1 / 21

Modelling Privacy for Off-line RFID Systems

This paper presents a comprehensive model for off-line RFID systems that addresses the critical issue of reader corruption. It discusses current RFID privacy models and introduces innovative forward privacy and self-stabilizing backward privacy protocols. By analyzing the complexities of real-world systems, it emphasizes the importance of secure connections and provides insights into achieving privacy even in the presence of adversaries. Key conclusions highlight the resilience of these protocols and their reliance on hash functions to improve synchronization and overall system security.

asa
Download Presentation

Modelling Privacy for Off-line RFID Systems

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Modelling Privacy for Off-line RFID Systems FlavioGarcia Radboud University Nijmegen together with Peter van Rossum RFIDSec 2009

  2. Outline • Current RFID privacy models • A new model for off-line RFID systems that considers reader corruption • Forward and self-stabilizing backwards privacy • Protocols • Conclusions

  3. RFID Systems

  4. Current RFID Models Permanent secure connexion Fwd-Privacy • Juels and Weis (2006) • Vaudenay (2007) • Avoine (2005)

  5. Fwd-Privacy Time Safe Un-Safe

  6. Narrow-FWD Private protocol [OSK03]

  7. Many real systems are more complex What kind of security can still be guaranteed? Periodic connexion More information on the readers

  8. Consider off-line systems where readers can be compromised

  9. An adversary is a PPTA with access to the set of oracles O: • CreateReader(R) • CreateTag(T) • Launch(R) • Send(m,A) • Result() • CorruptTag(T) • Sync() O+ = O  {DestroyReader(R)}

  10. Fwd and Bwd-Privacy Safe Un-Safe Safe Unachievable! (Unless extra assumptions are made)

  11. Forward privacy

  12. Self-stabilizing backwards privacy

  13. Forward and Self-stabilizing Backwards Private Protocol (idea) new day! BO K ← h(k) K ← h(k) K ← h(k’+1) K’ ← h(k’) K to `talk’ with the reader K’ to `talk’ with the BO MAC using k’

  14. Forward and Self-stabilizing Backwards Private Protocol

  15. Forward and Self-stabilizing Backwards Private Protocol

  16. Improving synchronization

  17. Improving synchronization

  18. What to do

  19. Conclusions • model for (off-line) RFID systems in the presence of reader corruption • forward and self-stabilizing backwards private protocols that uses only hash functions. • De-sync resilience

More Related