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AR review meeting

AR review meeting. The goal of this meeting is to take position on the ARs raised during the IASI SIOV before the IASI TRB Planned on the 30/01/07 This presentation contains the slides to be presented at the TRB on the AR status and some additional slides given rationale on the different ARs.

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AR review meeting

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  1. AR review meeting • The goal of this meeting is to take position on the ARs raised during • the IASI SIOV before the IASI TRB Planned on the 30/01/07 • This presentation contains the slides to be presented at the TRB on the • AR status and some additional slides given rationale on the different ARs

  2. AR’s and NCR’s Extract from TRB

  3. AR-6487 : IASI Ripple in Decontamination @300K • Observation : On the LND 1470 parameter, it had been observed 10,5 Amps ripple @ 1Hz during IASI Decontamination @300K. • Analysis : • The relative behaviour of the LND1470 parameter and the ENP0007 is confirmed by ground test data • The ripple of the current on the EQPWR line is directly linked to the conjunction of the thermal control and decontamination heater lines activation @ 1Hz. Simulation and data from the EMC test campaign were provided. • The IASI powers calculated with the two telemetries are consistent. • This situation should not be faced again (future decontamination @200K, ripple around 7.6 Amps). • A waiver for the ripple on the IASI EQPWR line is available to cover this situation. Extract from TRB

  4. Power consumption

  5. Power consumption

  6. Power consumption • The power consumption determined with the in orbit HK is consistent with • The optical vacuum results (IA-AR-1000-9858-AER) • The IASI /METOP ICD (MO-IC-MMT-IA-0001, Issue 7)

  7. Thermal lines activation • The heater lines of IASI are composed of : • 14 ATC lines for the thermal control of the instrument • 6 decontamination lines for the 300 and 200K decontamination of the radiator • 5 deployment lines for the CD, CCFD and LFDs deployment • Note : • The decontamination and deployments lines can not be switched on together • The decontamination lines are activated in the “Heater 1 Decontamination” mode in conjunction with the ATC (Warm-Up targets) • The deployment lines are activated individually (i.e. one by one) in the “Heater 1 deployment” mode in conjunction with the ATC (Warm-Up targets) • For all the higher modes, the ATC lines are activated in conjunction with the equipment switch on, at operational targets. • These lines are driven thanks to hardware automatons (one for the ATC, one for the Decontamination or Deployment activities)

  8. An HW automaton drives sequentially the heater lines @ 1 Hz

  9. An HW automaton drives sequentially the heater lines @ 1 Hz

  10. ATC Thermal lines Impedance “The linear summation of these individual contributors is impossible” Decontamination Thermal lines Impedance “The linear summation of these individual contributors is impossible”

  11. It is possible to establish the ripple on the EQPWR bus by injecting in the thermal simulation model the PWM and voltage acquired in the HK (4/11/06 09:37)

  12. EQPWR Ripples simulation data for the Heater 1Warm-Up & Heater 1 Decontamination are : • Heater 1 Warm-Up : 7.3 A • Heater 1 decontamination @300 K : 10.3 A • Heater 1 decontamination @200K : 7.6A • For the higher modes, combination of the simulated ripple of the heater lines and ripple measured during AIT activities allow to establish the following table (ripple at frequency 1, 4.8 and 1/8 Hz): IASI Deviation Request (IA-DR-1000-1115-AER) is updated • To integrate the ripple in decontamination mode (300K) • To update the ripple value for other modes

  13. AR-6614 : IASI DPS medium error (END0051) • Observation : After the first transition into Normal Operation with the processing enable, the cumulative counter of the minor/medium B errors started to increase. This situation was also observed after the NZPD Patch uploading • Analysis : • The first increase of the counter is directly linked to the shape of the earth interferograms which did not allow the determination of the central position of the interferograms. This situation was foreseen by CNES and a “NZPD” Patch was uploading (19/12/2006). • The NZPD Patch was demonstrated to be efficient (good determination of the central fringe of the interferograms with good quality status). The END0051 became “quiet” during two days. • The second counter increase events are directly linked to invalid determination of the internal processing data due to some spikes on the interferogams, leading to a propagation of invalid determination of the consecutive product. • It has been proposed by CNES to set some internal processing thresholds in order to filter the raw input to the processing. Extract from TRB

  14. END0051 behaviour

  15. DPS error detection Cf. IA-MU-1000-6870-AER v4.1 §1.2.2.2.7 & §1.2.2.7 • IMS errors management • EC32 (END0024 • EC21 (END0023) • DPS_EC21_Sum (END0051) • DPS_ELT21_Status • ELT entries in Report format IMS OD Complementary status DPS I/F Checks Image • DMC errors management : • ELT entries • EC32/EC21 counters IIS I/F Checks MAS I/F Checks Interferograms Spectra Processing Algorithms checks The goal of this presentation is not describe all the causes of the END0051 incrementation ; it’s to explain the major contributors in the current behaviour of this HKTM point

  16. Assumptions • END0051 = Accumulation of END0023 (0  END0051  65 535) • END0023 = DPS medium B & minor “error” – elementary counter (0  END0023  255) • Multi-topics counter (Cf. IA-MU-1000-6870-AER v4.1 §1.2.2.7) • END0051 current contain : • The present END0051 behaviour is NOT an abnormal situation of the DPC processing; it represents a synthesis of the flags raised by the scientific algorithms END0051 ZPD quality flag Spike quality flag Flow-chart of the major contributors to incrementation of the END0051 counter Index > Threshold Unsuccessful Research Index > Threshold Cold scenes Invalid Reduced spectra Cold scenes Invalid Reduced spectra Spikes in Calibration interferogram Spikes in Calibration interferogram

  17. History of the DPC processing status 1 : Computed in Norm-Op / processing enable 2 : Calibration interferogram corrupted by a spike and not rejected because no threshold No direct link

  18. AR-6667 : CCM CSQ Anomaly • Observation : The Flag Cube corner Speed Quality (CSQ) was detected to be in error three times during the SIOV activity. This flag is monitored by the IMS and reported into the report format (the anomaly counter is increased by one, red alarms). • Analysis : • This situation was already observed during ground tests and considered as acceptable since no effect on the products was noticed, and, that the event is very unlikely (refer to IASI NC-AO6298/001) • This situation could not lead to wrong internal processing data determination due to the monitoring on that data within the processing. • This situation could not lead to a refuse mode transition since this is a unlikely event (i.e. with no consecutive occurrence). Extract from TRB

  19. AR-6667 : CCM CSQ Anomaly • CSQ anomaly during routine operation : potential possibilities • Use as is, i.e. from time to time the anomaly counter will increase by one, report format will be acquired, and the signature of the anomaly shall be checked in order to confirm the CSQ reporting. It is reminded that there is no mode transition associated to that on-board monitoring if this anomaly is not consecutive. • To modify the DPS_ELT21_Status parameter in order to disable the monitoring of the CSQ_NV flag by the on-board software (with the subsystem parameter MCMD) Note : it could also be possible to modify the ground monitoring status (red vs yellow) for the anomaly counter in order to minimize the impact of that type of anomaly on the operators. For example : • the anomaly counter shall be an yellow limit when different from 0 • The refuse mode bit shall be a red limit when the associated mode is standby and an yellow limit if the mode is heater.

  20. AR-6697 : Transient red low on IASI TM points ENS0028 and ENS0015 • Anomaly : HK TM point transiently in red in External Calibration • Observation : SCAN position out of range in External Calibration ENS0028 (detail)  ENS0015 (global) in Red using the ground monitorings v08 • Analysis : The ground monitorings v08 corresponding the ENS0028 & ENS0015 are wrong in External Calibration • Status : • The ground monitorings v09 allows to correct the wrong thresholds for these 2 parameters • Already implemented (before Xmas period) Extract from TRB

  21. AR-6705 : DMC counter overflow (arithmetic error) • Observation : Due to the overflow of one of the DMC counter, the DPS automatically performed a transition to WAIT mode (with DPC suspended). This event triggered a Heater Refuse mode transition since the DPS mode is no more consistent with the Normal Operation mode. • Analysis (SAAB Tec note : P-IASI-NOT-00074-SE) : • The counter counts the number of the clock ticks since the first switch-on of the equipment • When reaching the value 0x80000000, an ALU fixed point arithmetic overflow flag is raised • This interruption is considered as a major anomaly by the DMC SW and leads to the DPS mode transition • Dumps performed on the equipment and simulation performed by SAAB on DMC breadboard confirmed that analysis • Patch was delivered and successfully applied • This event was observed during the night of 1st January with the expected behaviour (entry in the Report format, no refuse mode transition). • This event will happen periodically (every each 24 days and 20 hours) Extract from TRB

  22. AR-6705 : DMC counter overflow (arithmetic error) • It is proposed to extend the period of observation of this anomaly during a certain period to demonstrate the repeatability period and that the patch definitively fix the problem. • DMC counter overflowanomaly during routine operation : potential possibilities • Use as is, i.e. from time to time the anomaly counter will increase by one, report format will be acquired, and the signature of the anomaly shall be checked in order to confirm the overflow reporting. It is reminded that there is no mode transition associated to that on-board monitoring if this anomaly is not consecutive. • To modify the DPS_ELT21_Status parameter in order to disable the monitoring of the overflow flag by the on-board software (with the subsystem parameter MCMD) Note 1 : It was also possible to mask this interrupt directly in the DMC SW, in that case no error reporting is performed. This solution was not selected by CNES. Note 2 : it could also be possible to modify the ground monitoring status (red vs yellow) for the anomaly counter in order to minimize the impact of that type of anomaly on the operators. For example : • the anomaly counter shall be an yellow limit when different from 0 • The refuse mode bit shall be a red limit when the associated mode is standby and an yellow limit if the mode is heater.

  23. AR-6729 : OBDH area corruption • Anomaly : OBDH Area corrupted by SEU • Observation : Increase of the EDAC simple error counter (ENA0021), +2 every 16 seconds • Analysis : EDAC detects the SEU, but the SW does not correct the corrupted word in this RAM memory area (limited to 240 words, @0x40220 to @0x4030F). • Workaround : • Create an MCMD (named “Reset ODBH”) which will overwrite the data in that location • Description : • EOA024 : Transition program • Length : 240 words • Procedure ID : 40 (TBC) • Filled with : 117 “NOP” instructions (0x8000 0x0000) • Create a procedure allowing to execute systematically (at the end of each SVL visibility), thanks to the mission queue, the “Reset OBDH” • The idea is to systematically perform this workaround independently of the SEU Error detection in that area • The maximum time when the instrument could be subject to that anomaly will be limited to one orbit Extract from TRB

  24. AR’s and NCR’s CNES considers that AR’s and NCR’s could be proposed to closure and there is no technical point which prevents to start the Cal/Val Phase Extract from TRB

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