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A HETEROGENEITY ANALYSIS OF THE BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAMME EFFECT ON MEN AND WOMEN’S WORK SUPPLY. Clarissa Gondim Teixeira. Introduction. Bolsa Família Program – the Brazilian CCT Origin : PBF starded in 2003 as a result of the fusion of existing cash transfer programs

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a heterogeneity analysis of the bolsa fam lia programme effect on men and women s work supply

A HETEROGENEITY ANALYSISOF THE BOLSA FAMÍLIAPROGRAMME EFFECT ON MENAND WOMEN’S WORK SUPPLY

Clarissa Gondim Teixeira

introduction
Introduction
  • Bolsa FamíliaProgram – theBrazilian CCT
  • Origin: PBF starded in 2003 as a result of thefusion of existing cash transfer programs
  • Motivation:
      • AchievetheMDGs – short-runpovertyreduction (cash transfer)
      • Universal policiesfailuretoprovideaccesstobasicservices – increasedemandforeducation and health (conditionality)
      • Breakingintergenerationalpoverty cicle – investment in humam capital (conditionality)
introduction1
Introduction

PBF positive effects:

  • Increase in food consumption and educational expenditures (CEDEPLAR, 2005) (IFPRI, 2010).
  • Reduction in inequality and poverty rates (Chein, Andrade and Ribas, 2006)
  • Increase in school attendance but no consensus on child labor effects (Cardoso y Souza, 2004), (Cacciamali, Tatei y Batista, 2008), (Pedrozo, 2007), (IFPRI, 2010).
introduction2
Introduction

Frequent criticism concerning negative effects on labor supply:

  • No change in income – question the effectiveness of the program
  • Generates dependency – concern with exit doors
introduction3
Introduction
  • Objectives of the paper are:
  • Identify the existence of PBF´s impact on men and women´s participation rate and journey;
  • Through the disaggregated analysis by sex, type of occupation and ‘dose-effect’:
    • Explain the relation of receiving cash transfers and labor supply;
    • Identify and characterise the individuals whose labour supply are the most elastic.
literature review
Literature review
  • Time allocation theory (Becker, 1965)
  • Income and subsititution effects (Parker and Skoufias, 2000)
  • Multiplier effects (Martínez, 2004)
  • Informal work and production function (Cardoso, 1999)
  • Additional worker (Stephens, 2001)
  • ‘Collective approach’ of intrahousehold resource allocation (Chiappori, 1992)
literature review1
Literature review
  • Individual level
      • Increase in participation rate greater for women- Cedeplar (2005)
      • Increase in participation rate - IFPRI (2010)
      • Decrease in participation rate and labor hours for mothers -Tavares (2008)
      • No effect participation rate, decrease in labor hours, increase for rural women - Ferro Nicollela (2007)
  • Municipal level
      • No effect - Foguel Barros (2008)
      • Participation rate: increase rural, decrease urban – Ribas, Soares, Soares (2010)
bolsa fam lia programme pbf
Bolsa Família Programme (PBF)
  • Elegibility criteria: extremely poor families and poor families with children.
  • Targeting
      • Self-declared income verified by cross checking with formal work data
      • Analysis of Single Registry information
      • Inclusion and exclusion errors
bolsa fam lia programme pbf1
Bolsa Família Programme(PBF)
  • Cash Transfers:
  • Variable transfer of US$7.00 per childornursingmothermaximun of 3 per familiy (avoid incentive tochildbearing);
  • Fixed transfer of US$23.00 onlyforextremelypoorfamilieswithorwithoutchildren.
bolsa fam lia programme pbf2
Bolsa Família Programme (PBF)
  • Conditionalities:
  • 85% of schoolattendance;
  • Vaccinationforchildrenunder 6 yearsold;
  • Pre and pos natal careforwomen.
bolsa fam lia programme pbf3
Bolsa Família Programme (PBF)
  • Exitdoors:
  • Age of child (doesnotpunishprogression)
  • Family per capitaincomeaboveeligibility – single registriyupdatedevery 2 years (vulnerability )
labor market of the poor
Labor market of the poor

Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.

labor market of the poor1
Labor market of the poor

Men Women

Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.

labor market of the poor2
Labor market of the poor

Men Women

  • AIBF 82% Urban - PNAD 67% Urban

Source: AIBF 2005 and PNAD 2006. Own calculation.

evaluation estrategy
Evaluation estrategy
  • Cross section using annual household data – PNAD 2006
      • Cash transfer supplement
  • Quasi-experimental design
  • Propensity Score
  • Re-weighted multivariable regression
  • Cluster in the household level
empirical investigation
Empirical Investigation

Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation

results
Results
  • The average effect on the probability of working is not significant for men or women.
results1
Results
  • PBF does not cause a large work ‘discouragement’
  • Women are more sensitive to an income shock
results2
Results

Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.

results3
Results

Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.

results4
Results

Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.

results5
Results

Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.

results6
Results
  • Formal work is found to be the least elastic due to workers’ rights and income stability;
  • Urban self-employed women are the most sensitive to the PBF transfer;
  • Informal paid rural jobs are the most sensitive for men.
  • Unpaid workers reduce their labor hours in contrast with those earning one or two minimal wage
conclusion
Conclusion
  • One cannot affirm that PBF is responsible for generating dependence on account of income transfers
  • The results also confirm that the elasticity of labor supply varies according to sex and type of work.
  • Higher effects were found for greater income shock intensities