BIO-Defense Issues. Basic Premises. The Cat is out of the Bag Technology and Know-how too widely dispersed (Roger Breachy’s student) From Nations to: Nations Loose organizations/networks Garage Hackers (by 2010-2015) Impossible to distinguish beneficent from belligerent bioscience
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E.g., via aerosolizing
Very recently: enhance through modification
Limited number of agents of concern
Largely, observable indicators for intelligence to track
Containable Problem – ala Nukes -- i.e., Deterrence and non-proliferation more or less possible
The Old Threats PLUS:
Add new capabilities to a natural pathogen transgenically
Add totally new capabilities not found in nature
E.g., target to haplotypes or alleles
New immune-suppressors or neuro modulators
Design something totally new, UN-natural – designer bioweapons
Engineered to exploit vulnerabilities (e.g. fear-inducing agent)
Weapon does not have to be alive so long as it provokes a host response!!!!
Biomolecules as the agents, with the organism as the delivery mechanism
Further weaponize as necessary
IMPLICATIONS: NO LONGER A CONTAINABLE PROBLEM
No observable indicators in production
Total Sequence Awareness???
Must shift to detection and rapid response: analysis and diagnosis, intervention, therapiesOld vs. New BioDefense
Dilemma: Don’t need real knowledge to design something bad, but need full knowledge to respond effectively.
Viral reverse genetics
Engineered viral agents
Prions and similar things
Bioregulators – kinases, phosphates, peptides
Immunoregulators – Cytokines, chemokines
Multiple agents (e.g, influenza and pneumonococcus)
Ethnic WeaponsTechnologies of Concern