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Negotiation A Lesson in Multiagent System Based on Jose Vidal’s book Fundamentals of Multiagent Systems. Henry Hexmoor SIUC. Negotiation: The Bargaining Problem. Interaction in order to agree on a deal Approach is to exchange messages among agents Objective is to reach a deal, that:

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slide1

NegotiationA Lesson in Multiagent SystemBased on Jose Vidal’s bookFundamentals of Multiagent Systems

Henry Hexmoor

SIUC

negotiation the bargaining problem
Negotiation: The Bargaining Problem
  • Interaction in order to agree on a deal
  • Approach is to exchange messages among agents
    • Objective is to reach a deal, that:
    • maximizes utilities,
    • avoids expiration,
    • avoids risk of conflict, and
    • avoid failure on deal
automated negotiation
Automated Negotiation
  • Knowledge and Decision making is distributed to local sites
  • Utilities are optimized without:
  • central aggregation, or
  • central reasoning

Examples:

  • Large organizations, governments, societies
bargaining problem nash 1950
Bargaining problem(Nash 1950)

Where represents set of deals

R represents real number of states

  • : the no deal deal
  • i.e., agent prefers no deal to negative utility
pareto optimal
Pareto Optimal
  • A deal is Pareto Optimal if there is no other deal such that no one prefers it over
slide6

For two agents i and j

Pareto Frontier

j

Space of possible deals

A deal

i

slide7

Independence of Utility units Property

  • A Negotiation is independent of utility units if when U chooses and when given

chooses

Where

e.g., money in different countries

symmetry property
Symmetry Property
  • A negotiation protocol is symmetric if the solution remains the same as long as the set of utility function U is the same, regardless of which agent has which the utility.
rationality
Rationality
  • A deal is individually rational iff
slide10

Irrelevant Alternatives Property

  • A negotiation to protocol is independent of irrelevant alternatives if it is true that when given the set of possible deals it chooses and when where it again chooses , assuming U stays constant
egalitarian solution
Egalitarian Solution
  • Gains are equally shared and

Where E represents set of deals which equal payoff

egalitarian solution for two
Egalitarian solution for two…

Egalitarian deal may not be Pareto Optimal

egalitarian social welfare solution
Egalitarian Social Welfare solution
  • A deal that maximizes the utility received by the agent with the smallest utility

Example: Helping the poor!

Every problem is guaranteedto have an egalitarian social welfare solution

utilitarian solution
Utilitarian solution
  • A deal that the deal that maximizes the sum of all utilities
  • The utilitarian deal is a Pareto optimal deal.
  • There might be more than one utilitarian deals in the case of a tie.
  • The utilitarian deal violates the independence of utility units assumption.
nash bargaining solution
Nash Bargaining solution
  • A deal that maximizes the product of the utilities :
  • The Nash solution is
  • Pareto efficient,
  • independent of utility units,
  • symmetric, and
  • independent of irrelevant alternatives.
kalai smorodinsky
Kalai-smorodinsky
  • A deal that distributes utilities in proportion to the maximum that the agent can get.

Human preferences for deals is complex!

the rubinstein bargaining process
The Rubinstein Bargaining Process
  • Agents act only at discrete time steps.
  • In each time step, one of the agents proposes a deal to the other who either accepts it or rejects it.
  • If the offer is rejected then we move to the next time step where the other agent gets to propose a deal.
  • Once a deal has been rejected it is considered void and cannot be accepted at a later time.
  • The alternating offers models does not have a dominant strategy.
  • We assume that time is valuable. The agents’ utility for all possible deals is reduced as time passes. E.g., haggling over how to split an ice cream sundae which is slowly melting.
time matters
Time matters
  • Introducing a discount factor

= i’s discount coefficient at time t

= 0 do it now or lose

= 1 do it whenever . . .

  • The agents’ utility for every possible deal decreases monotonically as a function of time with a discount factor.
theorem
Theorem
  • The Rubinstein alternating offers game where the agents have complementary linear utilities has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium strategy where
    • Agent i proposes a deal

and accept the offer from j only if

    • Agent j proposes a deal

and accept the offer from i only if

zeuthern strategy
Zeuthernstrategy
  • Willingness to risk deal break down, riski
  • Agent calculates the risks for both agents.
  • The agent with the smallest risk should concede just enough to get the deal agreed in one step.
  • Zeuthern strategy converges to Nash solution.
one step negotiation rosenschein and zlotkin 1994
One step negotiation (Rosenscheinand Zlotkin, 1994)
  • Each agent then has two proposals: the one it makes and the one it receives.
  • The agents must accept the proposal that maximizes the product of the agents’ utilities.
  • If there is a tie then they coordinate and choose one of them at random.
distributed search
Distributed Search

Deals that dominate

Search through dominant deals as in a hill climbing strategy problems my exist

ad hoc negotiation strategies
Ad-hoc Negotiation Strategies
  • Faratin(Jenning’s student) deployed Multiagent Negotiation systems, such as ADEPT
task allocation problem
Task allocation problem

mapping

  • agent i incurs a cost for performing task S

Example:

  • Postman problem: Trading letters to lower their costs
  • Problems with lies . . .