Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectivity

1. Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectivity From Aesthetics and the Environment Allen Carlson Notes by Shannon Maylath

2. Nature and ObjectivityOpposition to the view that (some) aesthetic judgments are objective fall into one of two camps: • Such views are untenable concerning aesthetic judgments in general – art or environment • Hold some version of subjectivist, relativist and/or a noncognitivist view about aesthetic judgments • Reject these views about art, but have reservations about rejecting it when its about nature. • Ok – “Guernica is dynamic” Not Ok – “the Grand Tetons are majestic” • ** This paper

3. Walton’s Position • The truth value of aesthetic judgments about a work of art depend on two things: • The perceptual properties a work actually has • The perceived status of such perceptual properties when a work is perceived in its correct category(ies) of art. • Standard, contra standard, variable

4. Guernica. Pablo Picasso. 1937.

5. Walton’s 4 Circumstances for Correct Perception (of Guernica) • That it has a relatively large number of properties standard with respect to cubism. • That it is a better painting when perceived as a cubist painting • That Picasso intended or expected it to be perceived as a cubist painting • That the category of cubist paintings was well established in and recognized by the society in which Guernica was produced

6. Nature and Culture • Carlson believes the distinction between art and natural aesthetic judgments held by Walton and others based on the construction of the argument is inconsistent/implausible • Some judgments as nature seem to strike virtually everyone as true or false • Some other judgments seems like paradigms of aesthetic judgment in the way humans appreciate aesthetics. • Cultural accounts of the aesthetic are the basic reason for a bifurcated view of aesthetic judgments .. But this is promising, and should not be simply rejected.

7. Nature and Walton’s Psychological Claim • The psychological claim: “The aesthetic judgments that seem true or false of a work are a function of the perceptual status of its perceptual properties given any category in which the work is perceived.” • Small elephant example • Exemplifies the standard, contra standard and variable categories initially applied to artwork only

8. What about the psychological claim’s application to landscapes? • Example of the beach vs. tidal basin vs. seafloor • Example illustrates a shift of aesthetic response from “wild, glad emptiness” to “disturbing weirdness” with more information about the natural event you are experiencing aesthetically. • The standard, contra standard and variable classifications are useful here again in more accurately classifying a perception. • Thus, the psychological implications of categorization that Walton only found possible in man-made art, also apply to natural environments.

9. Psychological  Philosophical • This consistency in the psychological perceptions and categorizations between art and nature being proven, Carlson moves on to his more important questions about the correctness of such judgments. • Should he opt for the category-relative interpretation of aesthetic judgments of nature, or is it possible to consider certain categories of nature to be correct or incorrect (the same way art is handled)?

10. The Correct Categories of Nature • Thus the psychological claims proven to be possible above inform the truth value of aesthetic responses to nature. • So some categories of nature are true, and others are not. • There are easy cases of this – i.e. the small elephant • There are more difficult ones – whale = fish or mammal? (This is where perceptual properties may not be enough to decide a category.)

11. Preliminary Argument • Whale as fish or mammal example • We don’t produce but discover natural objects • So we don’t produce, but discover categories for natural objects. • As art relies on art critics or historians for this type of knowledge, natural aesthetics will rely on naturalists or scientists. • This at best shifts the burden of proof to those who defend category-relative interpretations.

12. Goal: • To prove that it is correct to perceive an object in the category of what it is, as opposed to what it appears to be, even in difficult cases where its perceptual properties do not themselves count toward one or the other categories being correct. • Example: a scenic coastline that appears to be natural, but is in fact man-made

13. First Coastline Example - 65 • Two indistinguishable coastlines – one natural one manmade. • On some level, we aesthetically appreciate them equally • At a “deeper” level, we don’t. And this is the more important level for aesthetic experience. • Additionally, there are important distinctions between the two coastlines, and not appreciating these differences is negligent, if not dangerous. • This provides grounds for calling something a “correct category,” even in cases that are unclear. • And the conclusion depends neither on very broad or very different types of objects being compared.

14. Second Coastline Example - 66 • There is an ethical argument for categorizing things correctly. • This is the best way to keep our aesthetics and ethics inharmony • Playboy centerfold example • “If our aesthetic appreciation of nature helps to determine our ethical views concerning nature, then our aesthtic appreciation of nature should be as it in fact is, rather than as what it may appear to be. • Implications for natural aesthetics may include safety or environmental concerns. What we know about that environment within its category will shape the ethical choices we make in our treatment of it. • This does not logically defend “discovering” correct categories, but it does establish ethical merit in using correct or incorrect categories.

15. Conclusion • Carlson has kept aesthetic appreciation within the confines of a cultural account, the same way man-made art objects are treated. The difference is: • In art, art history and art criticism play a role as bodies of knowledge to inform aesthetic judgment. • For nature, natural history and natural science will fill this role. • We can choose to simply appreciate nature formally, but the methods he has employed and the psychological/philosophical arguments he has made have provided a way to appreciate more appropriately and deeply. • This is not only more interesting/fulfilling/appropriate for Carlson; it is essential.