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Pretty-Bad-Proxy: An Overlooked Adversary in Browsers’ HTTPS Deployments . Shuo Chen † , Ziqing Mao † ‡ , Yi-Min Wang † , Ming Zhang † † Microsoft Research ‡ Purdue University May 20 th , 2009. HTTPS and Its Adversary Assumption.

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Pretty bad proxy an overlooked adversary in browsers https deployments l.jpg

Pretty-Bad-Proxy: An Overlooked Adversary in Browsers’ HTTPS Deployments

Shuo Chen†, Ziqing Mao† ‡, Yi-Min Wang†, Ming Zhang†

†Microsoft Research ‡Purdue University

May 20th, 2009


Https and its adversary assumption l.jpg
HTTPS and Its Adversary Assumption HTTPS Deployments

  • HTTPS: end-to-end secure protocol for web traffic.

    • Adversary assumption: MITM (man-in-the-middle).

HTTPS server

proxy

browser

Internet

SSL tunnel

  • Are today’s browser implementations consistent with this assumption?


Our research l.jpg
Our research HTTPS Deployments

  • Key finding

    • A class of browser vulnerabilities (demo)  proxy can defeat end-to-end security promised by HTTPS

    • Vulnerabilities exist in all major browsers

  • Industry outreach

    • Technical work finished in summer 2007

    • Paper withheld until this conference

    • Worked with all vendors to address the issues


The pretty bad proxy pbp adversary l.jpg
The Pretty-Bad-Proxy (PBP) adversary HTTPS Deployments

Browser

PBP

HTTPS server

Rendering modules

HTTP/HTTPS

HTTP/HTTPS

Unencrypted

TCP/IP

TCP/IP

SSL tunnel, encrypted


Attacks in this talk l.jpg
Attacks in this talk HTTPS Deployments

  • Key issue: browsers load unencrypted content from proxy in the HTTPS context of the victim server

    • Attack 1: Proxy’s error response

    • Attack 2: Proxy’s redirection

    • Attack 3: HTTP-intended pages that are HTTPS loadable

    • Attack 4: Visual context (GUI behavior, no script)


Attack 1 error response l.jpg
Attack 1: error response HTTPS Deployments

  • Proxy’s error page: e.g., 502-server-not-found, other 4xx/5xx response;

  • Script in error page runs in https://bank.com.

Bank

server

browser

PBP

<iframe src=

“https://bank.com”>

https://bank.com

502:Server not found

https://bank.com


Attack 2 redirection 3xx l.jpg
Attack 2: redirection (3xx) HTTPS Deployments

<script src=“https://js. bank.com/foo.js”>

bank.com server

browser

PBP

https://bank.com

https://js.bank.com

evil.com server

https://evil.com

HTTP 302: redirection

to https://evil.com

Script will run in the context of https://bank.com


Attack 3 http intended but https loadable pages hpihsl pages l.jpg
Attack 3: HTTP-Intended-But-HTTPS-Loadable Pages HTTPS Deployments (HPIHSL pages)

  • Many websites provide both HTTP and HTTPS services

    • Sensitive pages, e.g. checkout  HTTPS only

    • Non-sensitive pages, e.g., merchandise  Intended for HTTP access

    • However, non-sensitive pages are often accessible through HTTPS as well!.

  • What’s wrong with HPIHSL pages?

    • They often import scripts through HTTP

    • The scripts will run in the HTTPS context.

sensitive

Non-sensitive

HPIHSL

HTTP scripts


Attack 3 continued l.jpg
Attack 3 continued HTTPS Deployments

  • Browsers warn about HTTP resource in HTTPS contexts, don’t they?

  • The detection logic is only to determine the address bar’s appearance

    • Address bar only concerns top level page, so …


Bypassing the detection logic attack 3 cont l.jpg
Bypassing the detection logic (attack 3 cont.) HTTPS Deployments

  • Using an HTTPS iframe in an HTTP top level page.

Top level: HTTP

Attack script to run in the HTTPS context

Hidden iframe: HTTPS for an HPIHSL page

http://resources.jcpenny.com/foo.js


How pervasive attack 3 cont l.jpg
How pervasive? (attack 3 cont.) HTTPS Deployments

  • Very easy to find HPIHSL pages that import scripts

  • The paper shows 12 websites having this problem.

    • These HTTPS domains are not trustworthy.

    • They cover a wide range

      • Online shopping sites

      • Banks, credit card companies

      • Open source projects management site

      • Top computer science departments

      • Even the home domain of a leading certificate authority


Attack 4 visual context l.jpg
Attack 4: Visual context HTTPS Deployments

  • In attack 1, script in proxy’s error page runs in the HTTPS context. (all browsers)

  • This attack

    • No script, only static HTML

    • Due to GUI behavior

      • IE, Opera and Chrome display a certificate on the GUI as long as it is in the certificate cache.


Attack 4 continued l.jpg
Attack 4 continued HTTPS Deployments

  • A perfect GUI spoofing attack

    • Fresh browser, single tab, address bar input

Schedule a one-second timer for refreshing the page.

<head>

<meta HTTP-EQUIV=“Refresh” CONTENT=“1; URL=https://www.paypal.com”>

</head>

Before the timer is expired, cache a PayPal certificate

<img src=“https://www.paypal.com/a.jpg” style=“display:none”>

a response page

Get a.jpg from the real server

the phishing page (5xx)


Feasibility of exploitations l.jpg
Feasibility of Exploitations HTTPS Deployments


Threat level 1 when the proxy is malicious l.jpg
Threat level 1: when the proxy is malicious HTTPS Deployments

  • Proxies are used in many environments

    • Corporate and university networks

    • Hospitals, hotels

    • Third-party free proxies

  • Due to PBP issues, security of HTTPS communication depends on proxy’s integrity

    • Is proxy infected by viruses, hijacked by attackers or configured by malicious insiders?


Threat level 2 even without a compromised proxy l.jpg
Threat level 2: even without a compromised proxy HTTPS Deployments

  • All these attacks work as long as

    (1) Attacker can sniff your machine at the link layer

    • For HTTPS, you need to assume this.

      (2) The browser has its proxy capability ON

WPAD: Web Proxy Auto Discovery

PAC script: Proxy Auto Config script

Manual configuration


Attack tests l.jpg
Attack tests HTTPS Deployments

  • Our test bed

    • Proxy required for web traffic to the Internet

    • WPAD (default), PAC-script-config or manual-config

    • Tested on Ethernet

    • Tested on open wireless network

GET /wpad.dat

GET /wpad.dat

return goodProxy_cfg

return PBP_cfg

attacker


Vulnerability status more recent than the camera ready version l.jpg
Vulnerability status HTTPS Deployments (more recent than the camera-ready version)

Besides point fixes, how can we systematically prevent (or find) these bugs?

Future PBP issues


Mitigations by securing the network l.jpg
Mitigations by securing the network HTTPS Deployments

  • Not a fundamental “solution”

    • HTTPS security should not depend on the network.

    • However, it is worthwhile to have mitigations

      • Some issues not patched

      • New issues found in the future

  • Mitigations

    • Wireless router: use WPA (WiFi Protected Access)

    • Corporate network: deploy IPSec on many types of servers

      • Not only web servers, but DNS, DHCP, PAC servers

    • Travelling employees: secure-VPN to your corporate networks


Conclusions and future work l.jpg

Rendering modules HTTPS Deployments

Conclusions and Future Work

HTTP/HTTPS

  • The PBP adversary

    • Targeting the rendering modules

    • Encrypted/unencrypted contents confused

TCP/IP

  • Developers of rendering modules need to deal with MITM

  • HTTPS layer not masking MITM for rendering modules.

  • Beyond HTTPS

    • Other end-to-end protocols: Kerberos, IPSec, etc

    • E.g., HTTP over IPSec, using Kerberos authentication

      • What do you want to achieve if a proxy is in between?


  • Potential misinterpretations l.jpg
    Potential misinterpretations HTTPS Deployments

    • HTTPS is flawed.

    • We argue that many proxies are not secure enough to tunnel HTTPS.

    • We advocate link layer security.

    • In addition to browser issues, we also show issues in WPAD, etc.


    Advertising l.jpg
    Advertising HTTPS Deployments

    OCCUR: Open Chronologist for

    Currently Undisclosed Research

    • A free web service for timestamping research ideas

      • Why: some research contributions cannot be published immediately, e.g., due to responsible disclosure policy.

      • What: OCCUR gives your idea a timestamp from VeriSign

      • Details: search for “Microsoft OCCUR” or ask me offline

    http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/occur/