay in power past 2022 (when his second term will expire) • No “heir apparent” named among five new members of PBSC at 19th Party Congress • There is considerable uncertainty among China scholars just how powerful Xi Jinping really is

  30. Repression/New Censorship • Movement toward “hard authoritarianism” actually began at end of Hu Jintao regime • Xi Jinping has intensified this movement

  31. Repression/New Censorship • Xi Jinping in 2016: “All the work by the party’s media must reflect the party’s will, safeguard the party’s authority, and safeguard the party’s unity.” • State-controlled media must follow the party line

  32. Repression/New Censorship • July 2014 directive barred journalists receiving press passes from releasing information from interviews or press conferences on social media without permission of their employers • Such journalists are also banned from referencing this information in public events and passing on tips to the foreign journalists

  33. Repression/New Censorship • More restrictions on foreign journalists under Xi Jinping

  34. Repression/New Censorship • 41 journalists jailed in 2017 (2nd highest in the world) • 47 journalists jailed in 2018 (2nd highest in the world)

  35. Repression/New Censorship • 25th anniversary of Tiananmen Uprising, 100 or more dissidents, human rights lawyers, journalists and others were detained • 500,000 surveillance cameras in Beijing alone • No acknowledgement of Tiananmen events

  36. Repression/New Censorship • CCP “Document No. 9” lists seven dangerous Western values including constitutional democracy, universal human rights, civil society, media independence which are banned from university educational materials

  37. Repression/New Censorship • Reports that budget for internal security is close to overall defense budget

  38. Repression/New Censorship • Tight controls on internet have been further tightened under Xi • Xi heads Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization

  39. Repression/New Censorship • 2013 report in Beijing News states that China has around two million people policing public opinion online, working for the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda department, major Chinese news websites and commercial corporations

  40. Repression/New Censorship • In 2016 Cyberspace Administration of China (primary internet regulator) announced that the Chinese government will strengthen regulations on all internet platforms that "provide news information services."

  41. Repression/New Censorship • Under 2015 criminal law Chinese officials will be able to impose a prison sentence of up to seven years on a person convicted of creating and spreading “false information” online • Follows a 2013 law that makes a crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for online speech, used to target artists, essayists and human rights lawyers

  42. Repression/New Censorship • In 2013 authorities suspended, deleted, or sanctioned more than 100,000 accounts on Weibo (Chinese Twitter) for violating one of the seven broadly defined “bottom lines” that represent the limits of permissible expression

  43. Repression/New Censorship • Users switched to the instant messaging platform WeChat • In August 2014, Beijing issued new instant-messaging regulations that required users to register with their real names, restricted the sharing of political news, and enforced a code of conduct

  44. Repression/New Censorship • Even cracked down on celebrity gossip websites in 2015 as “dangerous to society”

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