The Basics of Philosophy

1. Moscow State Instituteof International Relations (MGIMO-University)School of Government and International Affairs& Alexander ShishkinDepartment of Philosophy The Basics of Philosophy Part VEpistemocentric Philosophy Lecture13John Locke and Gottfried Leibniz The Ontological Foundations and the Nature of Human Understanding

2. John Locke and Gottfried LeibnizThe Ontological Foundations and the Nature of Human Understanding • The “Innate Ideas” Controversy • John Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism • Leibniz’s Defence of “Innate Knowledge” • Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact • The Ontological Assumptions of Rationalism and the Rationalist Conception of Knowledge • Rationality of Nature as Prerequisite of Its Understandability • Leibniz’s Monadology • The Evolution of West European Rationalism • The Ontological Assumptions of Empiricism and the Empiricist Conception of Knowledge • Bodily Contact as Transmitter of Information • Primary and Secondary Qualities • Ideas of Sensation and Ideas of Reflection • Simple and Complex Ideas

3. John Locke Born on August 29, 1632 in Wrington Died on October 28, 1704 in Oates Gottfried Leibniz Born on July 1, 1646 in Leipzig Died on November 14, 1716 in Hannover John Locke and Gottfried LeibnizThe Ontological Foundations and the Nature of Human Understanding Oates Hannover Wrington Leipzig

4. John Locke(1632–1704) Principal Writings • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding(1690) • Two Treatises of Government(1690) John Locke

5. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz(1646–1716) Principal Writings • New Essays on Human Understanding(1704) • Essays of Theodicy on the Goodness of God(1710) • The Monadology(1714) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

6. Plato (427–347 B.C.) René Descartes (1596–1650) Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) Cambridge Platonists: Henry More (1614–1687) Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) The “Innate Ideas” Controversy Nativism(Lat. nativus,innate)is a philosophical theory that mind contains innate knowledge(ideas, principles). Principle Advocates

7. Plato’s Nativism Knowledge as Recollection Genuine, i.e. certain, absoluteand, therefore, eternal, knowledge is that of universals; of transient individualthings one can have but opinions. However, general knowledge cannot be obtained from individual facts, even if firmly established, for no finite number of particular instances can justify universal generalisations: one may not affirm of all what is only known of some. Since what we sense are but individual things,genuine knowledge cannot be based on sense perception.

8. Plato’s Nativism Knowledge as Recollection Since intelligible entities (ideas)can neither be perceived, nor deduced from opinions,based on perception, their knowledge is not dependent on perception, has existed before all perception, i.e. before birth.

9. Plato’s Nativism Knowledge as Recollection In this case the bearer of this knowledge, i.e. the soul, must have existed before the birth or, more precisely, before the birth of the body and, consequently, will, as an unborn entity, continue to exist after its death. If some ideas seem unfamiliar,this is because they have been forgotten. From this standpoint, all knowledge is butrecollection.

10. Descartes’ Nativism“Natural Light of Reason” Mind Matter thinks does not think unextended extended indivisible divisible If mind and matter have nothing in common, how can theyinteract?How can a mind knowanything about material bodies? How can it have even an idea of a material body?

11. Descartes’ Nativism“Natural Light of Reason” Human mind has an innate idea of material substance and innate knowledgeof the laws it is subject to as a part of the God-given natural light of reason. y = x2

12. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyJohn Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism Nativists’ Arguments Locke’s Objections The universal consent argument Universal consent does not exist, nor, if existed, wouldprove anything innate There are truths that everyone accepts. Considering how different men and women are, this fact is best explained by the assumption thatsuch truths are known by all since birthand knowledgeof them is not contingent on educational background and other individual circumstances. There are, in fact, no truths wherein all mankind agrees, for even the most widely shared ideas and beliefs are not known, for example, to children or idiots. But even if there were universally accepted truths, that would not prove them innate, unless it were demonstrated that there could be no other way to achieve such result.

13. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyJohn Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism Nativists’ Arguments Locke’s Objections Modification of the universal consent argument: the latent (imprinted) knowledge argument The notion ofunknown knowledgeis self-contradictory It is possible for a mind to have knowledge that is of no avail at the moment, and is, therefore, neither demonstrated, nor, perhaps, even realised.Children’s minds are good examples. If, however, children feel no need to use or demonstrate such “latent” knowledge, this does not mean they do not have it. It is, indeed, possible to know something and never have a chance or the will to use that knowledge, but it is not possible to know something without being aware of knowing it.In the meanwhile, children display, precisely, their ignorance of the truths some philosophers believe to be innate, not lack of interest in them.

14. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyJohn Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism Nativists’ Arguments Locke’s Objections Modification of the latent know-ledge argument: the immediate (spontaneous) consent argument Readiness to accepta truthdoes not prove it innate There aretruths we accept as soon as we learn them or become aware of them, without asking for further proof or substantiation. This means thatour minds are predisposed to accept them, which, in turn, means that they are somehow imprinted in our minds, or, to put it otherwise, are innate. Some people readily assent to false ideas, and as long as this is not taken to prove falsehoods are innate (thus rendering Nativism meaningless), one may not infer that spontaneous consent to a truth proves it to be innate, either. To insist, despite this, that our readiness to accept a truth means it is innate, is to declare all truths innate, however trivial they were.

15. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyJohn Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism Nativists’ Arguments Locke’s Objections Modification of the immediate consent argument: the deduction argument Unlike the logic of demonstration, the logic of discovery is that of induction Truths we need nothing to learn except to know how to thinkmust be considered innate, even if the process of learning involves reasoning and takes time, because the faculty for reasoning is, in fact, nothing else but knowledge of rules of thought,i.e. rules of logic, available to every rational person since birth. Rules of logic are usually understood as those of deductive reasoning; deduction may help demonstrate knowledge already obtained, but does not help acquire it; the process of discovery follows the path of induction and particular truths are known prior to general truthsfrom which they are presumably deduced.

16. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyJohn Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism Nativists’ Arguments Locke’s Objections The universal consent argument Universal consent does not exist, nor, if existed, wouldprove anything innate Modification of the universal consent argument: the latent (imprinted) knowledge argument The notion ofunknown knowledgeis self-contradictory Modification of the latent know-ledge argument: the immediate (spontaneous) consent argument Readiness to accepta truthdoes not prove it innate Modification of the immediate consent argument: the deduction argument Unlike the logic of demonstration, the logic of discovery is that of induction

17. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyJohn Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism There is nothing in the mind that was not earlier in the senses. Tabula rasa(Lat. scraped tablet)is a term of empiricist (more precisely, sensualist) epistemology that designates a supposed condition attributed to the human mind before ideas have been imprinted on it by the reaction of the senses to the external world of objects(e.g. the mind of the newly-born). Nihilest in intellectu,quod non priusfuerit in sensu.

18. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyJohn Locke: “Tabula rasa” versus Nativism There is nothing in the mind that was not earlier in the senses. Sensualism(from Lat. sensus)is an epistemological doctrine(once, the principal versionof empiricism)that sense perceptions are the only source and basis of knowledge. Nihilest in intellectu,quod non priusfuerit in sensu.

19. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyLeibniz’s Defence of “Innate Knowledge” Locke’s Arguments Leibniz’s Objections Universal consent does not exist, nor, if existed, wouldprove anything innate The existence and certainty of innate knowledge is not based on universal consent The notion ofunknown knowledgeis self-contradictory We know countless things that we are not aware of all the time, even when and if we need them Readiness to accepta truthdoes not prove it innate Not every truth is innate, however necessary truths that cannot be established by experience are Unlike the logic of demonstration, the logic of discovery is that of induction Neither deductive logic of demonstration, nor inductive logic of discovery can be deduced or induced from sense experience

20. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyTruths of Reason and Truths of Fact Truths of reasonare primary principles based on the logical law of non-contradiction(their denials are self-contradictory);they are also called necessary or eternal truths, because, unlike truths of fact, they are true under all circumstances(in all actual and possible worlds). The sum of the angles in a triangle equals two right angles. Truths of factare propositions that are not necessarily and universally true, but just happen to be true under certain circumstances and may be false under different circumstances; their denials are not self-contradictory and there must be sufficient reason for them to be accepted as true. There is a dog sitting in front of the house.

21. The “Innate Ideas” ControversyLeibniz’s Defence of “Innate Knowledge” There is nothing in the mind that was not earlier in the senses. There is nothing in the mind that was not earlier in the senses,except mind itself. Nihilest in intellectu,quod non priusfuerit in sensu. Nihilest in intellectu,quod non fuerit in sensu,nisi intellectus ipse. Human mind is not “tabula rasa”,but a faculty for, i.e. the know-how of thinking.

22. The Ontological Assumptions of RationalismRationality of Nature as Prerequisite of Its Understandability If nature wereirrational(devoid of all order, subject to no law), it would beutterly incomprehensible. If the principles of our reason were different from those of nature, nature would be incomprehensible for us. Nature is comprehensible only becausethe principles of human reasonare the same as the principles of nature. Hence mind does not need experience to discover the principles of nature, because they are already in the mind.

23. The Ontological Assumptions of RationalismRationality of Nature as Prerequisite of Its Understandability This thesisof the rationality of the Universeis pressed by Leibniz to a logical extreme,the assertion that the world God createdis “the best of all possible worlds”. Voltaire ridiculed this assertionin his satirical novellaCandide, or Optimism (1758).

24. The Ontological Assumptions of RationalismLeibniz’s Monadology There must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things. These simple substances, monads,can only come into being or come to an end all at once[tout d’un coup], i.e. by creation and by annihilation. A monad cannot be altered or changed by external agency: monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out. Each monad must be different from every other, for in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike. Each monad is subject to continuous change that is due to an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon it. 1

25. The Ontological Assumptions of RationalismLeibniz’s Monadology Change implies a multiplicity in that which is simple, even though a simple substance has no parts. The passing condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called perception. Monads are thus mental entities, each related to and expressing all the others, hence each being a perpetual living mirror of the universe. Since there are many monads, it is as if there were many different universes, which are in fact nothing but aspects of a single universe. It is this difference of aspects (perceptions) and of the level of apperception (consciousness), that makes monads differ from each other. 2

26. The Ontological Assumptions of RationalismThe Evolution of West European Rationalism Monism(fromGr. μόνος,one, sole) is a theory that there is only one kind of ultimate substance, i.e. that all phenomena can be reduced to one principle. Pluralism(fromLat. pluralis) is a theory that there are more than one kind of ultimate substance and that reality is composed of a plurality of entities that cannot be reduced to each other. Dualism(fromLat. dualis) is a subtype of pluralism that limits the number of ultimate substances to just two, in ontology usually matter and mind.

27. The Ontological Assumptions of RationalismThe Evolution of West European Rationalism Mind Matter Descartes The subject and object of knowledge are ontologically heterogeneous; despite the assumption of innate ideas, the possibility of cognition remains problematic. Dualism God, or Nature Spinoza The subject and object of knowledge are believed to be identical on the substantial level, but are different on the modes’ level; the possibility of cognition on the modes’ level is explained by reference to the ontologically unsubstantiated “intuition”. Monism M O N A D S Leibniz The subject and object of knowledge are fully identical, all knowledge turns out to be innate, rendering the very notion of cognition as transition from the state of ignorance to that of knowledge meaningless. Pluralism

28. The Ontological Assumptions of EmpiricismBodily Contact as Transmitter of Information Externalobjects the senses affect The second causal relationlinks mental statesand is, in this sense,itself mental. The first causal relationlinks material objectsand is, in this sense,itself material. and cause sensations ideas. that leavein mind, as their traces,

29. The Ontological Assumptions of EmpiricismBodily Contact as Transmitter of Information Externalobjects the senses But the ontological problemof howbody and mindcan and do interactremains unsolved. affect and cause The key aspect of the empiricist epistemologyis the assumption thatchanges in sensationssignal (inform of)changes in objects. sensations ideas. that leavein mind, as their traces,

30. The Ontological Assumptions of Empiricism Primary and Secondary Qualities Primary qualitiesare qualities the ideas of which resemble the qualities in the object. Secondary qualitiesare qualities the ideasof which do not resemble the powers that cause them. Size, form, solidity, movement Colour, sound, taste, smell exist in external objects and are properties objects possess independent of us. exist in our senses and are caused by the interaction of our perceptual apparatus with the powers of the primary qualities of the object.

31. The Empiricist Conception of KnowledgeIdeas of Sensation and Ideas of Reflection All ideasare derived fromexperience. Some ideas are derived from outer experience, viz.sense perceptions of external objects. Other ideas are derived from inner experience, viz.reflectionofthe activities of our mind.

32. Our mind getssimple ideasfrom experience, i.e. fromperception(outer experience) orreflection(inner experience); the mind itself remains passive throughout the process. The mind can engage in three different types of action in putting simple ideas together: The mind cancombinesimple ideas into complex ones; these are of two kinds: ideas of substances and ideas of modes. The mind canbring ideas, whether simple or complex, together without uniting them, and form ideas of relations. The mind can abstractgeneral ideas from particulars. The Empiricist Conception of KnowledgeSimple and Complex Ideas The passive state of mind The active state of mind

33. The Empiricist Conception of KnowledgeSimple and Complex Ideas Complex Ideas Substances Modes Relations Complex ideas that represent separate things Complex ideas indicating qualities of substances or something dependent on the substances Complex ideas obtained from comparing different ideas

34. Questions?