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UNCOUNTED Inequality, post-2015 and measurement as power

UNCOUNTED Inequality, post-2015 and measurement as power. Alex Cobham, CGD International Parliamentary Conference on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 28 November 2013. Pop quiz. Which measure would you prefer? P = y/x G = 58.1y – 119.5x + 41.86. 50 ways to be uncounted.

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UNCOUNTED Inequality, post-2015 and measurement as power

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  1. UNCOUNTEDInequality, post-2015 and measurement as power Alex Cobham, CGD International Parliamentary Conference on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 28 November 2013

  2. Pop quiz Which measure would you prefer? P = y/x G = 58.1y – 119.5x + 41.86

  3. 50 ways to be uncounted • Blatant ‘uncounting’ • Choice of reporting • Manipulation of data and targets • Patterns of being uncounted • Choices for Post-2015 • Choice of ‘development’ priorities • Choice of indicators, e.g. the Palma • Modest proposals

  4. Blatant 1: Choice of reporting The power to choose what is reported can exacerbate inequality

  5. Blatant 2: Manipulation The power to revise ‘results’ can render targets meaningless The power to revise targets can eradicate ambition

  6. Blatant 3: Patterns of uncounted Uncounted, through power • Top end of distributions (countries, people); • Criminality Uncounted, through lack of power • Bottom end of distributions; • Marginality

  7. Choice of ‘development’ aspects Millennium Development Goals: Decisions by… • Technocrats • Pragmatism • Inertia ?

  8. Choice of indicators • Criteria: • Technical accuracy • Political accountability • (Cost?) • An example: Inequality

  9. The Palma • Ratio of national income shares: top 10% to bottom 40% • Rests on Gabriel Palma finding: stability of ‘middle’ deciles (5-9) • ‘Basically, it seems that a schoolteacher, a junior or mid-level civil servant, a young professional (other than economics graduates working in financial markets), a skilled worker, middle-manager or a taxi driver who owns his or her own car, all tend to earn the same income across the world — as long as their incomes are normalized by income per capita of respective country.’

  10. Middle stability across countries

  11. Middle stability across time

  12. Stability across income stages

  13. Most and least equal income distributions, 2010

  14. Palma vsGini If Palma so closely related to Gini; and Palma ignores half the income distribution; why would you possibly want to use it? • Policy axioms • Gini flaws P = y/x G = 58.1y – 119.5x + 41.86

  15. Pop quiz Which measure would you prefer? Palma = top 10% share/bottom 40% share Gini = 58.1(top 10% share) – 119.5(bottom 40% share) + 41.86

  16. Choice of ‘development’ aspects Alternative approach: Global process defines (global) political priorities; National (and local?) process sets targets i.e. if it’s “too political” to impose targets, don’t; instead, set targets through a political process.

  17. Conclusions • Being uncounted reflects power • Decisions on statistics are political • Post-2015 offers great opportunities for progress (not least disaggregation, illicit flows); but not without recognising and confronting the (political) obstacles.

  18. Proposals • Inclusive politics (as far as possible) • Indicators chosen for accountability • Data to follow ambition (not v.v.) • Funding now(NSOs <0.1% of aid)

  19. Thank you cgdev.org/europe @AlexCobham

  20. Blatant 1: Choice of reporting E.g. banking confidentiality • Shadow banking: The Morning After the Night Before • Data provision: to BIS not public

  21. Blatant 1: Choice of reporting

  22. Blatant 1: Choice of reporting E.g. political suppression • The Black Book of Sudan: Who holds power?

  23. Blatant 1: Choice of reporting

  24. Blatant 1: Choice of reporting E.g. political suppression • The Black Book of Sudan: Who holds power? • Data provision: to IMF not citizens (then; now)

  25. Blatant 2: Manipulation… • …of data • ‘1990 revisionism’ • …of targets (Thomas Pogge)

  26. Choice of ‘development’ aspects High-Level Panel: We recognized that every country is wrestling with how to address income inequality, but felt that national policy in each country, not global goalsetting, must provide the answer. History also shows that countries tend to have cycles in their income inequality as conventionally measured; and countries differ widely both in their view of what levels of income inequality are acceptable and in the strategies they adopt to reduce it.

  27. Choice of ‘development’ aspects Thought experiment: We recognized that every country is wrestling with how to address gender violence, but felt that national policy in each country, not global goalsetting, must provide the answer. History also shows that countries tend to have cycles in their gender violenceas conventionally measured; and countries differ widely both in their view of what levels of gender violenceare acceptable and in the strategies they adopt to reduce it.

  28. Palma vsGini

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