MITRE

1. The Battle of Trafalgar Why it Happened! How it Happened! Why We Might Care! and A Modern Version! aka Linking C4ISR Systems to Military Effectiveness Charles R. Hall IIII, 21 September 2017 Pseudo-Trafalgar Day MITRE

2. Who is This Old Dude With the Funny Haircut? • Class of 1957 - Really tough Plebe Year!! Lost to Army! • 7 ropes of the Navy? • Flying Med moor? • Red, White and Blue “N”? • Naval Aviator - Helicopter Pilot • Two Tours in East Coast ASW Helo Squadrons • Tour in Vietnam: HAL-3 - OinC Gunship Det and Squadron Maintenance Officer • Post-Grad MS at Monterey, CA in Ops Research, 1964 • Taught Ops Research in Luce Hall in 64-66 • Retired in 1979 and worked in Defense Community til 2007 • Fly Fisherman whenever possible • A Disclaimer!!

3. Prologue • This is pure and simple a commercial!! I’m going to try to sell you on something that I hope you will someday use to the betterment of the Navy. • Like all good commercials, I’m first going to give you something free of charge to get you in the right frame of mind to accept my proposition. • So instead of Apple for the teacher, here’s Apples from the teacher.

4. Prologue 2 • Now to the punch lines: • It has been traditional for the Navy to view procurement budgets in two large chunks; weapons and C4ISR. If you wanted to start a new C4ISR program all the money had to come from the C4ISR chunk, none from the weapons chunk. • After today, I want you to believe, as I do, that all systems should be viewed equally and that all systems should compete for dollars from one big pot on the basis of combat effectiveness. • And therefore the best combat mix is that mix which produces the best combat Measures of Effectiveness, regardless of traditional funding splits. • For guns without targets is just as bad as targets without guns.

5. Eight or Nine Pound Brown Trout in Erie, PA 2014

6. 22 Inch Brown Trout from San Juan River, NM July 2017

7. Today’s Lesson! But No Quiz! Exam? Who Knows? • Two Main Elements • Battle of Trafalgar • Important Lessons for Today • Played a Big Part in World History • Led My Study Team to a Proper Approach to an Important Cost-Effectiveness Study • Multi-Functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) • Advanced C4I System – Hi Capacity, JAM Resistant, Digital • Supports Real-Time Tactical Information Exchange • Currently Found on F/A-18, F-15, E2-D, B-2, AWACS, etc. • Was Big Step Forward in Late 1900s • Expensive (Megabuck Radio?) and Skeptics Abounded

8. The Battle of Trafalgar How it Happened! Why it Happened! Why We Might Care! MITRE

9. The Battle of Trafalgar – Some Background! • War is often more about Logistics than Maneuvers and Heroism! Amateurs talk Tactics, Professionals talk Logistics!! More about this shortly! • Naval Warfare in Latter Days of Sail • Building and losing Fleets. Very High Value Assets and losing one was really bad for one’s morale and occasionally life expectancy!! • Sea is large, Fleets are small! Engagements tough to force. Usually near land and/or ports. • Even harder to force enemy to fight – windward and leeward choices • Fleets constrained to speed of slowest ship. Hard to catch up in a tail chase. Nightfall – Weather could end engagement • Decisive battles were few

10. The Battle of Trafalgar – Training for Combat • British Army and Navy burned gunpowder in training for combat. French dry-fired mostly. • British Military was well acquainted with all the issues involved with gunfire. • Many work-arounds were well known, land and sea. • British Navy spent lots of time at sea and exercised as ships and as Battle Fleets. • Sailors could do all sorts of ship maneuvers without much supervision. • British tactical execution and gunnery were far superior to French and Spanish. • British Officer Corps were experienced and many came from sea-faring families. • Many of the best French Navy Officers were executed early in the Revolution.

11. The Battle of Trafalgar – Nelson’s Mission • The Napoleonic Wars were fought in Europe. The Channel both protected England and was an obstacle to supporting Wellington on the Continent. • The Combined Fleets (French and their Allies) were a threat to British cross-channel shipping as long as they existed. • Nelson understood that his Mission was to neutralize those Fleets and that dictated his strategic and tactical decisions. • Nelson took out a large portion of the French Fleet at the Battle of the Nile (Aboukir Bay) in August 1798. • Nelson took out the Danish Fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen in April 1801 • That left the Combined French and Spanish Fleets as the remaining threat to channel shipping. • Nelson’s job was to find them, force them to fight, and leave the rest to British combat superiority.

12. The Battle of Trafalgar – Nelson’s Mission (Con’t) • Intelligence was poor and not very timely. • Nelson chased the Combined Fleet across the Atlantic and Med due to bad intel. • He had to do that because he could not wait for them to come find him. • Once he found them the next issue was to force them to fight. • Recall the windward-leeward choices discussed earlier. • So let’s see how he made them fight.

13. Technology Advances Before the Battle • Telescopes • Recent advances in lens grinding allowed signal flags to be read by a ship some distance away, perhaps 8 or 10 miles. • So information could be relayed ship-to-ship over some distance through several ships. • But signals could take a long time to compose, arrange the flag hoist, and be read. • Signal Book • The British Navy had been working on an alphabetic signaling method since about 1780. • Admiral Home Popham had developed a truly alphabetic signal book in 1803 and copies were distributed to Nelson’s Fleet in September 1805. • Many complete orders required only 2 or 3 flags. • Stage is set!

14. The Battle of Trafalgar – Strategic Maneuvers in Preparation • The Combined Fleet was in port at Cadiz, Spain. • Napoleon wanted to invade England and needed command of the English Channel. Needed Combined Fleet at sea to do that. • So Combined Fleet was forced to depart Cadiz. • Nelson had briefed his Captains (Band of Brothers) in late September about his plan to force the fight. • Nelson arrived off Cadiz in Mid-October. • Established his battle fleet about 50 miles to seaward. • Line of 7 frigates with one in visual contact with harbor. • Why Fleet not close aboard?

15. Why Fleet Not Close Aboard? • If British presence became known to Combined Fleets, they might not have gone to sea but waited Nelson out. • If Combined Fleets came out while Nelson was downwind of port then Nelson might well have been in a tail chase. • Nelson needed to force the fight so needed sea room to “cut them off at the pass”. • Line of Frigates with telescopes and signal books allowed Nelson to know Combined Fleets movements in short order. • Once the Combined Fleets went to sea, Nelson was in a position to intercept. • French and Spanish lack of skills helped a lot • Wind died in mid-morning and Combined Fleets were not at sea and organized until mid-day on October 20th • Nelson knew their whereabouts and was able to close.

16. The Battle on October 21st • The short version: • Nelson was to windward and could force the fight. • Combined Fleets had shallow water to leeward and could not choose to withdraw. • Nelson’s ships broke through the Combined Fleets lines and became the leeward force. • British seamanship and gunnery, as expected, carried the day against a numerically larger force. • Combined Fleets were essentially destroyed. • Napoleon’s sea power was gone forever. • English Channel became open to logistics transport. • Wellington was then able to defeat Napoleon. • Suggest reading the long version at leisure: “The Price of Admiralty” by John Keegan.

17. Summary • Logistic requirements on land defined Nelson’s Mission. • Mission meant that Combined Fleets must be forced to fight. • Nelson’s plan was derived from his mission and his C4ISR capabilities. • Telescopes • Signal Book • C4ISR systems made the battle possible. • British skill and training won the fight! • Victory resulted in British control of Channel. • No longer any French threat to England. • Napoleon defeated by Wellington on land.

18. Important Take-Aways! • Purpose of Navies is to influence events on land!! • Understanding mission is critical to military operations. • Nelson’s mission was to neutralize the Combined Fleets. • Partly accomplished at Nile and Copenhagen. • Found the enemy • Forced the fight • Nelson’s recognition of technological advances led him to develop a plan that was not possible earlier. • Non-shooting systems made Trafalgar possible. • Victory at Trafalgar completed Nelson’s mission. • C4ISR systems lead to increases in Military Effectiveness through new tactics.

19. Nine-Pounder! Largemouth Bass!! 3/2014 in Georgia

20. Military Benefits Analyses for Systems That Don’t Shoot aka Linking C4ISR to Military Effectiveness Charles R. Hall III Mid-Nineties MITRE

21. Preview of Coming Attractions • THE ISSUE • Theology • Challenge and Response: THE RECIPE • An example • Conclusions

22. The Central Issue • How to estimate the potential increase in military effectiveness that can be expected from an improvement in C4ISR capability • Affects budgetary decisions • Need to maximize “Bang for the Buck” • Traditional analytical approaches have shown little payoff for C4ISR improvements • Led to searches for “proper C4ISR MOEs” • Doomed to failure • MOEs are function of mission objectives • We have the answer

23. Giving Credit Where It’s Due • There were a number of people and agencies involved in this discovery process • Special recognition goes to PMA-159, N-81, and N-62 • OPDEVFOR, Strike U, and NRaD served as catalysts • MITRE Team did the Heavy Lifting and Study Director Soothing • Don Van Arman • Maggie Gomes • Anne Laffan • Steve Moore • Jim Perkins • Norm Stewart • Various MITRE Alumni

24. Theology • Objective of analysis should be to provide insight to decision-maker • Analysis works best at the margins • Military interactions can be difficult to model • Predictions of outcomes are dicey at best • Estimating the likely change in outcome for a specified force structure modification is readily achievable • The further from the pointy end of the spear that a system operates, the harder it is to assess its contributions to military effectiveness • “It’s a poor workman, indeed, that blames his tools!”

25. Today’s Spear • Ordnance-flingers/catchers • F/A-18, F-22, B-2, DD-21 • Aegis, Patriot, SSN-21, Tomahawk • LAMPS, Comanche, A-10, Abrams tank • Support systems • MIDS/JTIDS, RHAWS, Rivet Joint • AWACS, JSTARS, Guard Rail • C-5, C-130, AOR • Training systems • JTCTS, BFTT, JSIMS • T-45 (Not TC-45J), Link Trainers, et al

26. The Analytical Challenge • To link changes in C4ISR capability to changes in military effectiveness • The presence or absence of an expensive system ought to matter to a Force Commander • Measures must be things that the Commander cares about • Must relate to whatever he/she is trying to accomplish • How does an improvement in C4ISR capability affect those measures?

27. Our Answer (The Recipe) • An important advance in C4ISR capability enables a major change in the way business gets done, a change in doctrine and/or tactics, i.e., methods • The new methods then lead to an increase in operational effectiveness that can be measured in units that the Force Commander cares about • Ordnance on Target • Number of Leakers • Attrition to Both Sides • Not • Messages Delivered • Number of Targets Tracked • Radar/Sonar Range

28. The Procedure • The key element in these analyses is to figure out how those changes in methods will occur and what they are likely to be • Once tactics/doctrine is articulated for the new world, analysis is similar to that for ordnance systems. However: • Existing “Black Box” simulations are not likely to be useful • Spread-sheets and “back-of-envelope” calculations can be very useful • Sensitivities should cover opposition reactions • Weapons, sensors and tactics • Represent opposition potential, not just past behavior

29. Example: MIDS - A System That Doesn’t Shoot • MIDS - Multi-functional Information Distribution System • Link 16 (a support system) for F/A-18 • Pretty expensive at the time • Occasion was a MS II COEA • Proceed to E&MD • Evaluate ROI • Challenge was to figure out what MIDS (improved C4ISR) would allow TACAIR to do that they could not do previously, i.e., new tactics • New tactics then results in improved military effectiveness

30. Analytical Approach

31. Blue Concept of Operations MITRE

32. Engagement with Unexpected SAM MITRE

33. SAM Sequence of Events • Enemy Air Surveillance radars provide alert to SAM • SAM radars switch to warm-up when strike group is one minute from SAM envelope • SAM radars remain in warm-up until strike group reaches ambush range in order to increase exposure time to missiles • SAM initiates engagement • At ambush range or CPA • Immediately upon strike group evasion • If HARM fired, SAM radar shuts down • Engagement ends when SAM radar shuts down or strike group departs SAM envelope

34. Strike Group Sequence of Events • Proceeds to target at about 20K feet • Executes counter-SAM tactic upon warning • E-A6B • Radar Homing and Warning System (RHAWS)

35. Analytical Elements • Tactical analysis • Purpose is to identify “best tactic” as a function of warning delay for each case • Considered spectrum of warning delays • C4ISR system assessment • Purpose is to identify warning delays for each C4ISR system • Hard to get solid data • Mission analysis • Calculate mission MOEs for Baseline and MIDS cases • Difference is C4ISR contribution to military effectiveness

36. Tactical Analysis • Identified strike mission objectives • Maximize bombs to target • Minimize Blue aircraft losses • Articulated current tactics and developed potential tactics for a strike package (6 bombers) • Defined the tactical MOE as bombs to target per Blue bomber lost • Evaluated each tactic against documented opposition doctrine across a range of warning delays • Selected best tactic as a function of warning delay

37. Tactical Alternatives • Ordnance Tactic (Supression) • Ordnance Load-out • 3 Bombs • I HARM • Commence evasion when warning received • Suppress SAM with HARM during evasion • Information Tactic (Avoidance) • Ordnance load-out • 4 bombs • 0 Harm • Commence evasion when warning received

38. Results Of Tactical Analyses Counter with ordnance Counter with information 35 35 30 30 25 25 Bombs to Target Per Aircraft Lost Bombs to Target Per Aircraft Lost 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 Delay Delay 35 30 25 Bombs to Target Per Aircraft Lost 20 15 10 5 0 t Delay MITRE

39. 35 30 25 Bombs to Target Per Aircraft Lost 20 15 10 5 0 Delay “Best” Counter-SAM Tactic Counter with ordnance Counter with information MITRE

40. C4ISR System Assessment • Estimated ranges of delay times for three cases • All voice • MIDS on F/A-18 • All MIDS (an add-on for sensitivity) • No solid information available • Developed consensus of “expert opinion” • High confidence in rankings • Less confidence in specific values assigned • Could develop solid data given time and resources

41. Mission Results For “Best” Tactics 6 5 2 5 4 2 0 Bombs Surviving 3 1 5 2 1 0 A/C Lost 1 5 0 0 D e l a y D e l a y 8 7 5 5 0 - 9 • Mission MOEs as function of warning delay • Tactics matched to warning delay • Dashed red line illustrates cost of wrong tactics

42. Results of Engagement with Unexpected SAM • Voice system delay time requires suppression tactics • MIDS reduces delays and offers reliance on avoidance tactics (a new business method) • New business method increases military effectiveness through change in weapon load-out

43. Conclusions • This C4ISR improvement led to about 15% increase in bombs on target and about 10% less Blue attrition for a single engagement employing one system characteristic. • The recipe worked here!! It works at any operational level • The difficulties are mainly in articulating the new “business method” and gaining acceptance for same. • Once the new “business method” has been developed, the analysis itself is about the same as for systems that shoot. • So just as Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar, MIDS allows the Strike Package to do something not done before (a new tactic) and the new tactic provides increased Military Effectiveness. • That’s the way that C4ISR systems earn their keep!

44. Steelhead on Elk Creek in Erie, PA 10/2012

45. A Little Advice from an Old Grey Head • Shortly you will swear an oath to give your life for your country if need be. All else pales in comparison!! • Career can be a modern Siren (See Homer’s Odyssey) that sings an enchanting song that leads to destruction. • Complain not about your facilities (at sea, ashore, in foreign lands – in war or peace) while waiting to live up to your oath. • Ole Matt Maury said it best: When Principle is involved, be deaf to Expediency. • First find, and then be, your own man or woman. • As you move along, WORK as hard as you can, PLAY as hard as you can, and you will not have regrets when you heave to in some secluded cove later on. • Snake Stabler!!