Ethical Considerations for Dam Owners

1. Ethical Considerations for Dam Owners Bruce Thomson Ph.D., P.E. Civil Engineering UNM (bthomson@unm.edu)

2. Introduction • 4 years ago I was elected to the Board of Directors of AMAFCA. It has given me new perspective on the responsibility for public safety of public officials, agencies, and design engineers • Purpose of this talk • Consider some of the ethical issues associated with flood protection though: • Review of ethic theories • Case study • Explore the responsibilities for safety of owners, officials, design engineers and others • Consider use of ethics tests in addressing decisions • Fundamental question: What level of safety should we as flood managers provide the public?

3. Important Point • I am not an ethicist! • I cannot give guidance to ethical questions • But perhaps I can help frame the questions so that ethical principles can help lead to a course of action

4. What Ethics Are & Are Not • Ethics are: • Standards of behavior for proper action in personal, public, & professional lives • Way of considering a difficult situation to help understand a proper course of action • Ethics are not: • Laws & regulations that govern personal & professional behavior • Codes of conduct that identify proper behavior for different circumstances • Moral values

5. A Little About Ethical Theories • 5 common sources of ethical standards • Common good – Action that provides greatest benefit to all • Fairness or justice approach – Treat people equally or proportionately. Each person receives what he/she is due. • Rights approach – Protect the rights of the individual • Utilitarian approach – Select action that does most good (or least harm) • Virtue approach – Select action that has greatest virtue (honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, etc.)

6. Ethical Theories Most Relevant to Flood Protection • Rights approach – Protect the rights of the individual • Common good – Select action that provides greatest benefit to all • Note: These theories often conflict!

7. ASCE Code of Ethics – 7 Canons • Hold paramount the safety, health & welfare of the public • Perform services only in their areas of competence • Issue public statements in an objective & truthful manner • Represent employer or client as faithful agents & avoid conflicts of interest • Build one’s professional reputation on the merit of their services • Uphold & enhance the honor, integrity, & dignity of the profession • Continue professional development throughout their careers

8. Compare Engineering Code to Other Professions • The 1st canon of most other professions is allegiance to the client (lawyers), patient (physicians), student (teachers).

9. Political Ethics • Political ethics: • Ethics of process – Actions acceptable as politician may not be acceptable as individual. The end justifies the means (Machiavelli). • Ethics of policy – The key issue is the desired outcome, not the process (i.e. what level of flood protection is appropriate?). • NM Governmental Conduct Act – Governs conduct, principally related to conflict of interest. Provides little ethical guidance. • Ethics test is “how will this action appear on the 6 o’clock news?” • Two observations: • Blame is generally diffuse. Public failures seldom can be attributed to political leaders • Difficult political decisions often deferred indefinitely in accordance with the NIMTOO principle.

10. Hurricane Katrina

11. Purpose • Hurricane Katrina caused perhaps the greatest failure of engineered infrastructure the U.S. has ever experienced • Purpose here is to: • Review the failure & what went wrong • Consider the failures as an ethical failure • See if there are lessons that have application in NM

12. Background • Mississippi River flood of 1927 caused Congress to assign flood protection to USACE. Required local participation in flood protection • Local role is principally maintenance • Hurricane Betsy raised concerns about flooding of NO. Congress passed Flood Control Ac of 1965. • Reiterated requirement for local participation in flood protection • Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project • 70% federal funds, 30% state & local • Project estimated to take 13 years. Was 60 – 90 % complete in 2005 with projected completion date 2015

13. Background NO originally settled on high ground Development extended north to Lake Pontchartrain. Built on fill Canals built for waterborne commerce were subsequently closed. Caused drop in water table Settlement occurs, up to 1 - 2 ft Local sea level rise 0.4 ft 1986 USACE study suggested problems with Hurricane Protection System (HPS)

14. Location (USACE)

15. Lake Pontchartrain(USACE)

16. Storm Track

17. Storm Surge 6 AM Midnight Noon

18. Hurricane Katrina (8/29/05) 28 failures in first 24 hours. 50 total failures 2 breaches of industrial canal by 9:00 a.m. Damage to Duncan & Bonnabel pumping stations. Non-functional by 9:00 a.m. 65 to 75% of NO underwater by 9:00 a.m. By 8:30 p.m. all pump stations in Jefferson & Orleans parish were non-functional

20. Pre-KatrinaRisk Assessment Framework(USACE) What is acceptable level of risk?

21. Dam & Levee Failure Risk (USACE IPET Report)

22. Design Storm HPS was originally designed for 200-300 year storm Category 3 – Winds 111 – 130 mph. Will cause some structural damage and flooding near the coast Katrina was a category 5 until it reached the coast, then rapidly diminished to category 3

23. Storm Intensity & Size (radius(USACE)

24. Design Surge (D)Katrina Surge (K)(USACE)

25. Elements of the Flood Protection System

26. Levee Failure Mechanism(USACE)

28. Major Investigations USACE – designers of system – Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) ASCE UC Berkeley LA DOT NIST FEMA NRC Insurance Industry Katrina Consolidated Lawsuit Others

29. USACE Findings-1 • The Hurricane Protection System (HPS) • Datum misinterpretation • Subsidence • Poor design • I-walls didn’t consider deflection • Not designed for overtopping • Weak soils • System constructed as designed • Did not perform as a system • 1965 design criteria were not protective from modern storm

30. USACE Findings-2 • The storm • Storm surge was unparalleled in history of NO • Water levels exceeded design criteria • Local wave generation contributed to wave action in canals • Overtopping by waves generated high water velocities • Few measurements of wave & water level conditions

31. USACE Findings - 3 • Performance • >50 major breaches, all but 4 due to overtopping & erosion behind the walls, not their face • 4 breaches occurred before water reached the top of wall • Transitions between structures created vulnerabilities • Many sections of HPS performed well, especially those constructed with high quality materials. • Failure of pump stations contributed to problem, especially after storm passed • Poor maintenance of levees contributed to problem

32. ASCE Conclusions – 1 Risk was greater than expected. Was not communicated to decision makers or the public Flood protection system was constructed as individual pieces with strong systems next to weak systems. Many penetrations. Weak pump stations. Levees weren’t designed for overtopping Design storm wasn’t consistent with Weather Bureau & National Weather System characteristic storms Levee elevations were based on incorrect datum. Many levees were 1 - 2 ft too low. No measures were taken to account for subsidence.

33. ASCE Conclusions - 2 Fractured responsibility. No single agency responsible for hurricane protection. Poor inter-agency coordination Protection system funded on project-by-project basis. Piecemeal network of systems. Pressure to cut costs led to designs that compromised quality, safety, reliability. System was not subjected to rigorous external review

34. Other Claims • Construction deficiencies - Sheet piles were 10 ft not 17 ft • 30% factor of safety not 100% as used for other geotechnical structures

35. BEWARE OF INTERFACES(Robt. Gilbert, Sigma Xi Lecture, UNM 2010) • Between materials • Between jurisdictional entities • Between members of the design team • Between project participants (owner, sponsor, designer, and constructor)

36. Ethics Issues • What is the proper level of risk to design for? • How do you admit to Congress that design was inadequate? • How to deal with design deficiencies that are 20 years old? • Should agency responsible for failure investigate itself? • Why wasn’t local government & public informed of risk? • Why wasn’t government (federal, state, & local) better prepared to deal with emergency? • Where were the whistle blowers? What is role of individual if you know/suspect design is inadequate?

37. Back to New Mexico

38. Acceptable Level of Risk • What is the acceptable level of risk? • Flood protection is costly. Must balance risk reduction vs. cost.

39. Who Decides Level of Protection?Many individuals/organizations/agencies • Political Leaders (elected & appointed) • Agencies • Insurance industry • Engineering Profession • Owners • Level of protection involves multiple & competing factors • Public protection • Financial concerns • Designated responsibility • Public acceptability

40. Who Decides?Political Leaders (Elected & Appointed) • Poorly defined ethical criteria • Diffuse responsibility • Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan • Conflicting demands • Financial • Public protection • Public acceptance • Leaders generally have limited technical expertise • Very short time of influence • Next election cycle • NIMTOO

41. Who Decides?Regulatory Agencies • Clearly defined mission, but usually very limited scope • Cost is secondary consideration at best • Policies often decided by others, not based on ethics • Bureaucrats & risk: • Powerful incentives to avoid public & personal risk • Weak incentives to modify policies or allow innovation • Leadership changes frequently hence middle level managers possess institutional knowledge

42. Regulatory Agencies & Risk Example:Arsenic Rule • 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments mandated that EPA revise drinking water standard for arsenic (Congress did not set new std.) • Arsenic is a political pollutant – public perception is that it’s much more hazardous than it actually is • EPA spent ~10 years investigating risk& treatment technologies. Little consideration given to cost • Reduced std. from 50 ug/L to 10 ug/L based on studies of risk in Taiwan • Cost of new std. as high as $5 M per year of life saved • Reduced mortality/morbidity is not measurable

43. Who Decides?Insurance Industry • Issues: • Very large influence on policies & decisions of political leaders & agencies • Insurance industry is primarily concerned with reducing financial risk • No industry wide code of ethics except for insurance agents • No direct responsibility for flood protection • Conflicting demands • Minimize financial risk • Maximize pool of participants • Limited/no interaction with public • Limited/no concern for cost of risk reduction strategies (i.e. flood protection)

44. Who Decides?Engineers (& Hydrologists) • Clearly defined ethical responsibility: “Hold paramount the safety, health & welfare of the public.” • Engrs. have technical expertise to understand risk & cost • However, engineers are seldom decision makers. Subject to: • Policies established by political leaders, agencies, insurance • Fiscal constraints established by owners • Approvals by agencies • Engrs. have limited involvement with public • Perceived as technicians • Engrs. have greatest influence & responsibility over project scope & design • Often little influence over construction, O&M, & subsequent changes • Large uncertainties hence requires professional judgement • Engrs. are most likely to receive blame if project fails

45. Who Decides?Owners • Important that ownership be clearly defined • Lesson of Katrina is that shared responsibility doesn’t work • Owners are caught in the middle: • Have fiscal responsibility of infrastructure ownership • Accountable to public • Accountable to regulatory agencies • Dependent on the technical expertise of engineers & hydrologists

46. Issues Facing NM Flood Managers:How to Deal with Change? • Changes with technology • Improved data, processing & modeling • Extreme precipitation analyses • Changes in land use • Un-planned upstream and/or downstream development • Changes in climate and storm hydrology

47. Concluding Thoughts • Flood protection is critically important to built infrastructure & natural environment • In contrast to many other threats (i.e. carcinogens in water, air, & food) it poses a direct threat and consequences are clear and identifiable • Causes of most cancers are seldom attributable to a single cause • Managing risk requires balancing competing & conflicting constraints: financial, policy, public acceptance, technical uncertainty • Engineering Code of Ethics: “Hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public” • Doesn’t provide guidance on acceptable risk • Doesn’t provide guidance on balancing constraints

48. Acknowledgements • Chuck Easterling • Chuck Fleddermann • Jerry Lovato • David Thompson

49. References GAO Report to Congress, September 2005 - www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf - brief summary immediately after the storm USACE IPET report - https://ipet.wes.army.mil/ - Full report by USACE. Executive summary is ~150 p. ASCE Report –http://www.teachingthelevees.org/Levees_what_went_wrong.pdf - What went wrong & why  Levees.org – http://levees.org - Advocacy group. Critical of USACE, ASCE & others National Geographic - http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0902_050902_katrina_levees.html )