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Conflict and Commitment

Conflict and Commitment. War from Commitment Problems. Bargaining over goods that effect future bargaining power (e.g., strategic territory, weapons programs, disarmament of rebel groups)

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Conflict and Commitment

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  1. Conflict and Commitment

  2. War from Commitment Problems • Bargaining over goods that effect future bargaining power (e.g., strategic territory, weapons programs, disarmament of rebel groups) • Bargaining in the shadow of large shifts in relative power (e.g., rapid economic growth, acquisition of new weapons) • Bargaining in the shadow of first-strike advantages

  3. Bargaining over Objects of Power:The Example of Coercive Disarmament Possible attack outcome: US eliminates some NK weapons wUS wNK p NK ideal point: US recognizes NK and its right to nuclear weapons US ideal point: NK ends nuclear program and democratizes Possible deal: NK agrees to disarm in exchange for aid

  4. Bargaining over Objects of Power:The Example of Coercive Disarmament • NK’s disarmament increases US relative power, shifting the expected war outcome: wNK p wUS wUS wNK p • US can now force NK to accept an even worse deal, such as instituting political reforms. • Anticipating this, NK could be better off fighting in the first place, rather than agreeing to disarm.

  5. War from Commitment Problems • Bargaining over goods that effect future bargaining power (e.g., strategic territory, weapons programs) • Bargaining in the shadow of large shifts in relative power (e.g., rapid economic growth, acquisition of new weapons) • Bargaining in the shadow of first-strike advantages

  6. Bargaining with Shifting Power Today: wA p wB Tomorrow: wA p wB

  7. War from Commitment Problems • Bargaining over goods that effect future bargaining power (e.g., strategic territory, weapons programs) • Bargaining in the shadow of large shifts in relative power (e.g., rapid economic growth, acquisition of new weapons) • Bargaining in the shadow of first-strike advantages

  8. Bargaining with First-Strike Advantages • When there are first-strike advantages, the outcomes and values for war depend upon which side starts it: Bargaining space if A strikes first Bargaining space if B strikes first wA p wB wA p wB • There is no deal that both sides prefer to striking first.

  9. Empirical Implications • Factors that make war more likely • Strategic vs. non-strategic goods • The disarmament problem in civil conflict • Rapid economic growth/temporary economic shocks • Factors that might reduce the likelihood of war • Third-party guarantees, monitoring

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