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Freedom of the Press in Russia

Freedom of the Press in Russia. The Neglect of Constitutional Rights Laura DeMaria SIS 644: Summer 2013 Venturelli School of International Service. Introduction. Written as a representative of the International Democratic Institute for the USAID Bureau for Europe and Asia

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Freedom of the Press in Russia

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  1. Freedom of the Press in Russia The Neglect of Constitutional Rights Laura DeMaria SIS 644: Summer 2013 Venturelli School of International Service

  2. Introduction • Written as a representative of the International Democratic Institute for the USAID Bureau for Europe and Asia • Overall findings: under Putin, censorship, punishment and control have increased and press freedom has decreased • Utilize present-day academic articles, books, theories and expert opinions to analyze the Constitution and its enforcement

  3. Russia’s policy document: the Constitution Chapter 29, Article 2: 1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of ideas and speech. 4. Everyone shall have the right to freely look for, receive, transmit, produce and distribute information by any legal way. The list of data comprising state secrets shall be determined by a federal law. 5. The freedom of mass communication shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be banned. This reflects a Liberal Model framework – places emphasis on the free flow of information and a right to negative free speech, unfettered by state control.

  4. The reality of enforcement • More closely resembles a Nationalist-Cultural model • The state often determines what is and is not permissible • Presence of extensive state regulation • National collective identity taking precedence over individual rights • A sense that the function of the public sphere and social communication is the preservation and furtherance of the national interest

  5. Policy Analysis: In Brief • Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders have performed extensive research via their Freedom of the Press Reports, etc. • “Russian law contains a broad definition of extremism that authorities frequently use to silence government critics, including journalists; the enforcement of this and other restrictive legal provisions has encouraged self-censorship” • Expulsion of USAID from Russia • “Opposition protests on an unprecedented scale” • The state owns, either directly or indirectly, all six national TV networks, two national radio networks, two of the 14 national newspapers, more than 60% of all registered newspapers and two national news agencies • Large gap between presumed goals (freedom) and actual implementation

  6. Expert Analysis • Media is not viewed as a means for the transmission of information and enlightenment, but rather, an extension of the ruling party and a tool for furthering its agenda – also for upholding control over the press ensures that, to the outside world, a certain appearance is maintained • Therefore, Russia must reconsider its approach to civil society • Venturelli: if “public policy fails to address the content of public space, citizens cannot build better foundations for their opinions or their life plans, or for institutions and norms of their society, and thus cannot be said to enjoy freedom.”

  7. Expert Analysis, cont’d • Freedman: the purpose of a public broadcasting system is to “compensate for the tendency of markets to under-serve minority audiences and to produce powerful private monopolies or oligopolies in the media value chain.” • Instead, Russia uses the public airwaves to control the public conversations and set the tone for what is and is not acceptable communication – a monopoly is created

  8. Expert Analysis, cont’d • Talero: National Information Infrastructures (NII) should be harnessed to fight poverty, reduce isolation in rural areas, educate more people, make governments more efficient and accountable and effect an assortment of related areas which are critical in the development of a new nation • But again, Putin and the regime utilize these systems not to the advancement of the people, culture or economic standing, but as a means of furthering mechanisms of control

  9. Expert Analysis, cont’d • Soft power: a nation’s ability to “get its way through attraction and persuasion,” through three main sources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policies (Zhang/Nye) • Putin actively develops the nation’s soft culture initiatives in his own brand of “sovereign democracy” • “The rule of law, protection of minorities, a free press, a viable political opposition, or legally guaranteed property rights are not part of the reality” (Popescu)

  10. Recommendations • Recognize the laws, as written in the Constitution, which serve to protect the freedom of the press and speech, and establish the rule of law • Open back up to organizations like USAID, which serve as watchdogs, both to better ensure compliance with human rights initiatives, and to generate a more positive global image for Russia • Actively pursue partnerships with those nations who do place an emphasis on the necessity of a free press

  11. Conclusion • Russia’s policies serve to create a national identity, both at home and abroad • Future research must continue to expose the hypocrisy of Russia’s policies and their enforcement and shine a light on the true nature of the freedom of the press in Russia while calling for its reform • Otherwise, this will undoubtedly create further tension in the international community, particularly from the West, as Putin’s need for control turns outward to the nations he views as a threat to his greater aims

  12. Sources • Freedman, Des. The Politics of Media Policy. Polity. (Retrieved from Blackboard) • Freedom House. “Freedom of the Press 2013.” (2012, 1-4). Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Russia%20FOTP%202013%20final%20draft.pdf • Freedom House. “Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians.” (2009, June, 1-17). Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/russia.pdf • Lipman, Maria. “Russia’s Media: Freedom of Expression, but not Press Freedom.” (2010). Journal of International Affairs (63:2, 529-534). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/276371430?accountid=8285 • Popescu, Nico. “Russia politics: Russia's soft power ambitions.” (2006, Nov 2). New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/466605015?accountid=8285 • Reporters Without Borders. “Freedom of the Press Index.” (2013, 1-26). Retrieved from http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf • “Senior diplomat says "soft power" promotes Russia's policies abroad.” (2012, Oct 31). BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1121916071?accountid=8285 • Talero, Eduardo. National Information Infrastructure Initiatives: “National Information Infrastructure in Developing Economies.” Retrieved from Blackboard. • The Constitution of Russia, adopted 1993, retrieved from http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm • Venturelli, Shalini. Liberalizing the European Media. Chapters retrieved from Blackboard. • Zhang, Weihong. “China’s cultural future: froms oft power to comprehensive national power.” (4 Nov 2010) International Journal of Cultural Policy (16:4, 383-402).

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